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udicial District Court Kootenai Cou User: LEU 
ROA Report 
Case: 5-0001406 Current Judge: John T Mitchell 


























New Case Filed - Other Claims John T. Mitchell 
Filing: AA- All initial civil case filings in District John T. Mitchell 
Court of any type not listed in categories E, F and 
H(1) Paid by: Frantz, Jonathon (attorney for 
Frantz, Martin) Receipt number: 0006441 
Dated: 2/20/2015 Amount: $221.00 (Check) For: 
Frantz, Martin (plaintiff) 
Complaint and Jury Demand John T. Mitchell 
Summons Issued John T. Mitchell 
Miscellaneous Payment: For Making Copy Of John T. Mitchell 
Any File Or Record By The Clerk, Per Page Paid 
by: Christy Davenport Receipt number: 0006950 
Dated: 2/25/2015 Amount: $9.00 {E-payment) 
Motion for Pro Hae Vice - Jefferey Katz John T. Mitchell 
Affidavit of John C Riseborough John T. Mitchell 
Objection To Motion For Pro Hae Vice Admission John T. Mitchell 
Affidavit Of John F. Kurtz, Jr. John T. Mitchell 
Notice Of Appearance - John Riseborough obo John T. Mitchell 
Hawley Troxell 
Filing: 11 - Initial Appearance by persons other John T. Mitchell 
than the plaintiff or petitioner Paid by: John 
Riseborough Receipt number: 0017334 Dated: 
5/5/2015 Amount: $136.00 (E-payment) For: 
Troxell, Hawley (defendant) 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion 06/09/2015 02:30 John T. Mitchell 
PM) Pro Hae Vice; Frantz 
Affidavit Of John C Riseborough John T. Mitchell 
Notice Of Hearing Motion To Dismiss Or Abate John T. Mitchell 
With Oral Argument On A Date To Be 
Determined By The Judge 
Motion To Dismiss Or Abate With Oral Argument John T. Mitchell 
Memorandum Of Points And Authorities In 
Support Of Motion To Dismiss Or Abate 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion to Dismiss 
06/30/2015 02:30 PM) Risenbrough 
John T. Mitchell 
John T. Mitchell 
Answer of Defendant Hawley Troxell Ennis and John T. Mitchell 
Hawley LLP 
Amended Note for Hearing Motion to Dismiss or John T. Mitchell 
Abate With Oral Argument 
Sent to Judge for Review 
Hearing Scheduled (Scheduling Conference 
06/09/2015 02:30 PM) RE: Set Date for Trial 
Notice of Hearing 
John T. Mitchell 
John T. Mitchell 





































udicial District Court· Kootenai Co User: LEU 
5-0001406 Current Judge: John T. Mitchell 

























Hearing Scheduled (Scheduling Conference 
06/30/2015 02:30 PM) RE: Set Date for Trial 
Judge 
John T. Mitchell 
Hearing result for Scheduling Conference John T. Mitchell 
scheduled on 06/09/2015 02:30 PM: Continued 
RE: Set Date for Trial 
AMENDED Notice of Hearing 
Amended Answer Of Defendant Hawley Troxell 
Ennis & Hawley, LLP 
New File Created---#2----CREATED 
Response to Objection to Motion for Pro Hae 
Vice Admission 
Declaration of Jonathon Frantz 
Objection to Affidavit of John F Kurtz 
Objection to Affidavit of John C Riseborough 
Notice Of Hearing 
Hearing result for Motion to Dismiss scheduled 
on 06/30/2015 02:30 PM: Hearing Vacated 
Risenbrough 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion to Dismiss 
07/28/2015 04:00 PM) Riseborough; 1 hour 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion 06/30/2015 02:30 
PM) Pro Hae Vice; Frantz 
Hearing result for Motion scheduled on 
06/09/2015 02:30 PM: Hearing Vacated Pro 
Hae Vice; Frantz 
Amended Notice Of Hearing 
John T. Mitchell 
John T. Mitchell 
John T. Mitchell 
John T. Mitchell 
John T. Mitchell 
John T. Mitchell 
John T. Mitchell 
John T. Mitchell 
John T. Mitchell 
John T. Mitchell 
John T. Mitchell 
John T. Mitchell 
John T. Mitchell 
Second Amended Note For Hearing Motion To John T. Mitchell 
Dismiss Or Abate (1.R.C.P. 12(8)(8)) With Ora! 
Argument 
Affidavit Of John C. Riseborough John T. Mitchell 
Affidavit Of Jack Gustave! John T. Mitchell 
Reply Re Objection To Motion For Pro Hae Vice John T. Mitchell 
Admission 
Objection or Motion to Strike Reply Re Objection John T. Mitchell 
to Motion For Pro Hae Vice Admission 
Objection to Affidavit of John C Riseborough and John T. Mitchell 
Affidavit of Jack Gustave! 
Objection or Motion to Strike Reply RE: John T. Mitchell 
Objection to Motion for Pro Hae Vice Admission 
Hearing result for Motion to Dismiss scheduled John T. Mitchell 
on 07/28/2015 04:00 PM: District Court Hearing 
Held 




































udicial District Court Kootenai Cou User: LEU 
ROA Report 
Case: 5-0001406 Current Judge: John Mitchell 





















Hearing Scheduled (Motion 07/28/2015 04:00 John T. Mitchell 
PM) Admission Mr. Katz Pro Hae Vice; Frantz 
Hearing result for Motion scheduled on John T. Mitchell 
06/30/2015 02:30 PM: District Court Hearing He! 
Court Reporter: JULIE FOLAND 
Hearing result for Scheduling Conference 
scheduled on 06/30/2015 02:30 PM: District 
Court Hearing Held 
Court Reporter: JULIE FOLAND 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion to Dismiss 
07/28/2015 04:00 PM) 1 Hour; Riseborough 
Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial Scheduled 
05/09/2016 09:00 AM) 5 DAYS 
Scheduling Order, Notice of Trial Setting and 
Initial Pretrial Order 
Second Amended Notice Of Hearing 
Frantz's Brief in Support of Motion for Pro hac 
Vice Admission 
John T. Mitchell 
John T. Mitchell 
John T. Mitchell 
John T. Mitchell 
John T. Mitchell 
John T. Mitchell 
Declaration of Jeffrey Katz in Support of Motion John T. Mitchell 
for Pro Hae Vice Admission 
Declaration of Jonathon Frantz in Support of John T. Mitchell 
Motion for Pro Hae Vice Admission 
Response to Hawley Troxell Ennis and Hawley, John T. Mitchell 
LLP's Motion to Dismiss or Abate IRCP 12(8)(8) 
Declaration of Jonathon Frantz in Support of John T. Mitchell 
Response to Hawley Troxell Ennis and Hawley 
LLP's Motion to Dismiss or Abate IRCP 12(8) (8) 
Response of Defendant Re: Pro Hae Vice John T. Mitchell 
Objection 
Defendant's Reply RE Dismissal/Abate John T. Mitchell 
Plaintiffs Reply re: Motion For Pro Hae Vice John T. Mitchell 
Admission 
Hearing result for Motion to Dismiss scheduled John T. Mitchell 
on 07/28/2015 04:00 PM: District Court Hearing 
Held 
Court Reporter: JULIE FOLAND 
Hearing result for Motion scheduled on John T. Mitchell 
07/28/2015 04:00 PM: District Court Hearing He! 
Court Reporter: JULIE FOLAND 
Memorandum Decision and Order Granting John T. Mitchell 
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss or Abate, and 
Order Denying Plaintiffs Motion for Pro Hae Vice 
Admission 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion 09/17/2015 02:30 John T. Mitchell 






























udicial District Court Kootenai Cou 
ROA 
User: LEU 
CV-2015-0001406 Current John T. Mitchell 
Martin D 
User 
CLEVELAND Defendant's Brief in Support of Award of Costs, John T. Mitchell 
Including Reasonable Attorney Fees 
CLEVELAND Affidavit of Counsel in Support of Defendant's John T. Mitchell 
Memorandum of Costs Including Attorney Fees 
CLEVELAND Memorandum of Costs Including Attorney Fees John T. Mitchell 
CLEVELAND Motion for an Award of Attorney's Fees John T. Mitchell 
CLEVELAND Note for Hearing Motion for Award of Attorney's John T. Mitchell 
Fees (September 17, 2015 at 2:30 PM) With Oral 
Argument - John C. Riseborough 
CLAUSEN Hearing result for Jury Trial Scheduled scheduled John T. Mitchell 
on 05/09/2016 09:00 AM: Hearing Vacated 5 
DAYS 
WOOSLEY Civil Disposition entered for: Troxell, Hawley, John T. Mitchell 
Defendant; Frantz, Martin D, Plaintiff. Filing date: 
8/10/2015 
WOOSLEY Judgment John T. Mitchell 
WOOSLEY Case status changed: Closed pending clerk John T. Mitchell 
action 
MMILLER Motion For Enlargment of Time John T. Mitchell 
BRADY Defendant's Response Re: Enlargement Of Time John T. Mitchell 
DEGLMAN Objection to Motion For an Award of Attorney's John T. Mitchell 
Fees 
LEU New File Created--#3----CREATED John T. Mitchell 
ANGLIN Motion to Seal and Motion to Strike Declaration of John T. Mitchell 
Martin Frantz 
ANGLIN Notice For Hearing Motion to Strike and Motion to John T. Mitchel! 
Seal Declaration of Martin Frantz 
ANGLIN Affidavit of John C Riseborough in Support of John T. Mitchell 
Motion to Seal 
ANGLIN Memorandum Of Authorities John T. Mitchell 
CLAUSEN Hearing Scheduled (Motion 09/17/2015 02:30 John T. Mitchell 
PM) Seal & Strike Declaration; Riseborough 
JLEIGH Amended Notice Of Hearing Motion To Strike and John T. Mitchell 
motion To Seal Declaration Of Martin Frantz 
JLEIGH Declaration Of Jack Gustave! In Support Of John T. Mitchell 
Motion To Seal 
CLEVELAND Declaration of Jonathon Frantz in Support of John T. Mitchell 
Objection to Motion to Seal and Strike 
CLEVELAND Objection to Motion to Seal, and Objection to John T. Mitchell 
Strike 
HUFFMAN Reply of Defendant Re Motion to Seal and Strike John T. Mitchell 
HUFFMAN Response of Defendant HTEH to Plaintiff's John T. Mitchell 
Date: 1 
Time: 





























udicial District Court Kootenai Cou 
ROA 
5-0001406 Current John T. Mitchell 
User: 
Martin D Frantz 
& 
CLAUSEN Hearing result for Motion scheduled on John T. Mitchell 
09/17/2015 02:30 PM: District Court Hearing Hel 
Court Reporter: JULIE FOLAND 
MOTION GRANTED 
CLAUSEN Hearing result for Motion scheduled on John T Mitchell 
09/17/2015 02:30 PM: District Court Hearing Hel 
Court Reporter: JULIE FOLAND 
MOTION GRANTED 
CLEVELAND Filing: L4 - Appeal, Civil appeal or cross-appeal John T. Mitchell 
to Supreme Court Paid by: Frantz, Jonathon 
(attorney for Frantz, Martin D) Receipt number: 
0035987 Dated: 9/21/2015 Amount: $129.00 
(Check) For: Frantz, Martin D (plaintiff) 
CLEVELAND Bond Posted - Cash (Receipt 35989 Dated John T. Mitchell 














Appeal Filed In District Court 
Bond Posted - Cash (Receipt 36646 Dated 
9/25/2015 for 200.00) 
Notice of Supplement of Appeal to show 
estimated transcript fee paid 
Return Certificate #7014 1200 0001 4474 8704 
09/25/15 
Request For Additional Clerk's Records 
Order On Motion To Seal And To Strike 
John T. Mitchell 
John T. Mitchell 
John T. Mitchell 
John T. Mitchell 
John T. Mitchell 
John T. Mitchell 
Civil Disposition entered for: Hawley Troxell John T. Mitchell 
Ennis & Hawley LLP, Defendant; Frantz, Martin 
D, Plaintiff. Filing date: 10/13/2015 
Judgment John T. Mitcheil 
Case status changed: Closed pending clerk John T. Mitchell 
action 
Bond Posted - Cash (Receipt 39387 Dated 
10/19/2015 for 28.75) 
Notice of Lodging Transcript 
John T. Mitchell 
John T. Mitchell 
Bond Converted (Transaction number 1955 dated John T. Mitchell 
10/21/2015 amount 182.00) 




ISB No. 9129 
Attorney for Piaintiff, Martin Frantz 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF 




HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY 
LLP, an Idaho Limited Liability Partnership, 
Defendant. 
Case No.: ---~s __ f L{ O (~ 
COMPLAINT AND JURY DEMAND 
Category: IA Cost: $221.00 
COMES NOW the Plaintiff, MARTIN FRANTZ ("Frantz"), by and through his attorney 
of record, Jonathon Frantz of Frantz Law, PLLC and for a cause of action against the Defendant, 
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP ("Hawley Troxell") alleges and complains as 
follows: 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
1. This is an action sounding in legal malpractice against Defendant Hawley Troxell arising 
from Defendant's adverse representation against Plaintiff and/or for the use of Plaintiff's 
confidential financial information while representing a party adverse to Plaintiff in bankruptcy 
proceedings from Defendant's prior representation of Plaintiff in unrelated proceedings. 
COMPLAINT AND JURY DEMAND- Pg. 1 JOHN T. MITCHELL 
was Mr. 
to the purchase of property by one of Mr. Frantz's business entities in order to prepare a preliminary 
report for trial. 
3. Mr. Frantz filed for bankruptcy in October of 2011, and Defendant represented one of the 
creditors in the proceedings. During the bankruptcy proceedings, Defendant filed a motion seeking 
a finding that their client's claim against Mr. Frantz was not dischargeable in bankruptcy due to Mr. 
Frantz's allegedly fraudulent reporting of the value of his assets. This claim was substantially 
related to Defendant's knowledge of Plaintiff's financials from the earlier, unrelated proceedings in 
direct violation ofldaho Rule of Professional Conduct 1.9(c). 
4. Additionally, as a result of Defendant's professional negligence, Mr. Frantz has lost an 
amount in excess of $10,000 in attorney fees paid to Defendant Hawley Troxell and an additional 
amount in excess of $10,000 in attorney fees to seek removal of Hawley Troxell based on this 
conflict of interest as counsel in related proceedings as well as other sums to be proven at trial. 
PARTIES 
5. Plaintiff, Martin D. Frantz, currently resides in Kootenai County, Idaho. 
6. Defendant Hawley Troxell is a law firm with its principal office located at 877 W Main 
Street, Suite I 000, Boise, Idaho 83702. 
JURISDICTION AND VENUE 
7. The events that form the basis of this complaint occurred in Kootenai County, Idaho 
8. Jurisdiction and venue are proper pursuant to LC. §5-404 because IIB is an Idaho entity 
and the cause of action arose in Kootenai County. 
COMPLAINT AND JURY DEMAND- Pg. 2 
ALLEGATIONS 
an 
assisted living facility in Lewiston, Idaho. Several years later, Mr. Frantz discovered what he 
believed to be fraud on the part of the seller and commenced litigation against the seller. During the 
course of this suit, Mr. Frantz discovered that the real estate agent involved with the sale had 
colluded with the seller in the fraud against Mr. Frantz. Mr. Frantz's counsel initially refused to join 
the real estate agent to the suit. By the time counsel joined the real estate agent in the suit, the 
statute oflimitations had passed, and Mr. Frantz lost on his claims against both the seller and the 
real estate agent. 
10. Mr. Frantz then commenced a malpractice action against his attorney for loss of the claim 
against the real estate agent. In order to prove damages, Mr. Frantz hired Merlyn Clark ("Clark"), a 
partner at Hawley Troxell, to provide consultation and expert testimony on the matter. 
11. At this time, Mr. Frantz was not aware of Clark's affiliation with Defendant 
12. Clark reviewed the record in the fraud case, which included documents regarding 
financial information for Mr. Frantz's business entity and the purchase ofland itself. Clark prepared 
a 21-page prel:inlinary report detailing his findings and opinion on the issue of damages in the fraud 
case. Clark also provided oral advice on the matter. 
13. On May 26, 2009, Mr. Frantz paid Hawley Troxell's bill for Clark's services in the case, 
which included reviewing documents, preparing the report, and providing advice. 
14. Mr. Frantz eventually settled the malpractice claim. 
COMPLAINT AND JURY DEMAND- Pg. 3 
1 
Ridge"). 
16. IIB required Mr. Frantz to submit several financial statements regarding Mr. Frantz's 
assets and financial status to IIB . 
. 
17. The relationship between Mr. Frantz and IIB eventually deteriorated to the point where 
IIB commenced litigation against Mr. Frantz. 
18. In or around June 2010, IIB retained Defendant to pursue a claim against Mr. Frantz for 
failure to pay a loan in full that had matured. The parties attempted to reach a settlement on the 
matter but could not. 
19. While IIB's claim against Mr. Frantz was still pending, in or around October 2011, Mr. 
Frantz filed for bankruptcy. 
20. Defendant continued to represent IIB as a creditor in Mr. Frantz's bankruptcy 
proceedings, and IIB filed a $6,400,000.00 claim against Mr. Frantz's bankruptcy estate. 
21. During the bankruptcy proceeding, Mr. Frantz discovered that Defendant represented 
TriGeo, a company in which Mr. Frantz owned a small interest. As a result, Mr. Frantz opposed 
Defendant's representation of IIB in the bankruptcy proceeding based on a conflict of interest. The 
parties later stipulated that Defendant's representation of Tri Geo did not result in a conflict of 
interest. 
22. Shortly thereafter, Defendant filed a motion in the bankruptcy proceeding requesting a 
finding that IIB's claim against Mr. Frantz was not dischargeable in bankruptcy. The basis of this 
motion was that Mr. Frantz was fraudulent in reporting the values of his assets in his financial 
statements to IIB. 
COMPLAINT AND JURY DEMAND- Pg. 4 
24. In or around August 2014, Mr. Frantz became aware of Clark's affiliation with Defendant 
a..11d the substantial conflict of interest that it created with regard to Defendant's representation of 
IIB in the bankruptcy proceeding. 
25. As a result of Defendant's use of information relating to Defendant's prior representation 
of Mr. Frantz to Mr. Frantz's disadvantage in the current proceedings, Mr. Frantz immediately 
began to pursue disqualification of Defendant from representing IIB in the bankruptcy proceeding 
as well as other proceedings in which Mr. Frantz's financial status was a significant issue. 
COUNT I- LEGAL MALPRACTICE 
26. Mr. Frantz re-alleges and incorporates by reference Paragraphs 1-25 as and for Paragraph 
26 of Count I as though fully set forth herein. 
27. An attorney-client relationship existed between Mr. Frantz and Defendant Hawley 
Troxell starting on or about December of 2008 lasting through about May of 2009. 
28. As Mr. Frantz's prior attorneys, Defendant Hawley Troxell was required to act within the 
standard of care, including a duty to Mr. Frantz to not use information related to their prior 
representation of Mr. Frantz to Mr. Frantz's disadvantage. 
29. Defendant Hawley Troxell breached the standard of care to their former client Mr. Frantz 
in the underlying matter by: 
a. Representing IIB, a party with materially adverse interests to Mr. Frantz, in 
litigation and bankruptcy proceedings that are substantially related to the 
matter in which Defendant represented Mr. Frantz; 
COMPLAINT AND JURY DEMAND- Pg. 5 
screen out 
with the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct; 
d. Using information related to Hawley Troxell's representation oflv1r. Frantz to 
Mr. Frantz's disadvantage in the bankruptcy proceeding by claiming that Mr. 
Frantz' s financial statements were fraudulent; 
e. Otherwise acting in a negligent and careless manner. 
30. Hawley Troxell was negligent by failing to screen out Merlyn Clark and notify Mr. 
Frantz of the potential conflict of interest, which ultimately led to Mr. Frantz being deprived of his 
ability to address the conflict and timely seek removal of Defendant from the ongoing proceedings 
in which they are involved. 
31. Hawley Troxell violated their duty to Mr. Frantz by using the information related to their 
representation of Mr. Frantz against Mr. Frantz and to Mr. Frantz's disadvantage by claiming that 
Mr. Frantz's financial statements were fraudulent in ongoing proceedings. 
32. Had Hawley Troxell acted as competent counsel and within the standard of care by 
properly scree11ing Merlyn Clark from the bankruptcy proceedings and/or notifying Mr. Frantz of 
the apparent conflict, Mr. Frantz would have had the opportunity to timely seek removal of 
Defendant from the ongoing proceedings in which they are involved as well as prevent Defendant 
from asserting claims directly contrary to Mr. Frantz's interests based on improperly gained 
information. 
33. But for the professional negligence of Defendant Hawley Troxell, Mr. Frantz would have 
been able to discharge IIB 's claim against him in the ban.r..ruptcy proceeding and he would not have 
COMPLAINT AND JURY DEMAND- Pg. 6 
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valueless, requiring disgorgement of all legal fees paid by Mr. Frantz to them and 
withdrawal of any pending fee requests. 
COUNT II- BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY 
35. Mr. Frantz re-alleges and incorporates by reference Paragraphs 1-25 as and for Paragraph 
3 5 of Count II as though fully set forth herein. 
36. At all times relevant to the Complaint, an attorney-client relationship existed between 
Defendant and Mr. Frantz. 
37. As Mr. Frantz's attorneys, Defendant owed Mr. Frantz the fiduciary duties of candor, 
honesty, loyalty, and good faith. 
38. Defendant breached those duties by: 
a. Representing IIB, a party with materially adverse interests to Mr. Frantz, in 
litigation and bankruptcy proceedings that are substantially related to the 
matter in which Defendant represented Mr. Frantz; 
b. Failing to give proper notice to Mr. Frantz of the conflicting representation; 
and 
c. Using information related to Hawley Troxell's representation of Mr. Frantz to 
Mr. Frantz's disadvantage in the bankruptcy proceeding by claiming that Mr. 
Frantz's financial statements were fraudulent. 
COMPLAINT AND JURY DEMAND- Pg. 7 
No. 
40. Defendant should have advised Mr. Frantz of the conflict before using information given 
to Defendant in its capacity as Mr. Frantz's fiduciary against him. 
41. Defendant should not have disclosed this information absent Mr. Frantz' s consent. 
42. Defendant violated its fiduciary duties to Mr. Frantz by using the information related to 
their representation of Mr. Frantz against Mr. Frantz and to Mr. Frantz's disadvantage by claiming 
that Mr. Frantz's financial statements were fraudulent in ongoing proceedings. 
43. Had Defendant complied with its fiduciary duties and notified Mr. Frantz of the apparent 
conflict, Mr. Frantz would have had the opportunity to timely seek removal of Defendant from the 
ongoing proceedings in which they are involved as well as prevent Defendant from asserting claims 
directly contrary to Mr. Frantz' s interests based on improperly gained information. 
44. But for the breach of the fiduciary duties by Defendant Hawley Troxell, Mr. Frantz 
would have been able to discharge IIB' s claim against him in the bankruptcy proceeding and he 
would not have incurred additional legal fees seeking removal of Defendant from the bankruptcy 
and other concurrent proceedings. 
45. The failure to discharge IIB's claims damaged Mr. Frantz. 
46. Additionally, as a result of the foregoing, Defendant Hawley Troxell rendered their legal 
services valueless, requiring disgorgement of all legal fees paid by Mr. Frantz to them and the 
withdrawal of any pending fee requests. 
DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL 
4 7. Pursuant to law, Mr. Frantz demands a on all so 
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PRAYER FOR RELIEF 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff Frantz prays that judgment be entered in its favor and against 
the Defendant as follows: 
A. A judgment in favor of Plaintiff Martin Frantz and against plaintiff Hawley 
Troxell for legal malpractice and/or breach of :fiduciary duty in an amount in excess of $10,000, 
but which amount will be proven at trial; 
B. For disgorgement of attorney fees and other fees in an amount in excess of 
$10,000, but which amount will be proven at trial; and 
C. For such other and further relief as the Court deems just, equitable, and proper 
under the circumstances. 
7 'ir- ~-r!J ),)(i u,.,,-,.. ~ ) 5 DATED THIS /{j day of _~Ll::~-" __ '""-~--' 20 _ . 
J FRANTZ LAW, PLLC 
\ / 
By: --+--='l"'--------1'-'r--
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Jonathon Frantz 
FRANTZ LAW, PLLC 
Lincoln St Suite 






1 North LaSalle, Suite 2100 
Chicago, IL 60602 
Ph: 312.223.1699 
Fx: 312.223.8549 
Ill. Bar No: 6283209 
+1ZMHZ623891 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF 




HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY 
LLP, an Idaho Limited Liability Partnership, 
Defendant. 
Case No.: CVIS-1406 
MOTION FOR PRO HAC VICE 
ADMISSION 
Pursuant to LB.C.R. 227, the undersigned counsel petition the court for admission of 
JEFFEREY KATZ, pro hac vice, in this case. 
JEFFEREY KATZ certifies that he is an active member in good standing, of the bar of 
Illinois, Kentucky and Wisconsin, that he maintains the regular practice of law at the above-
noted address, and that he is not a resident of the State of Idaho or licensed to practice in Idaho. 
JEFFEREY KATZ certifies that he has previously been admitted under LB.C.R 227 in the 
following matters: Vician v. Vician (Florida) Case No# 13 CV 694; Vician v. Vician (Florida) 14 
p. 
0 
Goldfarb (Ohio) CV13807692; Ramirez v. Higdon, et al. (Texas) 2013 CI 04823. 
Undersigned counsel certify that a copy of this motion has been served on all other 
parties in this case and that a copy of the motion, accompany by a $325 fee and a certificate of 
good standing, have been submitted to the Idaho State Bar. 
Counsel certifies that the above information is true to the best of their knowledge. 
JONATHON FRANTZ of FRANTZ LAW, PLLC acknowledges that his attendance shall be 
rr.qnirflrl 11t l'lll r.nnrt pmr.r1:rling,'i in whic.h JRFFRRF.Y K.A TZ appr.ar, 1.mlr:ss ,c;pr,r.ifir..ally ex:m1sed 
by the trial judge. 
DATED THIS JI!_ day of O'\atlfh , 2015. 
FRANTZ LAW, PLLC 
, ~ 
DATED THIS~ay of __ h_~_f"_~----' 2015. 
ADMISMON-~6101s 
p 
0 : 41 FAX 
RlSEBOROUGH, 
PAINE HAMBLEN LLP 
717 West Sprague Avenue Suite 1200 
Spokane, Washington 99201-3505 
Telephone: (509) 455-6000 
Facsimile: (509) 838-0007 
PAINE HAMBLEN LLP 
Attorney for Defendant Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley LLP 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
Tiffi STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
MARTIN FRANTZ, ) 
) Case No. CVlS-1406 
Plaintiff, ) 
~ 002/007 
) OBJECTION TO MOTION FOR PRO 
vs. ) HAC VICE ADMISSION 
) 
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY ) 
LLP, an Idaho Limited Liability Partnership, ) 
) 
Defendant. ) 
COMES NOW defendant Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley, LLP ("Hawley Troxell"), by 
and through their counsel, and object to the admission of Jeffrey Ogden Katz, pro hac vice, as 
. counsel for plaintiffs in this matter. Defendant has evidence that Mr. Katz violated the provisions 
of IRCP Rule 4.2. Mr. Katz made an unauthorized contact with defendant's client, Idaho 
Independent Bank ("IIB"), in connection with this action, at a time that Mr. Katz was fully aware 
that IIB was represented by Hawley Troxell. The basis for this objection is as follows: 
First, the motion is procedurally defective as, despite counsel's knowledge of the 
representation of defendant Hawley Troxell by this firm this action, the hac vice 
motion was not served on counsel, as required under the Rule. 
PRO 
15:41 FAX PAINE HAMBLEN 14]003/ 
Accordingly, the Court should decline to admit Mr. Katz pro hac vice, or condition such 
admission on an explanation by Mr. Katz of his conduct in communicating with a party known to 
be represented by counsel, confinnation from Mr. Katz that he has read the Idaho Rules of 
Professional Conduct and further a commitment by Mr. Katz that he will fully comply with those 
rules in his conduct in this action. 
DA TED thi~ l day of April, 2015. 
PAINE HAMBLEN LLP 
By: ~ /1 --
~Riseborough, ISB #7898 
Attorneys for Defendant 
0 15: 41 PAINE HA!ffiLEN LLP 
SERVICE 
on 
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Jonathon Frantz 
Frantz Law, :PLLC 
307 N. Lincoln St. Suite A 
Post Falls, Idaho 83815 
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true 
2/ 15:41 FAX PAINE HAt\IBLEN LLP 
JOHN RISEBOROUGH, #7898 
PAINE HAMBLEN LLP 
717 West Sprague Avenue Suite 1200 
Spokane, Washington 99201-3505 
Telephone: (509) 455-6000 
Facsimiie: (509) 838-0007 
Attorney for Defendant Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley LLP 
TN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST ruDICIAL DISTRICT OF 




HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY 
LLP, an Idaho Limited Liability Partnership, 
Defendant. 
ST A TE OF WASHINGTON ) 
) ss. 
County of Spokane ) 
) 
) Case No. CV15-1406 
) 







I, JOHN C. RISEBOROUGH, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and state: 
14] 005/007 
I am the attorney representing Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley, LLP ("Hawley 
Troxell'') in this matter. 
2. This matter was filed, but not served, on February 20, 2015. I was notified of the 
suit and asked to appear for defendant. Accordingly, I had my paralegal telephonically notify 
Jonathon of our special appearance, and of my request that he promptly advise when he 
had served our client. She did that on March 2015. 
FAX PAINE HAMBLEN LLP 006/0 
It 
on April 13, 2015. were also not notified when the client was served with the 
Summons and Complaint. 
4. The Court is further advised that an essential element of plaintiff's claims against 
Hawley Troxell is that one of its partners, Merlyn Clark, provided legal representation to plaintiff 
Frantz. That allegation formed the basis of a motion by Mr. Frantz in the United States 
Bankruptcy Court, District of Idaho, to disqualify Hawley Troxell from representing a creditor in 
a non-discharge bankruptcy proceeding. The Honorable Judge Terry L. Myers conducted a two-
day evidentiary hearing during which the issue was litigated. After due consideration, Judge 
Myers concluded that Mr. Clark had never acted as legal counsel for plaintiff Frantz. 
Accordingly, the defense anticipates motion practice to dismiss the instant action based on 
collateral estoppeL 
JaffN C. RISEBOROUGH 
SIGNED AND SWORN to before me this 2.7...day of April, 2015, by JOHN C. 
RISEBOROUGH. 
Notary Public ~n a for~D3:)i~" 
Residing at ~·""""'fti-'-l:=l=i .,._vQ-=--..,---,------
My Commission Expires: S) b \ I$ 
51 
0 15:42 FAX PAINE HAMBLEN LLP 
OF SERVICE 
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Frantz Law, PLLC 
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true 
West Sprague Avenue 
Spokane, Washington 99201-3505 
Telephone: (509) 455-6000 
Facsimile; (509) 838-0007 
=Jfina,w }SS 
bl~tED: 
15 ~PR 24 I 50 
Attorney for Defendant Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley LLP 
IN THE D1STR1CT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OP IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
MARTIN FRANTZ, ) Case No. CVlS-1406 
) 
Plaintiff, ) AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN F, KURTZ, JR. 
) 
VS, 
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY, 










I, JOHN F. KURTZ, JR. being first duly swom on oath, depose and state: 
1. I am a partner with clefe11dant1 Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley, LLP ("Hawley 
Ttoxe11"), am competellt to be a witness in th.is action, and have personal knowledge of the 
matters herein asserted. 
2. I represent Idaho Independent Bank ("llB") in an adversary proceeding 
commenced by a Complaint for Determination of Nondischargeable Debt pursuant to 11 U.S.C. 
§ 523(a)(2) and (a)(6) filed by IIB against Debtors Martin D. Frantz and Cynthia M. Frantz, 
husband and wife, filed on August 23, 2013, in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the 
District of Idaho ("Non-Discharge Action"). The Non-Discharge Action is cunently before 
United States Bankruptcy Court, Judge Myers. 
AFFIDA vrr OF JOHN F. KURTZ. JR. 
05!ll3,0104.1380J25.2 
Hawley Troxell at that titne, received a letter from Jefferey Ogden Katz, a true and con-ect copy 
of which is attached to this Affidavit as Exhibit A. Mr. Berenter forwarded that letter to my 
attention to contact Mr. Katz to determine the basis for the statements in his letter. I left several 
telephone messages for Mr. Katz, but he never retumed my telephone calls. 
4. On October 31, 2014, Debtors Martin D. Frantz and Cynthia M. Frantz filed a 
Motion to Disqualify Hawley Troxell in the Non-Discharge Action. A true and copy of that 
Motion to Disqualify is attached to this Affidavits al"ld Exhibit B. In that Motion to Disqualify, 
Debtors claimed that Merlyn Clark, a partner with Hawley Troxell, had formed ru1 att0111ey-client 
relationship with Martin Frantz when he had agreed to provide expelt wimess tes ti:mony in a 
malpractice lawsuit filed by Mr. Frantz against the law firm of Witherspoon Kelly in 
approximately 2008. At the time the Motion to Disqualify was filed the trial i.11 the Non-
Discharge Aclion was set to commence on December 1, 2014. The Bankruptcy Court vacated 
the December 1. 2014 trial date and set an evidence hearing on the Motion to Disqualify for 
December 1, 2014. 
5. On November 28, 2014, the Debtors filed an Expert Witness Disclosure 
disclosing their intent to call Jefferey Katz as an e:x.pert witness ou the Motion to Disqualify. A 
true a11d con·ect copy of that Expe1t Witness Disclosure is attached to this Affidavit as Exhibit C. 
6. IID filed a Motion in Limine to prohibit the testimony of Mr. Katz, which the 
Bankruptcy Court granted. 
7. After a two day evidentiary heru.ing, fodge Myers ruled that Merlyn Clark 
never formed an attorney-client relationship with Mr. Frnntz and that lvlr. Clark's in the 
AFFIDA vrr OF JOHN KURTZ, JR. 
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testifying expert A true 811d correct copy of Bankruptcy Myers Oral Ruling is 
attached to this Affidavit as Exhibit D ("Oral Ru.ling"). Judge Myers concluded that ''Mr. 
Clark was acting a testifying expert witness 011ly," and that ''an accomey-client" relationship 
wo.s not created." Oral Ruling at p. 12, LL. 10-15. Judge Myers also conc1uded that it ''was 
clear" that Mr. Clark did noc review confidential information of Mr. Frantz as part of his 
work as a testifying e~pert witness. Id. at p. 9, LL. 12-23. Judge Myers subsequently 
rescheduled the trial in the Non-Discharge Action to begin on May 26, 2015. 
8. Notwithstanding the ruling by Banla:uptcy Judge Myers, on Febrnary 20, 2015, 
Mr. Frantz. through his son Jonathon Frantz. ISB #9129, filed the above captioned lawsuit 
against Hawley Troxell claiming that an attomey-client relationship existed between Mr. Frantz 
and Hawley'Troxell as a result of Mr. Clark having acted as an expert witness. 
9. On March 9, 2015, Mr. Jack Gustavel, the Chief Executive Officer of IlB 
forwarded an email that he had received from Mr. Jefferey Katz, in which he stated as follows: 
"I represent Marty Frantz in a newly filed action against his former attomeys at the Howley (sic) 
Troxell firm. I would like to discuss this matter with you a1Jd discuss how it may be financially 
beneficial to you." Based ou Mr. Katz's previous involve1nent in 1he Motion to Disqualify, it 
appears that Mr. Katz contacted Mr. Gustave! directly notwithstanding his knowledge that 
Hawley Troxell represents llB in the Non-Discharge Action. A true and c-0rrect of that e-mail is 
attached to this Affidavit as Exhibit E. 
JcfHN F. KURTZ, JR. 
AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN F. KURTZ, JR 
05t83.0104.7J80J25.2 
OF IDAHO ) 
) ss. 
of Ada ) 
On this 23rd day of Aprii, 2015, before me, Tammy N. Dettman, a Notary Public in and for said 
state, personally appeared JOHN F. KURTZ, JR., known or identified to me to be the person whose 
name is subsciibed to the foregoing imtrnmeut, and acknowledged to me that he executed the same. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed my official seal the day and 
year in this certificate fust above written. 
~=~-::,•r 
No~ry Public fot ~ . 
Residing at CJ I s e 
My co111missio11 expires $ /;3a I~ 
AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN KURTZ, JR. 
05183.0104.7380125.2 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this i.Jday of April, 2015, I caused to be served a uue copy of 
the foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN F. KURTZ, JR. by the method indicated below, and addressed to 
each of the following: 
Jonathan Frantz 
Frantz Law, PLLC 
307 N. Lincoln Street, Ste A 
Post Falls, Idaho 83815 
AFFIDAVIT JOHN KURTZ, JR. 
~ U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
__ Hand Delivered 
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Affidavtt: of John F. Kurtz In support of Motion ln Umine Page 4 of 4 
I s 
I Law Firm 
Octube:r 16, 2014 
VlA}.U!G:tfLm~.lif WML 
Mr. St.even W. Berent.er 
Hawley Tro;;:oll 
8,77 W. Main St, Suite 1000 
Boise, ID 83&702 
~bercn,!g@.hawleytro11:eU,com 
Re: In re MM{V F'tatt.g 
Dear Mr. Berenter. 
By way of introduction, 1 am a Partller wi!b The Patteraon Law Firm llC and have been 
reiained by Mr. Marty Frantz to investigate and pumue an aotion a.gainBt your :firm in 
comiection with your provision oflega.l services to Mr. Frantz. 
In oi:der to a.void filing a Compla'i:nt at this tjm~ I wou.lrl lz'ke to discuss this mmter with 
you in order to explom the possibility of pi:o--sult resoluti.on. Should you not respond lo 
me by Ogmber 29. 2014. we will have no choice but to file a Complaint sollllding in legal 
malpractice. I hope we can, resoive these issues without resort to that action. 
t lookforwe.rd to heari.o.g from you sooo. 
cc: Marty Frantz (via email only) 
Jooathou Frontz (via email only) 




Jonathon Frantz ISB No. 9129 
F:rantz Law, PLLC 
307 N. Lincoln St 
Suite A 
Post Falls, ID 83854 
Telephone: (208) 262-3893 
Facsimile: (208) 262-3894 
jonathon@cdalegal.com 
Entered 
Page 1 20 
Attorney for Marin D. Frantz and Cynthia M. Frantz, Defendants 
UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT 
DISTRICT OF IDAHO 
In Re: Case No. 11-21337-TLM 
:MARTIN D. FRANTZ and CYNTHIA M. 
FRANTZ, Chapter 7 
Debtors. 
IDAHO INDEPENDENT BANK, an Idaho 
Main 
ExbibitB 
corporation, Adversary Proc. No. 13~07024-TLM 
Plaintiff, 
VS. 
MARTIN D. FRANTZ, an individual, and 
CYNTHIA M. FRANTZ, an individual, 
Defendants. 
MOTION TO DISQUALIFY HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY, LLP- 1 
Case Filed 10/31/14 Entered 10/31/14 Main 
Document Page 2 of 
and 
''Frao.tzes") by and through their attorney of record, Jonathon Frantz of Frantz Law, PLLC, and 
hereby moves this Court to disqualify Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley, LLP as attorneys for 
Idaho Independent Bank ("IIB") based on the followiug: 
INTRODUCTION 
On. October 3, 2014, the Frantzes moved to continue the trial and pretrial order. See Dkt. 
3 8. A portion of that motion was based on the fact that the Frantzes believe that Hawley Troxell 
Ennis and Hawley, LLP ("HT"), attorney for plaintiff, IIB, may be in possession of confidential 
information. See Dkt. 38 pp. 4-5. At the time, the Frantzes had not yet been able to ascertain 
whether or not HT had breached confidences because the file containing the relevant documents 
was archived by the Frantzes' fonner attorneys at Owens & Cran.dall, PLLC. The Frantzes have 
since gained access to the file at Owens & Crandall, PLLC and have been able to identify that 
HT possesses confidential knowledge pursuant to HT' s prior representation of the Frnntzes. As a 
result, the Frantzes now move to disqualify HT based on the foregoing. 
BT's PRIOR DEALINGS WITB THE FRANTZES 
FACTS 
Sometime around 2000, Marty Frantz ("Marty"), or au entity that Marty controlled, 
entered into an agreement to purchase land for the development of a Guardian Angel Homes 
assisted living facility in Lewiston, Idaho (which .facility is hereinafter the "GAH Lewiston" 
facility). Walter Steed ("Steed") was the seller and Shelley Bennett {"Bennett'') was Marty's 
MOTION TO DISQUALIFY RAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY, LLP- 2 
case Filed 10/31/14 Entered Main 
Document Page 3 of 
estate 
on 
to light a potential issue with the land valuation. After looking into the issue, Marty discovered 
what he believed to be fraud on the part of Steed in the sale of the hmd to GAR Lewiston. 
Regardless, the appraiser switched valuation methods from the sales-comparison approach to the 
income approach, whlch required an in-depth look at GAH Lewiston's finances. GAH Lewiston 
ultimately received its financing. 
Thereafter; Marty hired an attorney to file litigation. against Steed. That attorney was 
from the Witherspoon, Kelley Firm, Coeur d'Alene, Idaho ("Withei-spoon Kelley"). Later in 
that lawsuit, Marty discovered that Bennelt had colluded with Steed to increase the price of the 
land. Marty requested Witherspoon Kelley to also file suit against Bennett, however, 
Witherspoon Kelley vacillated. By the ti.me Witherspoon Kelley included Bennett in the suit, the 
statute of limitations had passed and Marty lost on all counts against Bennett. At some point, 
Marty learned that Witherspoon I<.elley represented Ben.n.ett's father :in several matters. As a 
result, Marty filed a malpractice case against Witherspoon. Kelley in 2008. Marty hired Bruce 
Owens and Regina McCrea of Owens & Crandall, PLLC to represent himself and GAH 
Lewiston against Witherspoon Kelley. 
Shortly after filing suit against Witherspoon Kelley, Marty closed the sale-leaseback of 
OAH Lewiston, which is the subject of :intense scrutiny in this case. The sale-leaseback of OAH 
Lewiston generated more thau $3m in capital, a. substantial portion of which Marty alleges he 
invested into Eagle Ridge on Twin. Lakes, Inc., which is also the subject of intense scrutiny in 
this case. 
MOTION TO DISQUALIFY HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY, LLP- 3 
vs 
Case 
Marty's expert witness. Mr. Clark was hired to be a consulting expert witness as well as a 
consulting expert. See Declaration of Regina McCrea, Exhibit B, ,11 ("You have engaged my 
services as an expert witness to provide adv.ice and testimony ... ") (emphasis added). While the 
matter on which Mr. Clark was to testify involved whether or not Witherspoon Kelley committed 
malpractice, in order to form a basis for the manner in which Witherspoon Kelley commi.tted 
malpractice, Mr. Clark had to review a large amount of documents related to GAR Lewiston to 
become familiar with the project. Id. Mr. Clark, however, was also consulted on the matter of 
damages, which involved a review of confidential financial :information regarding GAH 
Lewiston. 
On May 4, 2009, Mr. Clark prepared a 21 page prelin:rina:ry report, at the top of which 
Mr. Clru:k had typ~ written "CONFIDENTIAL AND PRIVlliEGED COMMUNICATION." 
Furthermore, on May 26, 2009 Marty personally paid Hawley Troxell's $10,664 bill for the 
preparation of that report which included time spent in. a telephone conference with Mr. Owens 
and Ms. McCrea consulting on damages. Later, that matter would end up settling and Mr. Cla:rk 
would never testify. 
ARGUMENT 
HT entered into an Attorney-Client Relationship w;tll the Frantzes 
It is axiomatic that the existence of an attomey~client relationship is a question of fact. 
Storferv. Dwelle, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 112336, 2014 WL 3965033 (D. Idaho Aug. 13, 2014). 
While such a relationship is "generally fo1med by assent by both the putative client and 
MOTION TO DISQUALIFY HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HA wl..EY, LLP- 4 
Case 10/31/14 Entered 10/31/14 Main 
Document Page 5 of 20 
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted), "An attomey~client relationship may also be formed if 
the attorney fails to clarify whom the attorney is representing where , , . one of the parties could 
reasonably believe that the attorney is representing that person's interests." Id. (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
One such way an attomey~client relationship is formed by mutual assent is when an 
attorney accepts representation as a consulting expert, which has been construed as functioning 
as the client's co-counsel. See Richmond, Douglas R., Article: Lawyers as Witnesses, 36 N.M.L. 
Rev. 47, 62 (2006) (ctting, ABA Comm. on Ethics and Profl Responsibility, Fonnal Op. 97-407 
(1997) [hereinafter1 "Op. 97-407"]; see also Hertick Co. v. Vetta Sports, Ino. 1 1998 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 14544, 1998 WL 637468 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 14, 1998) (assuming that a consulting expert 
shares an attorney-client relationship with the party that retains the expert)). After all, the 
purpose of a consulting attorney-expert and co-counsel are 'Virtually identical. "Co-counsel" has 
been defined as "an. attorney who assists in or shares the responsibilities of representing a client. 
"Co-counsel," Merriam-Webster's Dictionary of Law, 1996. A consulting attorney-expert assists 
the primary attorney i11 representing a client. 
Conversely, the ABA Comm. on Ethics and Profl Responsibility (the "ABA 
Committee") clarified that, "A Lawyer Serving Solely as a Testifying Expert as Distinct from an 
Expert Consultant Does Not Thereby Occupy a Lawyer-Client Relationship ... " Op. 97-407 at 
p. 3. Said another way, in order to prevent the formation of an attorney-client relationship the 
attorney-expert must solely be a testifying ex.pert. The ABA Committee further recognized that 
an attorney-expert hired for the sole purpose of testifying often can bleed into the role of expert 
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takes place when an attorney-expert does not properly define his or her role and thereby gamers 
confidential information pertaining to the case. Id. at 6. The burden is upon the attorney-expert 
to "show that the [attorney expert] has taken reasonable measures under the circumstances to 
corrumm:icate:" that no attomey-client relationship exists. See Idaho Rules of Profl Conduct 
Rule 5. 7 official cmt. 7. 
When an attorney-expert's roles blur together, the attorney-expert will be bound by all 
the rules of professional conducl Op. 97-407 at 6. This blending can occur even though the 
principal purpose of the attorney-expert is to testify. Jd. When tbe mixing of roles takes place, 
the attorney-expert "then m1!§! exercise special care to assure that the law firm and the client are 
fully informed and e.xprcssly consent to the lawyer continuing to serve as a testifying expert ... " 
Id. Even if the attorney-expert so discloses, however, he or she is still "bound by the [rules of 
professional responsibility] relating to conflicts of interest and imputed disqualification ... " Id. 
Furthermore, the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals has issued an opinion wherein that court assumed 
that an attorney-client relationship existed with the party retaining him as an expe1t. Abbott v. 
IRS, 399 F.3d 1083, 1085-87 (9th Cir. 2005). 
In the case of HT and the Frantzes, the Frantzes and :Mr. Clark had a relationship that 
pennitted the Frantzes to have a reasonable expectation that their communications '>lith Mr. 
Clark would remain in confidence. Mr. Clark entered into an attorney-client relationship with 
the Frantzes because he was engaged as both a consulting attomey~expert and a testifying 
attomey-expert. His engagement letter begins, ''You have engaged my services as an expert 
witness to provide advice and testimony ... " (emphasis added). Furthennore, in both. Owens & 
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with Owens & Crandall on the matter of damages. Pursuant to that consultation, Mr. Owens and 
Ms. McCrea had c.ommunication regarding strategies and practices to prove the damages 
suffered by GAH Lewiston and Marty. 
Moreover, during roe course of those conversations, Mr. Clark accepted confidential 
:financial :information from the Fnmtzes regarding the operations and financial viability of GAH 
Lewiston. The Frantzes, or their attorneys, in no way limited the fmancial information. or other 
documents provided to Mr. Clark. 
Conversely, Mr. Clark did not in. any way limit the representation strictly to that of a 
testifying attorney-expert. Mr. Clark only provided the Frantzes with one single document, his 
draft report. Nowhere in Mr. Clark's report does :Mr. Clark limit his engagement to testifying. 
to the contrary, Mr. Clark ex.presses that he has been engaged to ''I!.rovide advice and testimony 
on the alleged professional malpractice asserted against Witherspoon Kelley ... " (emphasis 
added). Attorney's provide advice to their clients; expert witnesses provide testimony and 
opinions. Even if Mr. Clark in some way attempted to disclaim any status as an expert 
consultan~ the burden is upon him to communicate the absence of an attorney-client relationship. 
Mr. Clark undertook no such disclaimer. 
It is e.lso noteworthy that 'Mr. Clark is an ex.pert with regard to attorney's rules of ethics 
and resultant obligations, self.evident by the fact that he holds himself out as such. See 
http://www.hawleytroxell.com/people/merlyn-w-clark/. As a result, it should be inferred that 
:M:r. Clark is aware of the boundaries within which he operated as an attomey-expert. It is 
axiomatic that, "each person is charged with knowing the law." How trne that is, then, when 
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consultant. As provided by the ABA Committee, an attorney-client relationship ensued. 
While it is true that the ABA Committee holds no orecedential value. the 9th Circuit has . , 
implicitly gone even further than the ABA Committee in Abbott by assuming that all attorney-
expert witness arrangements create an attorney-client relationship. Just as the court in Abbott 
reviewed the attorney-expert's con.duct under the nu.es of professional conduct, so too should this 
Court review HT's conduct in light of the Idaho rules of professional conduct. 
Resultantly, HT entered into an attorney-client relationship with the Frantzes in 
2009 and their relationship is governed by the Idaho Rules of Professional Col1.duct. 
Ill's Current Representation of IlB is Substantially Related to §T's Former 
Representation of the Fraotzes 
Idaho Rules of Prof'l Conduct Rule 1.9( a) states: "A lawyer who has formerly 
represented a client in a matter shall not thereafter represent another person in the same or a 
su.bstantially telated matter in which that person's interests are materially adverse to the interests 
of the former client .. " (emphasis added). "Substantially related" is further defined in Rule 1.9 
cmt. 3, "Matters are 'substantially related' for purposes of tbis Rule if they involve the same 
transaction or legal dispute or if there otherwise is a substantial risk that confidential factual 
information as would normally have been obtained in the prior representation would mate1ially 
advance the client's position in the subsequent matter.,, Comment 3 then adds1 
A former client is not required to reveal the conftdential information learned by 
the lawyer in order to establish a substantial risk that the lawyer has confidential 
information to use in the subsequent matter. A conclusion about the possession of 
such inf orrnation may be based 011 the nature of the services the lawyer provided 
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The 9th Circuit Court has con.finned the application of I.R.P. C 1.9 cmt. 3 as follows, '"If 
there is a reasonable probability that confidences were disclosed which could be used against the 
client in later, adverse representation, a substantial relation between the two cases is presumed . ., 
Trone v. Smith, 621 F.2d 994, 998 (9th Cir. 1980). In short, if an attomey receivedi or could 
have received, confidential information from the prior case that is relevant to an issue in the 
current case, than the matters are substantially related. Id.; see also, Gov't of India v. Cook 
Indus., Inc., 596 F.2d 737, 739 (2d Cir. 1978). Said another way, «the relationship is measure by 
the allegations in the complaint and by the nature of the evidence that would be helpful in 
establishingtlrnse allegations. Ttone, 621 F.2d at 1000. 
In the case at hand, it is not hard to see the nexus between the two matters. Mr. Clark,, in 
bis representation, received confidential financial information regarding the value and operations 
of GAR Lewiston and its second phase expansion. In the current litigation, HT represents IIB in 
claiming, inter alia, that the assets listed in Marty's financial statement are materially inaccurate. 
See Complaint {Dkt. 1) 'li120, 114 ("In requesting the Twin Lakes Coustructio11 Loan, the 
Debtors submitted a signed financial statement in which they represented and certified that as of 
December 31, 2005 ... Guardian Angel Homes [was) valued at $4,645,908 ... In obtaining the 
Twin Lakes Constrnction Loan ... the Debtors made a statement in 'Writing regarding [the value 
of Guardian Angel Homes] that [was) materially false when made."). 
Furthennore, much of the discovery that HT has conducted has been in relation to the 
value of the G.A...'1 projects, including OAH Lewiston. See Memorandum in Support of Motion 
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Those documents [which Plaintiff seeks an order compelling Defendants 
to produce] are as follows: 
7) Copies of all appraisals for GAR Lewiston ... ; 
8) Copies of all documents related to the sale and leaseback of GAH 
Lewiston facility that occillTed in September or October 2008 ... ; 
9) Audited Financial Statements for GAH Lewiston (2004-present) ... ; 
10) All OAH Lewiston Audited Financial Statements from 2004 to 
present; 
11) Tax returns for GAR Lewiston for 2004, 2005, 2012, and 2013 ... ; 
13) Copies of all documeuts showing payments to Tailored Management 
Services by GAH Lewiston ... ; 
14) Copies of all Opera.ting Agreements and all Amenchnents to those 
Operating Agreements for GAh Lewiston ... ; 
17) All emails and other form. of written commtmications ... regarding the 
following: GAH Lewiston ... ; 
19) All GAH Lewiston 2 [which refers to the GAH Lewiston second 
phase] Audited Financial Statements from 2004-present ... 
See also, Memorandum in Support of Motion to Compel Production of Doscuments (Dkt. 43-1) 
p. 9 (Plainti:f:rs Request for Production No. 41: ''Please produce any and all documents that you 
utilized or referenced to determine the value of [GAH Lewiston]"). 
Furthermore, in the deposition that HT took of Marty on August 9 ~ 10, 2014, the 
following terms were referenced: 
A) "sale-leasebaclc' (referring to the GAH Lewiston sale-leaseback): 29 times; 
B) "GAH" (referring to Guardian Angel Homes): 57 times; 
C) "Guardian" (referring to Guardian Angel Homes): 10 times; 
D) "Lewiston" (refening to GAH Lewiston): 62 times; 
E) "Angel" (refening to Guardian Angel Homes): 10 times. 
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discussing the value of GAR Lewiston. See Declaration of Jonathon Frantz, Ex. A ( discussing 
OAH Lewiston values and transaction related to OAH Lewiston). The allegations contained in 
tbe Complaint, the amount of coverage GAR Lewiston received in Marty's deposition, and the 
motion HT filed to com.pd production of documents all demonstrate that the value of GAR 
Lewiston and the transactions related thereto (all of which took place prior to Mr. Clark's 
representation of Marty and GAH Lewiston) are a vecy integral part of this litigation. 
Moreover, in the depositions of Jonathon Frantz, Tyson Frantz and Mathew Frantz (taken 
during the week of October 27, 2-014) HT questioned the deponents at length regarding GAR 
Lewiston (because those depositions were so recent, transcripts are not yet available). As a 
result, the matter for which Mr. Clark represented Marty and GAH Lewiston is substantially 
related to the current matter. More particularly, the confidential information that Mr. Clark 
received (information regarding GAH Lewiston values and operations) goes to the vecy heart of 
this litigation in which ITB is claiming that Marty overvalued the GAR Lewiston asset. Bearing 
in mind that the ethical rules are violated even when there is a "substal.1.tial risk" or a "reasonable 
probability" that confidential information substantially related to the matter at hand could ba.ve 
been received, the issue is even more poignant when it has been shown that there was a 
disclosure of confidential information. 
The Frantzes djd not Delay in Bringing this Motion 
It is well-settled that a primary concern of the courts when reviewing a moti.011 to 
disqualify is with abuse of the disqualification procedure. It is likely that HT wiU question why 
it took the Frantzes so long to bring this motion. In that regard, it should be noted that the 
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representation and IIB 's action to collect on the personally guarantees; those two matters were 
not substa:ntially related because GAH Lewiston was not at issue in that former litigation. 
Likewise, the substantially related requirement was lacking when HT, for IIB, filed a cl.aim. in the 
bankruptcy estate because the claim bad nothing to do with GAH Lewiston's financial 
infonnation. 
Conversely, as outlined above, the confidential information. Mr. Clark possesses is now 
implicated in this proceeding that HT is conducting for IIB. Thus, any alleged delay could only 
exist for as long as tbis non-dischargeability litigation has ensued. 
Furthermore, Marty has, over bis career, employed in one fashion or another scores of 
attorneys in the northwest and Alaska (nearly all of which have been transactional attorneys). 
Moreover, Marty knows his attorneys by their personal names, not by their firm names. As a 
result, it is difficult for Marty to keep track of all the attorneys he has employed. It was not until 
recently that Marty discovered that Mr. Clark was an attorney for HT. On August 7, 2014 Marty 
discovered the $10,664 bill he paid directly to HT for Mr, Clark's services. It was at that time 
that Marty realized that Mr. Clark was an attorney for Irr. Less than two months later the 
Fra.ntzes raised the issue with the court in their Motion to Continue Trial and Pretrial Order (Dkt. 
3 8). As a result, the Frantzes did not delay in bringing this action. 
Regardless, even if the Frantzes did delay (which they did not), there is no duty on the 
Frantzes to be aware of attorneys conflict of interest. Conversely, HT is required by the Rules of 
Professional Conduct to ensure there are no conflicts. I.RP.C. Rule 1.9. HT has a duty to 
ensure compliance with the professional rules of conduct. Marty is under no such obligation. 
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affirrnati:ve duty to ensure that it is complying with the rules of professional conduct 
Furthermore, HT had an opportunity to review this issue in 2011 when the debtors 
initially objected to HT's :representation ofIIB in the underlying bankruptcy case. 'While 
discussed further below, HT represented over and over again that the Frantzes bad never been. 
clients of HT. Not once did HT mention the connection between the Ftantzes and Mr. Clark. 
Presumably, at that time, HT performed a conflicts check. How then, IIB failed to bring Mr. 
Cla:rk' s representation to light at that time remains to be seen. Had IIB followed the Idaho Rules 
of Professional Conduct, there would have been no delay in bringing this matter before the court. 
The Frnntzes did not Knowingly Waive their Conflict with HT 
HT will certainly point to the Stipulated Order Granting Motion for 2004 Examination of 
Debtors in supp01t of their contention that there is no conflict. See. Dkt. 54, Case No. 11-21337 
("the debtors hereby aclmowledge and represent that Hawley Trox.ell has not and does not 
represent the Debtors in this bankruptcy case and any other dispute against the Debtors ... "). 
However, this alleged waiver is not valid because it was not made knowingly. 
I.R.P.C. l.9(b)(2) allows an attorney to represent a client against a former client unless 
the former client "gives informed consent, confirmed in writing." Furthennore, "if the attorney 
fails to adequately inform the client of the conflict, then the waiver may be invalid." Sto;fer, 
supra at 25. A fonner client is only informed when the conflicted attorney makes a "full . 
disclosure of all the material facts." Untfied Sewerage Agency v. Jelco, ln.c., 646 F.2d 1339, 
1352 (9th Cir. 1981). Under such arequirement, no furtheranaJysis need be conducted. 
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153 Idaho 857, 863 (2012). Con-versely, if it was not mutual error (i.e. HT was aware of Mr. 
Clark's connection with the Frantzes but failed to disclose tlie relationship), then HT would be in 
severe violation of other professional conduct rules (i.e. I.R.P .C. 4. 1 ). The Frantzes assume, 
however, that HT bad somehow failed to discover their connection with Mr. Clark (the Frantzes 
are not presently alleging that HT subversively wrote the particular language of the stipulated 
order in order to avoid this current issue). If HT> with its conflict check systems in place, failed 
to find the connection, then the Frantzes should not be faulted with failing to recall the 
connection either. As a result, it was a mutual mistake of fact and should be voided. 
Second. even were the stipulation a waiver, it is inconceivable that HT made a full 
disclosure of all the material facts. The issue in. which the Stipulated Order Granting Motion for 
2004 Examination of Debtors arose related to HT's rnpresentation of a corporation in which 
Marty was a 0.032% shareholder. It had absolutely nothing to do with :Mr. Clark's 
representation of the Frantzes. Further, at no point in any conversation or the stipulation was Mr. 
Clark ever mentioned or discussed. As a result, it would be impossible for such a waiver to be 
valid. As a result, no waiver has ever been obtained. 
Disqualificatfon of HT is an Apn1·opriate Remedy 
While disquallfi.cation is a severe remedy, it should be granted freely when the "farmer 
representation is 'substantially related' to the current representation." Trone, supra at 998 (citing 
Gas~A~Tro1t of Arizona v. Un.ion Oil Co. of California, 534 F.2d 1322, 1325 (9th Cir. 1976)). 
This is because of the immense value our legal system place6 on the preservation of secrets and 
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998-99. The focus of the substantial relation test is to ensure that there likely is a :possible breach 
of confidence. If the courts were to allow such breaches, clients would be more likely to hesitate 
in disclosing all pertinent information because it may be used against them someday. If clients 
were to lose faith in the confidentiality of the statements made to cou11sel, attorneys would not be 
able to adequately represent their clients. In short, the legal system as we know it would break 
down. 
The 9th Circuit Court has even remanded cases with an order to disq_u.alify counsel with 
the understanding that its decision will impose "hardship" and a "burden on both the [litigant 
whose attorney is disqualified] and the court'' which "is bound to be substantial." Id. at 1002. 
In the case between HT and the Fnmtzes, there is a clear breach of confidences which is 
very pertinent to the case at hand. HT has inside infonna:tion regarding tl1e values and operations 
of GAH Lewiston and was in fact consulting with Marty and GAR Lewiston in 2009, post-sale-
lease-back of GAH Lewiston. As outlined above1 such infonnation is highly relevant to IIB in 
its non-discharageablility litigation against the Prantzes. Moreover, while disqualification will 
be a burden, it is one that :HT has placed upon itself. Had HT reviewed its relationship with the 
parties ( or given heed to the information it did review) at the outset of this litigation, as it is 
supposed to do, it would have realized there was a conflict of interest and that it was in 
possession of confidential information, Had it done that, it could have handed this portion of the 
case off to another finn. By so doing, BT would have alleviated any resultant burden caused by 
this matter. The breach of confidence by HT should not be allowed to stand merely because 
Marty, who has no duty to monitor the firms his attorneys have worked for, did not discover until 
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information disclosed to HT by Marty, HT should be disqualified. 
HT's INTERACTIONS WITH THE FRANTZES B1RED EXPERTS 
FACTS 
Main 
HT, too, has acquired confidential information from its inappropriate interactions with 
the Frantzes' consultants. Beginning in 2006, Mr. Rand Wichman was lured as a consultant by 
Marty and/or Eagle Ridge on Twin Lakes, Inc. ("Eagle Ridge"). See Declaration of Martin 
Frantz, Ex. B (ilwoices from Rand Wichman Planning, LLC and statements showing billing in 
excess of $11,000 from July 2006 to March 2007). At approximately the same time, Marty and 
Eagle Ridge hired Mr. Mike Reagan as an attorney for the Eagle Ridge development. While M.r. 
Wichman was lilied to secure additional lot lines for Eagle Ridge, he was present in many 
meetings between Marty, Mr. Reagan, and himself. During those meetings, the three often 
discussed confidential information, such as expenditures on properties not encumbered by DB. 
Additionally, with Mr. Wichman present and participating, Marty and Mr. Reagan would discuss 
confidential matters involving the properties that were outside of DB's mortgage and costs 
related to improving the properties outside of IIB 's mortgage. 
Mr. Wichman also attended various "project coordination meetings" which discussed the 
overall de'lelopment strategy for Eagle Ridge. See Declaration of Martin Frantz, Ex. B. 
Furthermore, Mr. Wichman would often participate in meetings alone with Mr. Reagan in his 
capacity as consult.ant for Eagle Ridge. Id. (" 11/14/2006 mtg at County with Mike [Reagan J on. 
lot line adjustments;" "11/21/2006 mtg at Lakes Hwy, phon.e call- Mike [Reagon]"). 
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ARGUMENT 
HT Should be Disqualified for I<:nowingJy Hiring the Funtzes' Consultant 
An attorney who knowingly hires an opposing party's former expert, consultant or 
employee should be disqualified if the former expert, consultant or employee had confidential 
information. Collins Y. Siate, 18 Cal.Rptr. 3d 112 (3d Dist. Ct. App. 2004) (citing Shadow 
Traffic Network v. Superior Court, 24 Cal.App. 4!h 1067 (1994)). This results from the 
''paramount concern ... to preserve public trust in the scrupulous administration of justice and 
the integrity of the bar." Id. at 120. Further, "the important right to counsel of one's choice must 
yield to ethical considerations that affect the fundamental principles of our judicial process." Id. 
The overarching principle is the protection of confidential information. 
Communications between employees and outside consultants a.re covered by the 
corporate attorney-client p1ivilege. United States v. Graf, 610 F. 3d 1148, 1159 (9th Cir. 2010) 
(adopting In re Bieter Co., 16 F.3d 929 (8th Cir. 1994). As a result, any communications by and 
between Marty, Mr. Reagan and Mr. Wichman are confidential and/or protected by the attorney-
client privilege. In such circumstances, a presumption arises that the expert has disclosed the 
confidential infonnation to his subsequent employer. Collins, 18 Cal.Rprtr. 3d at 123-24. Such 
a presumption is necessary "because the party seeki.n.g disqualification will be at a loss to prove 
what is known by the adversary's attorneys and legal staff." Id. 
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the industry and my familiarity with the Eagle Ridge Developnient Project. .. I was 
requested to review draw requests, conduct site inspections . . to opine on whethe.r the 
construction loan proceeds we.re expended on the 104 Acres that is the subject of (IIB 's] 
m01tgage ... and whether the infrastructure was completed as represented." See Declaration of 
Jonathon Frantz, Ex. B. Moreover, HT, for IIB, had already received in discovery the bills and 
statements that Mr. Wichman had sent to Eagle Ridge. In fact, as indicated above, Mr. Wichman 
acknowledges i.11 lris report that, in part, he was selected specifically because of his former 
relationship with Eagle Ridge. 
Furthermore, in the capacity as an agent/consultant for Eagle Ridge, Mr. Wichman met 
individually with Mr. Reagan, Eagle Ridge's attomey for purposes related to the development 
and construction of Eagle Ridge. Further, Mr. Wichman was integral to the planning of Eagle 
Ridge as to the setup of the 104 Acres and the 50 Acres. These issues are very much at issue in 
this matter. 
I.nits Complaint for nondischargeability, IlB has alleged ''Construction Proceed~ Not 
Fulli; Expended on Mortgaged Property, As Represented" (no emphasis added). See 
Complaint (Dkl 1) 1167 - 80 (alleging that the Frantzes spent loan proceeds on the 50 Acres 
instead of tbe 104 Acres, whfoh 104 Acres was en.cumbered by DB). Furthermore, the 
expenditure of funds on the 50 Acres and the draw requests have been the subject of much 
scrntiny by HT and DB. The deposition of Martin Frantz and Jonathon Frantz explored these 
issues. Further, there have been repeated discovery requests aimed at obtaining infocmation 
related to the expenditures on Eagle Ridge and the draw requests submitted by Eagle Ridge. M 
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Thus, there is a presumption that HT has learned of the confidential information Mr. 
Wichman possessed. Furthermore, HT knew of the fonner relationship. Resultantly, HT should 
be disqualified for its acquisition of confidential information from former consultant, Mr. 
Wichman. 
CONCLUSION 
HT, as a result of the foregoing, should be disqualified for 1) its breach of confidences 
and violation of the rules of ethics, and 2) knowingly employing Mr. Wichman as an expert 
witness. 
DATED THIS 31st day of October, 2014. 
FRANTZ LAW, PLLC 
By: Isl Jonathon Frantz 
Jonathon Frantz ISB No. 9129 
Attorney for Defendant 
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with the Clerk of the Court in the above-captioned matter using the CM/ECF system, which sent 
electronic notice to John F. Kurtz, JL and Sheila Rae Schwager, both on. behalf ofldaho 
Independent Bank. 
DATED this 31 1t day of October, 2014. 
By.. Isl JonathonFrantz 
Jonathon Frantz, ISB No. 9129 
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JONATHON FRANTZ 
Frantz Law, PLLC 
307 N. Lincoln St. Suite A 
Post Falls, ID 83854 
Telephone: (208) 262-3893 
Facsimile: (208) 262-3 894 
jonathon@cdalegal.com 
ISB# 9129 
Attorney for Mario D. Frantz and Cynthia M. Frantz, Defendants 
UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT 
DISTRICT OF IDAHO 
(Coeur d'Alene) 
InRe: Case No. 11-21337-TLM 
MARTIN D. FRANTZ and CYNTHIA M. 
FRANTZ, Chapter 7 
Debtors. 
IDAHO INDEPENDENT BANK, an Idaho 
corporation, Adversary Proc. No. 13-07024 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MARTIN D. FRANTZ, an individual, and 
CYNTHIA M. FRANTZ, an individual, 
Defendants. 
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EXPERT DISCLOSURE 
to 
au expert witness at the hearing to Disqualify Hawley Troxell Ennis and Hawley, LLP in the 
above-entitled matter. Mr. Katz's hourly rate for preparation and trial testimony is $175 per 
hour. 
Main 
Attached hereto and incorporated herein is a rrue and correct copy of the disclosure 
prepared by Mr. Katz's which sets forth his findings and concl11sions to which he '11 testify at the 
aforementioned hearing. Mr. Katz1 s qualifications are set forth in Mr. Katz resume, attached 
hereto and incorporated herein, as well as the aforementioned disclosure. 
DATED this 25th day ofNovember, 2014. 
FRANTZ LAW, PLLC 
Isl 
Jonathon Frantz, 
Attorney for Martin and Cynthia Frantz 
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form of communication): 
1 1 fr, f'l 11 A 
.LJ./ LOI .L't 
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John F Kurtz, Jr.- jkurtz@hawleytroxell.com 
Sheila Schwager- sschwager@bawleytrox.ell.com 
Desc 
sent true correct 
recipients as to the 
I FURTHER CERTIFY that on the 2510 day of November, 2014, I sent true and correct 
copies of the foregoing to the ColUt via personal delivery to the Coeur d'Alene Federal 
Courthouse. 
I FURTHER CERTIFY that on the 25th day of November, 2014 until today (not including 
Thanksgiving Day) I was unable to file this document 011 the ECF due to what I believe was a 
technical error by the ECF. 
Isl Jonathon Frantz 
Jonathon Frantz 
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26(aJ(2) Expert Witness Disclosure 
LaSalle Street Suite 2100, Chicago, Illinois 60602. 
A. Mr. Jefferey 0. Katz is a leading expert on matters ofla-wyer 
professional responsibility. In 2012, Mr. Katz founded the At-nerican 
Association for Justice Professional Liability Litigation Group, which 
he has chaired since. He is a member of the Association for 
Professional Responsibility La-wyers, and he chaired the Chicago Bar 
Association Young La-wyers Section Professional Responsibility 
Committee from 2009 until 2012. 
Mr. Katz attended the University of Wisconsin at Madison, where he 
eanied his Bachelor of Arts degree in International Relations and 
Political Science. Mr. Katz earned his Juris Doctor degree at the Case 
Westem Reserve University School of Law in Cleveland, Ohio. For the 
entirety of his career, Mr. Katz has worked as a litigator and trial 
attorney in Chicago, Illinois, with a primary focus on professional 
liability matters involving attomeys. Mr. Katz is a partner at The 
Patterson Law Firm, a distinguished boutique litigation firm located in 
downtown Chicago. 
Mr. Katz has filed and litigated over 400 legal complaints stemming 
from the professional negligence of attorneys in a variety of 
circumstances, roles, and jurisdictions throughout the United States. 
Mr. Katz is admitted to practice law in the states of Illinois, 
Wisconsin, and Kentucky. He is also admitted to practice in United 
States District Courts in lliinois, Wisconsin, and Indiana. He has been 
admitted to the S:bcth and Seventh Circuit United States Courts of 
Appeals and the United States Supreme Court. 
Mr. Ka:tz has an extensive record of publications and lectures on best 
practice methods, with a particular focus on professional 
responsibility. Mr. Katz recently published an article in the summer 
2014 issue of the Seattle Journal for Social Justice in which he 
proposed an amended Rule 8.4, a rule pertaining to lawyer 
misconduct that is mirrored in both Illinois and Idaho. Mr. Katz also 
taught a seminar for attorneys on Rules 1.3 and 1.4, two professional 
responsibility rules that are also mirrored in both Illinois and Idaho. 
Mr. Katz lectured in a. late 2014 National Business Institute seminar 
on professional liability dispute resolution1 in which his speaking 
topics focused on trends in professional liability cases and the 
elements of professional liability tort claims. Mr. Katz gave a lecture 
Filed 11/28/14 Entered 11/28114 Main 
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Legal Malpractice Claim. lecture, "A Practical Diligence 
Checklist on Preventing the Most Common Attorneys Errors in Civil 
Litigation'> at the ACI/LPL Legal Malpractice Conference in May of 
2012 in New York was a product of his expertise in the area of 
professional responsibility, and he has served as a moderator for the 
Chicago Bar Association Seminars on Rules of Profe.ssional Conduct 
in December 2009, June 2010, December 2010, June 2011, 
December 2011, and June 2012. 
B. Mr. Katz will testify that he was retained by Martin and Cynthia 
Frantz's attorneys as a Rule 26la)(2) expert to testify with regard to a 
matter of professional responsibility. Mr. Katz will testify as to the 
professional standards of conduct applicable to Mr. Clark and Hawley 
Troxell Ennis & Hawley, LLP, during the time in which they were 
retained by Mr. Frantz and the duties and responsibilities that extend 
from that relationship and continue to exist in the present matter 
With Idaho Independent Banlt. Mr. Kat2 will focus on the duties owed 
to Mr. Frantz and the proper and professionally responsible actions 
that should be taken in the present matter. 
Amongst other testimony, Mr. Katz will testify that an attorney-client 
relationship did exist between Mr. Frantz and Mr. Clark and Hawley 
Troxell Ennis & Hawley, LLP. Due to the language contained within 
the retainer agreement, Mr. Clark's role in the prior matter, and Mr. 
Frantz's expectations of Mr. Clark's contributions, Mr. Clark and 
Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley, LLP, served a dual-role as both expert 
witnesses and expert consultants. Because the present matter is 
substantially related to the prior matter and because Mr. Clark and 
Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley, LLP, received or were given access to 
confidential financial information that is at issue in the present 
matter and adverse to the interests of Mr. and Mrs. Frantz, the motion 
for disqualification is proper. 
Further, Mr. Katz will testify that the record does not establish that 
Mr. Frantz made a valid waiver of any privilege or conflicted 
representation. Finally, Mr. Katz will testify that knowingly hiring a 
previously retained expert consultant of an adverse party does in fact 
create grounds for disqualification, as appears to be the case in the 
present matter. It is Mr. Katz's opinion that the ldaho Rules of 
Professional Conduct prohibit Mr. Clark and Hawley Troxell Ennis & 
Hawley, LLP, from continuing as counsel for Idaho Independent Bank 
in the present matter. 
Doc Entered 
Page 6 of 8 
D. In addition to his education, training, and experience, Mr. Katz's 
opinions are or will be based upon his review of the following material: 
(1) Defendants' Motion to Disqualify Counsel; 
(2} The Declaration of Regina McCrea, along with all attached 
exhibits; 
(3) The Declaration of Martin Frantz, along with all attached exhibits; 
(4) The Declaration of Jonathon Frantz, along with all attached 
exhibits; 
(5) Idaho Independent Bank's Memo :in Opposition to the Motion to 
Disqualify, along with all attached affidavits and exhibits; 
{6) Second Declaration of Martin Frantz, along with all attached 
exhibits; 
(7) Defendants' Reply in Support of their Motion ta Disqualify; 
(8) The Supplemental Declaration of Regina McCrea; 
(9) The Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct; and 
(lO)Any additional material that may be appropriately considered or 
later provided or disclosed. 
Dated: November 24J 2014 
Respectfully submitted, 
Ls I Jefferey Q. Katz 
Jefferey O. Katz 
The Patterson Law Firm, LLC 
One North LaSalle Street, Suite 2100 
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Jefferey Ogden Katz 
The Patterson Law Finn 
North Street, 
Chicago, Illinois 60602 
(312)750-1817 (Phone) 
(312) 223-8549 (Fax) 
(312) 545-5107 (Mobile) 
jkatz@pattersonlawfirm.com 
www.nattersonlawfinu.com 
Tlte Patterson Law Firm LLC, Chicago, IL 
Partner (September 2012-Present) 
Main 
• Practice concentrated in litigation, including but not limited to general commercial litigation and 
professional liability matters involving attorneys, accountants and other professionals. 
Oxiginated and obtained judgment in the amount of $2,550,377 for Scottie Pippen against Christian 
Laettner in action i11volving failed purchase of professional sports franchise. 
Second chaired frve week jury trial resulting in a judgment of $2,000,000 on behalf of Scottie Pippen 
against former attorneys and advisors. 
First chaired action on behalf of Ben Gordon against former accountant and advisor which resulted in 
summary judgment in the amount of $1,386,666 for M:t. Gordon. Subsequently ft:rst chaired and 
obtained summary judgment for Mr. Gord.on in defense of action brought by former agent seeking in 
excess of $1,200,000 for alleged breach of professional services contract. 
First chaired and obtained voluntary ,dismissal of major bank vice president charge<l with contribution 
and indemnification in the middle of a jury trial involving legal malpractice. 
• First chaired and obtained settlement in the amount of $1,100,000 on behalf of a major Chicago law 
firm in connection with a departing partner's alleged theft of a contingent fee matter. 
The Spellmire Law Firm LLC, Chicago, IL 
Attorney (September 2005-September 2012) 
EDUCATION 
Case Western Reserve University School of Law, Cleveland, OH 
Juris Doctor, May 2004 
Univers:ity of Wisconsin at Madison, Madison, WI 
Bachelor of Arts: International Relations and Political Science, May 2000 
BAR ADMISSIONS 
State of Illinois, November 2004 
State of Wisconsin, September 2009 
State of Kentucky, June 2014 
United States District Court, N orthem District of Illinois, January 2005 
United States District Court, Western District of Wisconsin, October 2008 
United States District Court, Northem District of Indiana, February 2010 
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, September 2011 
United States District Court, Central District of Illinois, June 2014 
United States Supreme Court, October 2013 
vs 
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Admitted Pro Hae Wisconsin, Ohio, Texas, Indiana, Kentucky and DC state courts 
PROFESSIONAL MEMBERSHIPS 
Member, American Bar Association, Illinois 
Chicago Bar Association YoUIJ.g Lawyers Section. Professional Responsibility Committee 
2010, 2010-2011 and 2011-2012 years) 
Founding Chair, American Association for Justice Professional Liability Litigation Group (2012-present). 
PUBLICATIONS AND SEMINARS 
No Good Mental Note: Keys to Progressing, AA.J Trial Lawyer Magazine (Summer Edition) 
Attorneys, The Inteme\ & Hate Speech: An Argument For An Amended Model Rule 8.4, Seattle Journal 
for Social Justice (Summer 2014 issue). 
Avoidance of the Dreaded Legal Malpractice Claim, American Association for Justice Almu.al 
Convention (Washington, D.C., July 2014) 
Stream.lining Client Representation: Leveraging new business structures, Law Bulletin Seminars 
(Chicago, June 2014) 
Contributing Editor, lll$ideCoun.sel Magazine (January 2014,Preseut) 
So You Want to File a Legal Malpractice Case? American Association for Justice Annual Convention 
(Chicago, June 2012) 
View from the Plai.nti.frs Bar. Adapting Your Claims and Litigation Strategies to New and Innovative 
Theories Being Brought by You.r Adversaries, ACI/LPL Legal Malpractice Conference (New York, May 
2012). 
A Practical Due Diligence Checklist on. Preventing the Most Common Atto11J.eys Errors in Civil 
Litigation, ACIILPL Legal Malpractice Conference (New Y od<, May 2012) 
Ethical Considerations Related to Modem Technology, Chicago Bar Association YLS Professional 
Responsibility Committee (Chicago, September 2010). 
"Rules 1.3 and 1.4 of the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct," Half Moon Seminar (Chicago, October, 
2006). 
Moderator: Chicago Bar Association Seminars on Rules of Professional Conduct (December, 2009, June, 
2010, December 2010, June 2011, December 2011, and June 2012). 
Moderator: Chicago Bar Association Seminar-State of the Profession (December 2012). 
VOLUNTEER/PRO BONO EXPERIENCE 
Volunteer attorney with Chicago Volunteer Legal Services (2005-Present) 
Chicago Bar Association e-mentoringprogrammentor (2006-2007, 2012) 
Brief grader for Chicago Bar Association moot court competition (2006) 
American Association for Justice (formerly ATLA) mock tTial judge (2006) 
Chicago Bar Association Judicial Evaluation Committee (2009-Present) 
Young Professionals Committee for Justice Mary Jane Theis (2011J2012) 
Case Western Reserve University School of Law Alumni Recruiting Coordinator (2011-Present) 
American Association for Justice Law Schools Committee (2012-Present) 
Region.al Coordinator American Association for Justice STAC Program (2013, 2014) 
.American Association for Justice NLD Education Committee (Present) 
CHARITABLE EXPERIENCE 
Founding Member of The Up Foundation. (benefits Autism Speaks) 
Advisory Board Member ofLifeLine Response and Clandestine Development 
AWARDS AND HONORS 
Illinois Rising Stars List 2013 and 2014 (Professional Responsibility) 
American Association for Justice Trial lawyers Care Award 2014 (Finalist) 
vs Hawley 
7 West Sprague Avenue Suite 1200 
Spokane, Washington 99201-3505 
Telephone: (509) 455-6000 
Facsimile: (509) 838-0007 
Attorney for Defendant Hawley Troxell Em1is & Hawley LLP 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE ST ATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
MARTIN FRANTZ, ) Case No. CVlS-1406 
) 
Plaintiff, ) AFFIDAVlT OF JOHN P, KURTZ, JR. 
) 
vs. 
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HA WIEY, 
LLP, and Idaho Limited Liability Partnership, 
Def end ant. 
----------------
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss. 








I, JOHN F. KURTZ, JR. being first duly swom 011 oath, depose and state: 
1. I am a partner with defendant, Hawley Troxell E1uris & Hawley, LLP ("Hawley 
Troxell"), am competent to be a witness in this action, and have personal lrnowledge of the 
matters herein asserted. 
2. I represent Idaho Independent Bank ("fIB") in a Non-Discharge action filed on 
August 23, 2013, in a Chapter 7 banluuptcy proceeding curret.1tly pending before Jndge Myers in 
the United States Bankruptcy Court, District of Idaho. 
AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN F. KURTZ, JR. 
O:H83.0l04.7380l2!U 
aware 
unauthorized contact with the CEO of our client, without notice to me or the finn. 
4. By way of background, on August 23, 2013, Hawley Troxell filed a lawsuit on 
behalf of IIB against :Martin and Cynthia Frantz's Cllaptei- 7 banktuptcy case, seeking a non-
discharge judgment on the basis of fraud and conversion ("Non-Discharge Action°), On the 
eve of trial, Frantzes 1 represented by their son, Johnathon Frantz, filed a Motion to 
Disqualify Hawley Troxell claimu1g that Hawley Troxell had previously represented Mr. 
Frm1tz as legal counsel and alleging that the firm was using confidential informatio11 in the 
Non-Discharge Action. Ju connection with that motio11, plaintiffs submitted an Affidavit of 
Mr. Katz, attempting to present Mr. Katz's expert opinion on whether a conflict existed. 
While the action was proceeding, Mr. Katz, an attorney licensed in Illinois, wrote the firm iu 
a letter, attached hereto a.s Exhibit A, advising that he intended to file a legal malpractice 
action against the firm on behalf of the Framzes. 
5. The Bankruptcy Court properly rejected Mr. Katz's expe1t testimony, and, after 
a two day evidentiary heaiing, ruled that Merlyn Clark of Hawley Troxell had not previously 
represented Mr. Frantz, and that no confidential information was being utilized by Hawley 
Troxell in the Non-Discharge Action. That ruling was entered on December 10, 2014. 
6. Neveitheless, on February 20, 2015, Mr. Frantz, through his son Jonathon Frantz, 
JSB #9129, filed the afore~threatened legal malpractice lawsuit against Hawley Troxell, Thus, 
Mr. Katz was fully aware that JIB was represented by Hawley Troxell. 
7. Nevertb.eless, on March 9, 2015, Mr. Katz sent an electronic message to 
Jack W. Gustavel, the CEO of IIB, introducing himself as an attomey representing Frantz in 
AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN F. KURTZ, JR 
D5l83.D!04.1380!25.l 
discuss how this newly action may "financially beneficial to you." (See Exhibit B) 
This is a clear violation of Idaho Rules for Civil Procedure 4.2. 
8. It should also be noted that Mr. Katz's effort to present himself as an expert 
wit11ess in the Non-Discharge Action, while simultaneously representing himself as Mr. Frantz's 
attorney, suggests a lack of familiarity with IRCP 3.7, which precludes fill anomey acting as an 
advocate at trial in which that attomey is likely to be a necessm·y witness. Mr. Katz's intentions 
DJ regard to presenting himself as a witness in this instant action is unclear at this point. 
_JOHNF. KURTZ, JR. 
SIGNED AND SWORN to before me this __ day of April, 2015, by JOHN F, 
KURTZ,JR. 
Notary Public in and for the State of ____ _ 
Residing at _____________ _ 
My Comn1ission Expires: ---------
AFFIDA VII OF JOHN F. KURTZ, JR 
0Sl83.0104.73&0125.l 
vs 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the day of April, 2015, I caused to be served a true 
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J onathou Fram2. 
Frantz Law, PLLC 
307 N. Lincoln St. Suite A 
Post Fells. Idaho 83815 
OS I 83.010<1.7380125.l 
Exhibit "D" 
) 
MARTIN FRANTZ, ) Docket No. BK-11-21337-TLM 
Debtor. 
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Frantz Law, PLLC 
307 N. Lincoln St., Suite A 
Post Falls, ID 83854 
208-297-6647 
Jonathon@cdalegal.com 
V-13-7024-TLJ.~ !daho Independent Bank v. Martin Frantz 
Judge's Or~l Ruling 
12/10/14 
NW TRANSC~IPTS, iLC - IDAHO DIVISION 
P.O. Box 33, Issaquah, Washington 98027-0002 










PROCEEDINGS BEG&~ AT 2 00:06 P.M. 
* * * * * 
THE CLERK: Good afternoon. This is Mel 
MR. JONATBA.~ FRANTZ: Hello. 
THE CLERK: -- with Judge Meyers. Mr. Frantz? 
MR. JONATHAN FRANTZ: Yeah. Hi, Mel. How are you? 
THE CLERK: Great, Thank you for calling in. I 
10 have Ms. Schwager on the line. And do I have Mr. Tim Kurtz 
11 on the line? 
12 
13 
MR. TIM KORTZ: Yes, I'm here. Thank you. 
THE CLERK: Great. Thank you all for calling in 
14 and we'll begin in just a moment. 
15 (Pause in the proceedings) 
16 TBE COURT: Good afternoon, counsel. This is Judge 
17 Myers. Thank you for calling in. I appreciate it. 
18 This is in the matter of Idaho Independent Bank 
19 versus Frantz, Adveraary 13-7024. 
20 Before me are two motions( Docket Numbers 55 and 59; 
21 both brought by the defendants. They seek to disqualify 
22 plaintiffs' counsel, Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley, and to 
23 disqualify the plainti 's expert, Rand Wichman. 
24 The motions were heard on December 1 and 2. There 
25 were other motions in this adversary also heard on those days, 
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2 en on deci ion 
3 two pending and yet unresolved motions. 
4 The context of the dispute i5 clear. This cau5e 
5 was set down for a week long trial to com.~ence Decewber 1. 
6 That initial trial setting was made almost a year in advance. 
7 Several amendments to the order setting trial were made on 
8 the parties requests and stipulations, generally dealing with 
9 discovery and trial preparation, but the trial date never 
10 varied. 
11 In October the defendants filed the first of 
12 multiple motions seeking to continue the trial and to obtain 
13 related relief. On October 20, at hearing, I denied those 
14 motions. That result was followed by the defendants' motion 
15 to disqualify Hawley Troxell a little over a week later and a 
16 week after that came the motion to disqualify Wichman as an 
17 expert witness. 
18 On September 17, I entered an oral ruling noting 
19 that the motions could well be viewed as strategic rather 
20 than meritorious and designed solely to gain the relief that 
21 the fai d motion to continue the trial didn't achieve. 
22 Indeed, defendants' counsel in the October hearing 
23 acknowledged considering but not bringing the motion to 
24 disqualify Hawley Troxell because at that point in the game, 
25 as you said, it was a little late. 
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3 Corporation requires, whenever allegations of ethical 
4
1 
violations are made it's this Court's duty to examine the 
5 charge since it's this Court that must supervise the conduct 
6 ot the members of its Bar. I, therefore, look closely at the 
7 assertions, the objections, the declarations, and the 
8 affidavits that were submitted by the parties. 
9 I noted that defendants bore the burden of 
10 establishing good cause for the request of disqualification. 
11 And I noted under the rules, contested matters that raise 
12 factual issues require proof. Unfortunately, the affidavits 
13 and the declarations did not provide an adequate settled 
14 record. I would have been called upon to make inferences 
15 and weigh testimonial assertions in the affidavits without 
16 the benefit of observing the witnesses or hearing their 
17 testimony under cross-examination, as well as their direct 
18 testimony. I simply couldn't resolve the motions on that 
19 basis. 
20 So while I noted at that prior ruling that the 
21 showing by defendants in their submissions was less than 
22 compelling or even preponderating and were not then adequate 
23 to justify granting the motions, they would be provided an 
24 opportunity to present evidence to prove them up. As l noted 
25 in November this approach was taken not just because of the 
DV-13-7024-TL~ Idaho Independent Bank v. Martin Frantz 
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2 al 
when 
on affidavits was also 
3 motions on the burden of proof type basis and on the then 
4 inadequate showing, would leave a cloud hanging over the 
5 entire case and hanging over the plaintiff's law firm which 
6 would prevail, but under a ruling based more on defective, an 
7 eleventh hour approach to the issue than on the merits ruling. 
8 So the motions were set down for December 1 and I reluctantly 
9 vacated the trial setting. 
10 The parties were required to disclose evidence by 
11 November 25 at 5:00 p.m. Mountain time. The plaintiff 
12 complied with that deadline; the defendants did not. Docket 
13 75, the defendants' witness disclosure was filed 16 minutes 
14 late and their exhibit disclosure filed the following day. 
15 As discussed at the time, the hearing on the 
16 motions commenced on December 1. The plaintiff did not 
17 exercise the right that it had to ask for exclusion of the 
lB defendant's untimely disclosed witnesses and exhibits. I 
19 think it was clear that comiistent with the Court's comments 
20 at the November hearing, plaintiff's counsel wanted the 
21 matter heard and resolved on the evidence and on the merits 
22 and not on a default ruling. 
23 My view in November was that I needed to hear the 
24 testimonial assertions of Merlyn Clark, Marty Frantz, Regina 
25 McCrea, and Rand Wichman in court, subject to cross-
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3 resolve any inferences or ambiguities that might arise. 
4 The hearing became far more involved and extensiver 
5 in large part due to the nu:rober of e~.hibits the parties 
6 offered. In my view many of the exhibits were purely 
7 collateral, some immaterial. This was, recall, simply a 
8 hearing on two disqualification motions, not a trial or a 
9 preliminary trial of the causes under the complaint or the 
10 defenses to the complaint. Many of the exhibits ultimately 
11 were of value only in corroboration or impeachment and a few 
12 were particularly noteworthy in that regard. But of course, 
13 ! was required to and I ha~e evaluated all of the e~hibits 
14 that were admitted. This of course, prohibited entry of a 
15 decision on December 2 while I was in Coeur drAlene, but I am 
16 ready to issue a decision now having considered all the 
17 testimony, the exhibits 1 and the briefing tha~ were £iled 
16 that was filed and also the oral arguments that were made. 
19 And I've also independently reviewed the authorities. My 
20 oral ruling complies with 9014 and 7052 of the Bankruptcy 
21 Rules. 
22 I'll take up first Docket 55, the disqualification 
23 of Hawley Troxell. 
24 The defendants' motions to disqualify Hawley 
25 Troxell as counsel for the plaintiff urges that 
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2 And 
3 applicable in adversary proceedings in 
4 local Bankruptcy Rule 9010.l(g). 
Court our 
5 The defendants assert that 2008, Merlyn Clark; a 
6 partner at Hawley Troxell formed an attorney-client 
7 ~elationship with Marty Frantz. Idaho Rule of Professional 
8 Conduct 1.9 instructs that a lawyer who has formerly 
9 represented a client in a matter shall not, thereafter, 
10 represent another person in the same or a substantially 
11 related matter in which that person's interests are 
12 materially averse to the interest of the former client, 
13 unless the former client gives informed consent confirmed in 
14 writing. 
15 The plaintiff responds to this contention by noting 
16 that in 2008, Merlyn Clark was retained and acted solely as a 
17 testifying expert wi~ness and did so on the subject of 
18 professional malpractice in Marty Frantz' State Court lawsuit 
19 against Witherspoon Kelley in which Mr. Frantz Wa5 
20 represented by Owens & Crandall. The plaintiff argues that 
21 Mr. Clark was not retained as co-counsel, nor did he in any 
22 way act as an attorney to Mr. Frantz. Thus plaintiff argue5 
23 no attorney-client relationship was ever forroe.d. 
24 The defendants respond that Clark, even if 
25 initially hired as an expert witness, became a consulting 
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when and 
on Owens 
3 Crandall, particularly Ms. McCrea. 
4 At hearing Mr. Clark was clear and direct and 
5 credible in his testimony. He testified, and the Coµrt finds 
6 and concludes that his role in the malpractice litigation was 
7 solely that of a testifying expert witness. In that capacity 
8 he prepared an affidavit( Exhibit 200, to which he attached 
9 his expert opinions. Within that report Mr. Clark listed all 
10 the information he reviewed and considered in forming his 
11 opinion, as would be required for expert disclosures. No 
12 confidential information was there listed. Indeed, Mr. Clark 
13 stated that. he did not receive any confidential information 
14 while evaluating the malpractice case as a testifying expert 
15 witness in such case. 
16 Mr. Clark was also clear that not only did he not 
17 review confidential information, he discussed with Owens & 
18 Crandall the fact tha~ any information provided to him would 
19 be subject to discovery by the State Court defendants and 
20 thus, obviously, should not be included in any of the 
21 information provided to him. Such a warning is consistent 
22 with the limited role of a testifying expert witness; not one 
23 as a retained attorney or as co-counsel. 
24 The defendants have placed a great deal of emphasis 
25 on the words, quote, "confidential and privileged," close 
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Mr 
3 was hired, quote, "as an expert witness to 
he 
advice and 
4 te5timony on the subject of the alleged professional 
5 malpractice," close quote, as in Exhibit 200 at 9. 
6 Mr. Clark credibly testified that the word, 
7 "advice" -was in effect, as in advising Owens & Crandall what 
I 
8 he would be able to testify to and what his opinion would 
9 be. Moreover the confidential and privileged nomenclature 
10 was intended, consistent with the rules that Mr. Clark and 
11 Owens & Crandall understood to reflect the fact that if they 
12 decided not to disclose him as a testifying expert witness, 
13 the report he created would not be subject to discovery. In 
14 this contex~ and given the whole of the evidence about the 
15 retention and use of Mr. Clark by Owens & Crandall, the use 
16 of the term "confidential" does not and did not create an 
17 attorney-client relationship. 
18 The Court has also considered carefully the 
19 testimony of Ms. McCrea, one of Marty Frantz' State Court 
20 attorneys. She stated that Mr. Clark was hired as an expert 
21 to establish and later testify to the standard of care in the 
22 malpractice litigation. 
23 While she testified that she asked Mr. Clark 
24 questions about damages, her testimony was not materially 
25 inconsistent with Mr. Clark's; and the question of what sorts 
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0 an Moreover did 
3 not providing any of the documents attached to her 
4 notes to Mr. Clark. Instead she asserted that her questions 
5 for Mr. Clark were based on his review of the depositions and 
6 the exhibits attached to those depositions. She did not 
7 testify that Mr. Clark provide advice beyond what Mr. Clark 
8 himself testified to. fie did not believe certain damages 
9 were available and he would not provide expert testimony on 
10 that aspect of the litigation. But again, such discussions 
11 would be consistent with an expert's analysis of the facts in 
12 defining the testimony the expert is willing to provide in 
13 the litigation and the opinion that he would provide in his 
1q report. 
15 Ms. McCrea's testimony was responsive to 
16 questioning. I was impressed that she acted not as an 
17 advocate for the defendants' motion but as a percipient fact 
18 witness and she was careful and measured and clear in her 
19 testimony and in that way she was credible. Her testimony 
20 did not establish that Mr. Clark was a consulting expert, 
21 nor that he had ent.sred into an attorney-client relationship 
22 with either her firm qr with hex firm's client. 
23 Marty Frantz testified as well. fie testified as to 
24 
25 
the retention and use of Mr. Clark by his former malpractice 
lawyers at Owens & Crandall. But his testimony in that 
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3 rsthand knowledge of the facts. Instead, he was simply 
4 interpreting the other evidence and expressing his opinion 
5 about its significance or its consequence. 
6 Whether it was volunteered from the witness stand 
1 or, more often than not, proffered in response to patently 
8 leading questions 1 it was not entitled to weight, e~en where 
9 arguably relevant. 
10 The Court concludes plaintiffs' analysis of the 
11 facts and the law is supported by the record. Mx. Clark was 
12 acting as a testifying expert witness only. As such, an 
13 attorney-client relationship was not created. There's no 
14 basis to disqualify Hawley Tro~ell under IRPC 1,9 and 
15 defendants motion, Docket 5S, will, therefore, be denied, 
16 Given this conclusion, the several other arguments 
17 advanced factually and legally about whether matters are 
18 substantially related under Rule 1.9 and similar sorts of 
19 debates simply need not be reached. 
20 I 1 11 turn next to the disqualification of Rand 
21 Wichman, Docket 59. 
22 The defendants urge that disqualification, arguing 
23 that Wichman was previously defendant's hired expert and 
24 cannot now switch sides to provide expert testimony for the 
25 plaintiff. The evidence establishes that in 2006 Mr. Frantz 
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1 the to services. an 
3 contractor Wichman's role to assist Marty Frantz and his 
4 engineers, quote, "In evaluating development options, 
5 regulatory constraints and agency concerns," 
6 that were associated with the so-called Eagle Ridge at Twin 
7 Lakes Development. 
8 The agreement made no reference to or indication of 
9 confidentiality. The agreement contained an integration 
10 clause that required any mod~ficatioos to be in writing and 
11 signed by both parties. There were no such other writings 
12 introduced. 
13 Mr. Wichman's role and his value was due to his 
14 long prior involvement with the regulatory side of 
15 development, including his work with the Kootenai County 
16 Planning and Development authorities. And it was in those 
17 regards that he provided advice and assistance. The 
18 defendants failed to establish that the scope and extent of 
19 Wichman's involvement went into the specific areas that he 
20 now evaluates as plaintiffs' expert. 
21 It's true that an e~pert may be disqualified when 
22 the expert switches sides to consult for the opposing party 
23 or is affiliated with experts for an opposing party. 
24 However, because an expert does not advocate during 
25 litigation, but acts as a source of information and opinion, 
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the 
2 from di 
3 One of the several cases on this score is Cren~haw 
4 versus M-0-N-Y Life Insurance, 318 F.Supp.2d 1015 from the 
5 Southern District of California in 2004, 
6 Another case that is relevant is Hewlett-Packard 
7 Company versus EMC Corporation, 330 F.Supp.2d 1081 1 from the 
8 Northern District of California in 2004. In the Hewlett 
9 Paokaxd case the Court states, quote: 
10 ~In s~itching sides cases, disqualification may be 










received from the original hiring party." Closed quote. 
In essencer quote, "disquaJ.ification of an expert 
is warranted based on a prior relationship with an 
adversary ifr 
1) the adversary had a confidential 
~elationship with the expert, and; 
2) the adversary disclosed confidential 
information to the expert that is relevant to the 
current ligation. '1 Closed quote. 
21 That again is from the Hewlett Packard case. 
22 The defendants here bear the burden of 
23 demonstrating both that a confidential relationship existed 
24 between Frantz and Wichman or that it was reasonable for them 
25 to believe that such a relationship existed. And to also 
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3 the relationship. Here, as Ive noted, Mr. Wichman's 
4 agreement to provide services, Exhibit 216, signed by Mr. 
5 Frantz contained no confidentiality provision. Moreover, Mr. 
6 Wichman testified he didn't believe a confidsntial 
7 relationship existed and that he was not provided any 
8 confidential information. 
9 To be sure, Mr. Wichman admitted he held sensitive 
10 information. And Marty Frantz responded to questioning 
11 several times over emphasizing the word, ''sensitive." 
12 And Marty Frantz's attorney on the Eagle Ridge 
13 project, Mr. Reagan, stated that certain of the strategies 
14 that ~ere contemplated such as lot line adjustments were 
15 sensitive, at least in the sense that they could be 
16 compromised or made more difficult or expensive if they were 
17 learned of by regulators or by anti-development factions 
18 before Eagle Ridge was ready to effect the strategy. But 
19 sensitive is not generally synonymous with confidential and 
20 it is certainly not synonymous in the legal sense that I'm 
21 required to evaluate. 
22 Mr. Wichman was under no obligation to guard such 
23 information from disclosure and the agreement 1 Exhibit 216, 
24 is totally silent as to any obligations or duties in regard 
25 to either sensitive or confidential information. 
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i contr p 
3 defendants' burden, under this motion, to establish the same. 
4 The defendants were also required to, quote, "Point to 
S specific and unantbiguous disclosures that if revealed would 
6 prejudice the party." Close quote. Again a quotation from 
7 Hewlett Packard. 
8 The defendants assert that Mr. Wichman was involved 
9 in numerous discussions ~ith counsel for Eagle Ridge, Mr. 
10 Reagan, indeed he was. However, as the Court in the Hewlett 
11 Packa~d case noted, quote, "Discussions between parties or 
12 counsel and experts do not carry the presumption that 
13 confidential information was exchanged." Close quote. 
14 Mr. Reagan did not tell Mr. Wichman that any 
15 conversations they had were subject to the attorney-client 
16 privilege, nor did Mr, Reagan in his testimony identify any 
17 confidential disclosures that were provided. The defendants 
18 have failed to provide the specific disclosures and have 
19 failed to meet their burden. 
20 The defendants point to Mr. Wichman's attendance at 
21 several project meetings where they assert that project bids 
22 weke discussed. However, the defendants did not identify 
23 specific information that would fall within the rules ambit. 
24 And when Mr. Wichman was questioned regarding those meetings, 
25 he credibly testified that he did not recall bid amounts 
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3 of his job. 
4 Mr. Wichman's expert opinion for plaintiff deals 
5 with an analysis of the state of development at the time 
6 various draw requests on the IIB credit facility were made, 
7 using those requests and the checking account records of 
8 Eagle Ridge. He testified credibly that even without his 
9 prior association with the Eagle Ridge Development he could 
10 have prepared that expert opinion. His prior association 
11 provided some familiarity with the layout of the development, 
12 the project. plan, that he could have developed the same 
13 knowledge for purposes of the expert opinion through 
14 inspection of the property and revie~ of public records. 
15 While acting as an independent contractor for Mr. 
16 Frantz, Mr. Wichman did not prepare draw requests. Wichman 
17 did attempt to find the least expensive route to develop the 
18 property, but was not involved with procuring financing, 
19 budgeting for the project 1 or paying expenses. 
20 Itts clear from the evidence that Mr. Wichman had 
21 not seen tbe draw requests or supporting materials until 
22 plaintiff provided them and it was these materials that 
23 Wichman analyzed in his expert report. 
2~ Finally, I would note that Wichman testified that 
25 he contacted Mr. Frantz in 2011 to inform him that plaintiff 
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3 but s opinion that it would be a good thing for him to have 
4 Mr. Wichman educate the plaintiff and provide an accurate 
5 picture of the development. 
6 That raises a couple of concerns, one of which of 
7 course is the delay from 2011 in raising concerns over 
8 confidentiality or side switching experts. 
9 The other issue that it raises, concerns the nature 
10 of the information that Mr. Wichman could provide regarding 
11 the development. 
12 Mr. Frantz testified that he limited his approval 
13 of Wichman's involvement only to discussion of lot line 
14 adjustments. But I find Mr. Wichman's testimony of the 
15 discussions more credible. 
16 Frankly, if Mr. Frantz wanted to have his cake and 
17 eat it too, by allowing Wichman to education IIB on the 
18 development but simultaneously restrict him from mentioning 
19 or commenting on other aspects of the developrnentr a fine line 
20 to be sure, then Mr. Frantz was required to make that 
21 demarcation clear and unambiguous. He did not do so, nor is 
22 it clear that he would have had a right to do so and if it 
23 was a concern it is one certainly ripened years ago. 
24 The defendants tried other avenues at hearing to 
25 convince the Court that relevant confidential information was 
DV-13-7024-TLM Idaho Independent Bank v. ~artin Frantz 
Judge's Oral Ruling 
NW TRANSCRIPTS, LLC - IDAHO DIVISION 
P.O. Box 33 1 Issaquah, @aahington 96027-0002 
(2061 989-3455 - gay1e@nwtranscripts.com 
1~710714 
18 
And ed Mr. 
Wi bi 
3 of FN excuse me, FIN and ~progress w1~h Marty." 
4 Close quote. This is in Exhibit 21?, The abbreviation of 
5 FIN means financial. 
6 This entry was rebutted by the testimony. Mr. 
7 Wichman explaining that it concerned not the financial 
8 guarantees that Mr. Frantz may have made to IIB, but instead 
9 deal with financial performance guarantees that Eagle Ridge 
10 had to make to and for the benefit of public entities. The 
11 reliance on this thin read was emblematic of tbe attempt of 
12 defendants to create an alleged role for Mr. Wichman and a 
13 suggestion of delivery or disclosure of so-called 
14 confidential information which simply wasn't there. 
15 Based on the evidence presented I conclude there 1 s 
16 no basis to disqualify Mr. Wichman as plaintiff's expert. 
17 The motion, Docket 59, will be denied. And because Wichman 
18 is not disqualified, the attendant motion to disqualify 
19 Hawley Troxell, based on the retention of Wichman, would also 
20 be and will also be denied. 
21 I'll enter my own orders on the ruling today. 
22 Given the resolution of these motions, the trial 
23 needs to be reset. Given the Court's calendar, and this i$ 
24 unfortunate, the earliest that that may occur is April. 
25 I ~ill ask the parties to provide the Court with 
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2 
3 precise, and to limit their suggested unavailable dates to 
4 only trial settings and hearing settings of matters which are 
5 likely to go and which counsel may not utilize, substitute 
6 or co-counsel. I request and expect that the parties will 
7 provide their unavailable dates to me by the end of this week 
8 by looking at your calendars for next year. You submit them 
9 in the proper form in the adversary pleading by a submission 
10 and I will evaluate the same and will, thereafter, issue an 
11 amended pretrial order establishing briefing deadlines, which 
12 were previously abated. 
13 However, in establishing the deadlines and issuing 
14 an amended pretrial order, I will not be reopening discovery. 
15 I also will not allow for additional witnesses or exhibit 
16 disclosures beyond those that were previously required. 
17 I'm advised that the parties have disclosed their 
18 exhibits and their witnesses to one another. I believe that 
19 plaintiff haa provided the original and required copies of 
20 trial exhibits to the Court. I'm not sure that the 
21 defendants have done so. But my pretrial order will 
22 establish a prompt deadline for both parties to have 
23 completed the process of delivery of their proposed exhibits 
24 to the Court so that we have them available. 
25 My intent here should be quite clear, while there 
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3 no more discovery, there's no more disclosure of 
4 witnesses and exhibitsr therers no more litigation. We're 
5 preparing for trial. 
6 I'll issue that order with the trial setting as 
7 soon as I can, after reviewing your unavailable dates. I 
8 will also get the order out on the two motions that I have 
9 resolved today. 
















MS. SCHWAGER: Thank you. 
MR. JONATHAN FRANTZ: Thanks. 
PROCEEDINGS CONCLUDED AT 2:27:16 P.M. 
~ * * * * 
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- ·--· --··~ .. ~_....,~--' ~" - - ... ~, . .,------··-~----------------------~ 
from: Jefferey Katz. [mallto:JKatz@pai:tersoolawfirm.cumJ 
sent: Monday, March 09, 2015 B:59 AM 
To: Jack: W. Gustave! 
Subject Marty Frantz 
Mr. Gustavel-
1 represent Marty Frantz ln a newly filed action against his former attomeys at the l'!owleyTroKeil firm. I would like to 
diswss this matter with you and discuss how it may be financially beneficial to you. 
Please give me a call at your convenience. 
Jefferey Ogden Kati 
Partner 
li~nerson l..aw Firm 
One North LaSalle Street, Suite 2100 
Chicago, Illinois 60602 
Direct (312) 750.1817 
Main (312) 223.1699 Ext. 104 • Fax: (312) 223.8549 
email I _website I maQ 
CONFID~N iJAU fY NOTICE; 
Thi; nlcctronlt: c.orn111unicatio11 and any att;;ched lff~4 contain lnforrnatlon lotend~d for tile exclusive use o( the tndlvldua1 or entlty co whoni It ls 
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11ot th!l intend<>Ji reclpicmt, \'OU are hereby notJf!NI that any vlewln~. copying, c.115,::to,ure or distrll>t,tfon of this information lS prohlllitti.'Cl anct mav 
be subjai: to !cga! ms.Mctkm or s<1n~tton. Plc2su notify the sendGr, by electronic mail ortelt:l)hono, of MY unintended rec:iple.nts anti dl.'lut~ tlie 
orJeindl rne.s;dge .,,lthoul lTlalcing Joy copie~. e:~malls art:! su,ce.ptll.>19. to change. The Patteson Lnw Arm. I.LC does not guarantee that: the lntegrttv 
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RISEBOROUGH, ISB #7898 
HAMBLEN 
West Sprague Suite 
Spokane, Washington 99201-3 505 
Telephone: (509) 455-6000 
Facsimile: (509) 838-0007 
Attorney for Defendant Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley LLP 
1N THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 




HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY 
LLP, an Idaho Limited Liability Partnership, 
Defendant. 
) 
) Case No. CVlS-1406 
) 
) NOTICE OF APPEARANCE 
) 
) FEE CATEGORY: I.I 
) FEE: $136.00 
) 
) Confirmation No: 04725D 
) Fax No: 509-838-0007 
TO: THE ABOVE-NAMED PLAINTIFF; and 
TO: YOUR ATTORNEY, JONATHON FRANTZ 
YOU WILL PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that John C. Riseborough of PAINE HAMBLEN 
LLP hereby enters the appearance of said finn as attorneys of record for Defendant, HAWLEY 
TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP, an Idaho Limited Liability Partnership, in this action. All 
future pleadings, correspondence, and other documents relating to this matter should be 
forwarded to John C. Riseborough of the Paine Hamblen LLP law firm, as attorneys for 
Defendant HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP at the above-referenced address. 
Defendant hereby specifically reserves all defenses, including but not limited to those 
described in IRCP 12, whether assertable by motion, or in an appropriate responsive pleading. 
DATED this !J_ ctay May, 2015. 
By if& Ris~o,(!~ 
Attorneys for Defendant 
l :\Spodocs\00 l 96\00038\PLEAD\01434903. DOC 
NOTICE OF APPEARANCE - 2 





J:\Spodocs\00196\00038\PLEAD\O J 434903.DOC 
NOTrCE OF APPEARANCE - 3 
Jonathon Frantz 
Frantz Law, PLLC 
307 N. Lincoln St. Suite A 
Post Falls, Ida.ho 83815 
7 West Sprague Avenue Suite 1200 
Spokane, Wasrungton 99201-3505 
Telephone: (509) 455-6000 
Facsimile: (509) 838-0007 
Attorney for Defendant Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley LLP 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 




HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY 
LLP, an Idaho Limited Liability Partnership, 
Defendant. 
STATE OF WASHINGTON) 
) ss: 
County of Spokane ) 
) 
) Case No. CVIS-1406 
) 







JOHN C. RJSEBOROUGH, being fust duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says: 
1. I am the attorney representing defendant, Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley in this 
action. I am competent to be a witness and have personal knowledge sufficient to authentkate 
the documents attached hereto. 
2. Attached to this Affidavit as Exhibit I is a true and complete copy of the 
Declaration of Regina McCrea sans Exhibits, filed in the currently pending bankruptcy 
proceeding, In Re: Martin V Frantz and Cynthia M Frantz, Debtors, United States Bankruptcy 
Court, Case l l and 
3. Attached hereto as Exhibit II is a true and correct copy of Declaration of 
Martin Frantz as filed in the Bankruptcy Proceeding and denominated as Document 55-5. 
4, Attached hereto as Exhibit III is a true and correct copy of a letter, dated 
December l 6, 2008, to Merlyn Clark from Regina McCrea as filed in the Bankruptcy Proceeding 
as Exhibit A to her Declaration, and denominated as Document 55-2 therein. 
5. Attached hereto as Exhibit IV is a true and correct copy of the demand letter 
regarding commercial guaranties. 
6. Attached hereto as Exhibit V is a true and correct copy of the Affidavit of 
Merlyn W. Clark with Exhibits thereto as filed in the Bankruptcy Proceeding, and denominated 
as Document 66-1 therein. 
7. Attached hereto as Exhibit VI is a true and correct copy of the Stipulated Order 
Granting Motions for 2004 Examinations of Debtors entered in the Bankruptcy Proceeding, and 
denominated as Document 54 therein. 
8. Attached hereto as Exhibit VII is a true and complete copy of the Motion and 
Memorandum to Disqualify Hawley TroxelJ Ennis & .Hawley filed in the Bankruptcy 
Proceeding, and denominated as Document 55 therein. 
9. Attached hereto as Exhibit VIII is a true and complete copy of the Memorandum 
in Opposition to Motion to Disqualify filed in the Bankruptcy Proceeding, and denominated as 
Document 66 therein. 
10. Attached hereto as Exhibit IX is a true and complete copy of the official transcript 
of the oral ruling regarding the motion to disqualify Hawley Troxell by the Honorable Terry L. 
Myers, Chief U.S. Bankruptcy Judge, United States Bankruptcy Court for the District ofldaho. 
11 . Attached hereto as Exhibit X is a true and complete copy of the Order Denying 




d // - / .Ur./-== 
SIGNED AND SWORN to before me this .]_ day of May, 2015, by JOHN C. 
RISEBOROUGH. 
'~-:t·~ Print Name: -n . , ts- n . 
NOTARY PUBLIC in :d~ 
of Washington, residing at Spokane 
My Commission Expires: 6\ o \ \ °I 
113 of 513 
b/07/201 14:58 FAX PAINE flAJlU:>LJ:m ...,,,, 
)< 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
on day of 






Frantz Law, PLLC 
307 N. Lincoln St. Suite A 
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Affidavit of Regina McCrea Page 1 of 3 
Law, 
307 N. Lincoln St. Suite A 
Post Falls, ID 83854 
Telephone: (208) 262-3893 
Facsimile: (208) 262-3894 
jonatbon@cdalegal.com 
ISB# 9129 
Attorney for Martin D. Frantz and Cynthia M. Frantz, Defendants 
UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT 
DISTRICT OF IDAHO 
(Coeur d'Alene) 
In Re: Case No. 11-21337-TLM 
MARTIN D. FRANTZ and CYNTIIlA M. 
FRANTZ, Chapter 7 
Debtors. 
IDAHO INDEPENDENT BANK, an Idaho 
corporation, Adversary Proc. No. 13-07024 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MARTIN D. FRANTZ, an individuai, and 
CYNTHJA M. FRANTZ, an individual, 
Defendants. 
DECLARATION OF REGINA McCREA 
STATE OF IDAHO) 
)ss. 
County of Kootenai ) 
REGINA McCREA declares under tl1e penalty of perjury as follows: 





Regina McCrea Page 2 of 3 
an the 
In 2008, attorney Bruce Owens I represented Marty Frantz and his company, Guardian 
Angel Homes Lewiston, LLC [hereinafter "GAH Lewiston"] in an attomey malpractice 
lawsuit against Witherspoon, Kelly> Davenport & Toole, P.S. The action was filed in 
Kootenai County District Comt as case number CV-08-2630 [the "Case"). 
3. Mr. Owens a11d I retained Merlyn Clark {an attorney with Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley, 
LLP) to serve as an expert witness in the Case. 1 have attached (as Exhibit A) a true and 
correct copy of the letter I directed to Mr. Clark concerning the underlying facts of the matter 
and highlighting the perceived breaches Witherspoon committed in its prior representation of 
Marty and GAH Lewiston. 
4. On or around April 15, 2009, Mr. Owens and I bad a phone conference with Mr. Clark to 
discuss his preliminary opinions. h1 that conversation (as reflected in my notes and emails), 
we also discussed the damages that were potentially recoverable as a consequence of the 
malpractice. 
5. Thereafter, Mr. Clark prepared a written report, a true and correct copy of which is attached 
as Exhibit B. 
6. I exchanged email correspondence with Marty concerning Mr. Clark's involvement and 
opinions. A true and correct copy of that communication 1s attached hereto as Exhibit C. 
7. The Case resolved through mediation, without Mr. Clark having been deposed. 
DATED this ~y of October, 2014 . 
.,,-i 
~~rd/!LU(/ 
REG .~ M. McCREA 
DECLARATION OF REGINA McCREA~ 2 
3 





1"nr,:aon,no to the following: 
John F Kurtz, Jr.· jkurtz@hawleytroxell.com 
Sheila Schwager- sschwager@hawleytroxell.com 
Isl Jonathon Frantz 
Jonathon Frantz, 
Attorney for Debtors 
:59 FAX PAINE HAMBLhN LLi 
EXHIBIT II 
0 14. 59 FAX PAINE HAMBLEN LLP 
Doc Filed 10/31,.,.4 
Affidavit Martin Frantz Page 1 of 8 
JONATHON FRANTZ 
Frantz Law, PLLC 
307 N. Lincoln St. Suite A 
Post Falls, ID 83854 
Telephone: (208) 262-3893 
Facsimile: (208) 262-3894 
jonathon@cdalegal.com 
ISB# 9129 
Attorney for Marin D. Frantz and Cynthia M. Frantz, Defendants 
UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT 
DISTRICT OF IDAHO 
(Coeur d'Alene) 
In Re: Case No. 11-21337-TLM 
MARTIN D. FRANTZ and CYNTHIA M. 
FRANTZ, Chapter? 
Debtors. 
IDAHO INDEPENDENT BANK, an Idaho 
corporation, Adversary Proc. No. 13·07024 
Plaintiff: 
vs. 
MARTIN D. FRANTZ, an individual, and 
CYNTHIA M. FRANTZ, an individual, 
Defendants. 
DECLARATION OF MARTIN FRANTZ 
STATE OF IDAHO) 
)ss. 
County of Kootenai ) 
MARTIN FRANTZ declares under the penalty of perjury as follows: 
@ 028/07 
05 14. 59 FAX PAINE HAMBLEN LLP 
TLM Doc 55-5 Fiied i0i31i14 Entered 10/31, J.4 
Affidavit of Martin Frantz Page 2 of 8 
am over 
Prior Reeresentation by Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley. LLP 
2. In 2008, I requested that Mr. Owens and Ms. McCrea represent me and my company, 
Guardian Angel Homes Le'Wiston, LLC ("GAH Lewiston j, in an attorney 
malpractice lawsuit against Witherspoon. Kelly, Devenport & Toole, P .S. 
("Witherspoon"). 
3. Mr. Owens and Ms. McCrea accepted representation of both GAH Lewiston and I 
and thereafter filed suit against Witherspoon in Kootenai County District Court as 
case munber CV-08-2630 (the "Case"}. 
4. The basis for the action centered on the land acquisition for the construction and 
development of GAH Lewiston in Lewiston, Idaho. In 1999, my business associates 
and I began looking for land in Moscow, Idaho for the development of a Guardian 
Angel Homes facility. After finding no available land in Moscow, Idaho, our real 
estate agent, Shelley Bennett, showed me some property in Lewiston, Idaho. In 2000, 
my business associates and I purchased the property. Several years after purchasing 
the property and developing GAR Lewisto~ GAR Lewiston and I attempted to 
refinance the property in order to expand and construct a second phase. The 
refinancing was delayed on account of an appraisal issues. The appraisal issue 
revealed information which I believed indicated that the seller had defrauded GAH 
Lewiston and myself when selling the property to us. More specifically, GAH 
Lewiston and I believed that the property was sold to them at an inflated price, which 
had in turn caused the appraisal issues. As a result, GAH Lewiston and I hired 
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Affidavit of Martin Frantz Page 3 of 8 
conspirator came to light Despite my requests to Witherspoon to include 
Bennett as a defendan~ Witherspoon failed to file suit against her in a timely manner. 
As a result, after Witherspoon included Ms.-Bennett in the law suit, the matter was 
summarily dismissed as beyond the statute of limitations. The dismissal was entered 
in January 2008. 
6. Late in 2008, Mr. Owens, Ms. McCrea and [ decided that an expert in the area of 
malpractice would be beneficial for the Case. As a result, we contacted Mr. Merlyn 
Clark an attorney with the law firm Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley LLP. Mr. Clark 
agreed to take a look at the Case. 
7. Sometime before April 15, 2009, Mr. Owens, Ms. McCrea and I discussed the matter 
of damages for the Case. In that conversation, we discussed the various possible 
damages and amounts. As a result of that conversation, Mr. Owens and/or Ms. 
McCrea requested that I prepare a statement and estimate my damages based upon 
our conversation. Subsequent to that conversation, I provided my attorneys with 
several estimates, and backup documentation, ofmy damages: 1) $408,364 for the 
difference in the price paid for the land and the value of the GAH Lewiston land; 2) 
$133,000 for the interest that GAH Lewiston and I owed the land seller in relation to 
the overpayment for the land; 3) lost profits for the delay in constructing GAH 
Lewiston's second phase expansion in the amount of $180,000; 4) attorney fees 
awarded against me in the earlier case conducted by Witherspoon in the amount of 
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amount 
8. Mr. Owens and/or Ms. McCrea then requested that GAH Lewiston and I further 
identify the damages caused directly to GAH Lewiston from paying an in.flat,xl price 
for the land and for the delay in developing GAH Lewiston's expansion. 
9. As a result, I provided N!r. Owens and Ms. McCrea with a further breakdown of those 
costs. In my response, I detailed the operational profits of GAH Lewiston from 2003 
to 2005 in order to determine the lost profits resulting from the delay in construction. 
I also provided my attorneys tax information related to GA.FI Lewiston and sought 
damages for the increased property taxes GAH Lewiston had paid to Nez Perce 
County as the county relied on the purchase and sale amount in its determination of· 
property assessed value. 
10. Subsequently, Mr. Owens and/or Ms. McCrea participated in a telephone conference 
with Mr. Clark. 
11. Ms. McCrea informed me about the contents of that conversation and that she, Mr. 
Owens and Mr. Clark had discussed the strengths and weaknesses in the Case, but in 
particular they had consulted on the matter of damages. 
12. In fact, Ms. McCrea informed me that Mr. Clark did not feel portions of our damages 
in the Case were collectible. 
13. I hag conversations with my attorneys regarding Mr. Clark's advice and I directed 
Ms. McCrea to supply additional information to Mr. Clark. 
14, ·when reviewing the file from the Case, sets of notes from both Mr. Owens and Ms. 
McCrea were found. Both sets of notes were designated as telephone conference with 
DECLARA~NJVF>~IN 
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however, only Mr. Owens was dated 
\ 
handwritten notes were not dated. 
15. The last portions of both sets of notes contemplated 'the matter of damages. 
Specifically, Mr. Owens's handwritten notes covered the damages outlined in my 
breakdown of those costs. Further, as the notes were found in the file, attached to 
them by paperclip were the GAH Lewiston financial documents I had provided to Mr. 
Owens and Ms. McCrea. 
16. The financial documents attached to my attorneys' handwritten notes had been 
marked up in such a way that corresponded with the comments Ms. McCrea indicated 
Mr. Clark shared as it relates to damages. 
17. On or about May 26, 2009, I received a bill for :Mr. Clark's services. On or about 
May 26, 2009 I directly paid the Hawley Troxell bill from my personal credit card. 
18. Later, the case was settled out of court. Mr. Clark never produced a :final report and 
never testified. 
Prior Relationship with Mr. Ran.d Wichman 
19. ln 2005, I began work on a real estate project on Lower Twin Lake in Kootenai 
County, Idaho. The project consisted of approximately 160 acres. The project, 
however, was split into two main sections: the southerly 104 acres (the "l 04 Acres") 
and the northerly 50 acres ("50 Acres"). A map of the project is attached hereto and 
incorporated herein as Exhibit A. The l 04 Acres is approximately shown outlined in 
yellow on the attached map, Ex.lnoit A. The 50 Acres is approximately shown 
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were encumbered a mortgage Idaho Independent 
however, was 11ot encumbered any mortgage. 
20. Prior to 2006, I and Eagle Ridge had hired Mr. Mike Reagan, attorney, to advise and 
act as c.ounsel for Eagle Ridge. 
21. In or about 2006, Eagle Ridge on Twin Lakes, Inc. ("Eagle Ridge") hired Mr. Rand 
Wichman for the purposes of consulting on development constructio~ planning and 
design of Eagle Ridge. Mr. Wichman was hired because he was the former Kootenai 
County Building and Planning Director. As such, he had an in depth knowledg~ 
about the Kootenai County codes and regulatiom as well as the understandings of the 
people who enforced the codes and regulations. 
22. When I hired Mr. Wichman, I felt that Mr. Wichman was a significant asset to the 
Eagle Ridge project. As a result, I informed IIB of the retention in order to validate 
the future of the Eagle Ridge project to IIB. 
23. Mr. Wichman was also to work with Mr. Reagan in securing lots lines for Eagle 
Ridge's development strategy, which consisted of concentrated early development on 
the 5 0 Acres. 
24. Once active development ceased on Eagle Ridge, Mr. Wichman's services were no 
longer sought 
25. While Mr. Wichman was Eagle Ridge's consultant, he would attend private planning 
meetings between myself, Mr. Reagan. During those meetings, we (Mr. Wichman, 
Mr. Reagan and myself) discussed the following: Eagle Ridge development strategy 
as it applied to making lot line adjustments; valuations of the lots; sizing of lots; 








26. Furthermore, while Mr. Wichman never prepared any draw requests for any loans 
issued by IIB, the numbers and amounts on the draw requests were made known to 
Mr. Wichman. In fact, at one point, the road that was to serve Eagle Ridge was 
required by the highway district to be designed with larger corner radiuses. This 
matter was discussed with Mr. Wichman and .Mr. Reagan. Specifically, the issue of 
cost increases and how that would affect Eagle Ridge's draw requests from IlB were 
discussed. 
27. Those conversations were always made in confidence. I do not recall ever having any 
other person present for those meetings outside of myself: Mr. Reagan and Mr. 
Wichman. 
28. At some of those meetings, detenninations were made that would require Mr. Reagan 
and Mr. Wichman to work together, just the two of them, in resolving some Eagle 
Ridge's issues. 
29. It was my expectation that the conversations in those meetings and my interactions 
with Mr. Wichman would remain confidential as they related to sensitive 
development information. 
30. Attached hereto as Exhibit B are true and correct copies of bills and statements that 
Eagle Ridge received from Mr. Wichman. 
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CERTIFICATE OF ELECTRONIC SERVICE 
I CERTIFY that on this day sent true 
correct copies of the foregoing to the following: 
John F Kurtz, Jr.· jkurtz@hawleytroxell.com 
Sheila Schwager- sschwager@bawleyt.roxell.com 
Isl Jon<Ithon Frantz 
Jonathon Frantz, 
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· R.BruceOwens•+ 
Jeffrey J. Crandall¥ 
Jeffrey R. Owens 
Douglas A. Oviatt 
Regina M. McCrea+ 
Linsey E. Mattison 
1859N. Lakewood Drive, Ste. 104 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83 814 
Phone (208) 667 -8989 
Fax (208) 667-1939 
www.owenscrandall.com 
•Ovil Trial Specialist 
+.Licensed io ID & WA 
Vlicensed io ID. WA & CA 
December 16, 2008 
MerlynOark 
Hawley Troxell 
877 W Main St., Ste 1000 
PO Box 1617 
Boise, ID 83701-1617 
OWENS & CRANDALL 
Attorneys At Law 
RE: Frantz et al v. Witherspoon Kelley 
Dear Mr. Clark: 
Thank you for agreeing to take a look at this case. 'This correspondence contains an outline of the 
basic facts in the hopes of obtaining an initial impression from you. As you know, this office 
represents Marty Frantz who is one of the owners of Guardian Angel Homes, a group of assisted 
living communities [hereinafter referred to as "GAH"J. In the summer of 1999, GAH began 
exploring the possibility of opening a facility in the Moscow/Pullman area and engaged Moscow 
Realtor Shelley Bennett to locate suitable property. The parties entered into an exclusive buyer 
representation agreement on June 17, 1999. 
GAH's members explained. to Bennett the type of property they wanted and, ideally, bow the 
purchase would be structured. They reviewed with her the deal they had put together in Post Falls 
and stressed. their desire to find a seller who would be willing to become a partner in the project and 
be a key person in the property's development. Initially, Bennett focused her search on the Moscow 
area with which she was chiefly familiar. When that area proved unfruitful, she allegedly expanded 
her scope to include Lewiston. Bennett had no access, however, to the Lewiston MlS and allegedly 
was not aware of the large discrepancy in property values between Moscow and Lewiston. Rather 
lb.an perusing available listings, she bad a chance conversation with a past business acquaintance, 
Walter Steed, who told her he had property in Lewiston that would meet her client' s needs. The 
two also cliscussed price, but their stories do not match. Bennett contends that Steed set the price, 
and Steed asserts that Bennett freely told him that her clients would pay $4.25 a square foot. Either 
way, the price became set at $4.25/SF. 
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with Realtor at 
initial listing up to and through the ti.me Bennett and Steed had this conversation, not a single 
serious inquiry or offer had been made on the property. The list price at the time (and for the 
preceding 4 years) was $359,000 (which equates to a square foot price of approximately $3.28). 
Steed's Realtor, however, bad repeatedly advised him that the listing price was too high. 
In Bennett and Steed's initial conversation or a subsequent conversation, Bennett learned about the 
listing and the list price. The two then concocted a plan to let the listing expire (which was set to 
occur in January) and for Bennett to represent both Steed and GAH in the transaction. Bennett took 
a look at the property and gave her GAR clients an enthusiastic review. She also told them. though, 
that she was still working on convincing the owner to sell and partner with GAR 
Completely oblivious to the property's listed status and relying on their Realtor, members of GAH 
viewed the property in November, 1 found it met basic requirements, and were told the seller would 
accept $4.25/SF for the property. Bennett gave her stamp of approval on the deal, telling GAH it 
was an excellent location and a good price. 
Bennett and Steed delayed further negotiation until a time when Bennett could become a dual agent 
for both GAH and Steed. In February 2000, Bennett had GAH re-sign an Exclusive Buyer 
Representation Agreement and had Steed sign a similar agreement in that same time period. 
Additionally, Steed continued to consider becoming a partner or equity owner in GAH and 
expressed interest in that course on numerous occasions. He held himself out to Frantz and the 
other members of GAH as having expertise in commercial development in the Lewiston and 
knowledge of local development issues. Steed also made numerous representations ( with Bennett's 
knowledge and blessing) to Frantz that comparable commercial property m Lewiston, such as what 
was needed for GAH's assisted living facility, had a market value of $4.25 to $4.50 per square foot. 
Steed's and Bennett's experience resonated with Frantz, and he reposed his trust and confidence in 
them. Frantz and GAH were impressed enough with Steed that even when he declined to become 
their partner they offered to enter a separate agreement with him to retain his services. In March, 
the buyers and Steed entered into a professional services contract, the purpose of which was for 
Steed to assist in moving GAH' s construction and development plans along, which obviously 
included the acquisition of his property. Steed and Bennett also continued to substantiate the price 
to GAH. 
In April, GAH and Steed entered into a purchase and sale agre.ement, and the transaction formally 
closed on August 22, 2000. In lieu of a sales commission, Bennett received $30,000 worth of stock 
in the GAH entity developing the Lewiston project and, therefore, became a part owner in that 
entity. Steed, through Lewiston Vineyard, LLC (an entity created by Ste.ed and bis wife in 
conjunction with the sale), received $175,538 at the time of closing and two promissory notes: one 
for $105,000 payable on July 1, 2001 and a second for $220,702 due on July 1, 2005. GAH 
1 A 4x8 realty sign was on the property at the time. No one from GAH recalls seeing it, however, and all 
knowledgeable parties agree that it was partially obscured by tall weeds. 
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me:rnbe:rs paid note made a 2003 
suspect their agreement in the underlying transaction had been fraudulently procured.. 
In 2003, GAH attempted to refinance the project in order to complete an expansion. The bank's 
appraisal revealed that the land had a value of only $1.25/SF at the time it was purchased.2 Through 
Frantz's subsequent inve-stigation, he learned that Steed and Bennett had to have known the contract 
price was inflated and bad intentionally deceived him and his partners to complete the deal. Given 
that Steed had fraudulently misrepresented the property value to GAH and had already been paid 
more than fair market value for the property, the GAH members did not make the final promissory 
note payment. In the ensuing litigation, GAH also discovered that the property had been on the 
market for over eight years, with no offers, at a price significantly less than what they paid, and that 
its Realtor, Bennett, and contractual agent, Steed, had conspired together to close the deal at an 
inflated price. 
Knowing that the note payment deadline was quickly approaching in July 2005, Frantz met with 
Mark Ellingsen at Witherspoon Kelley [hereinafter "WKDT'] in May and retained his services. 
Frantz turned over all relevant documentation at that time, including an August 2003 letter Frantz 
had written to Steed alleging the evidence is compelling that he and Bennett must have known that 
$4.50/SF. (the final price including the realtor fee) was nearly 4 times other available land in the 
area.3 Mark advised Frantz that his best case is against Bennett. Mark further tells Frantz about a 
potential conflict of interest because Bennett's father and the Bennett Lumber Company have been 
longstanding clients of WKDT. In a later meeting, Frantz is told that the partners have determined 
no conflict exists, but that the Bennett cas.e is not as good as he originally thought, although the 
Steed case was looking better. Frantz never agreed to waive any conflicts. 
In June, Mark sent a settlement offer to Steed for $100,000 as full and final payment and 
satisfaction of the promissory note and real estate contract. It does not appear as if any response 
was received, and Steed filed suit against Frantz and the other prorrrissory note signatories on July 
5th, a mere 4 days after it became due. Frantz retained a potentially valid breach of contract claim 
against Bennett up through August of 2005. 
In early 2006 while discussing filing an answer to the Complaint, Frantz suggested to Joe] Hazel 
(who had presumably taken over the file by this point) that a claim also be filed against Bennett. 
Frantz reiterated this request later that month; in the meantime, however, Joel filed an Answer, 
Counterclaim, and Third-Party Complaint in the Steed action. The Third-Party Complaint brought 
in as third-party defendants Walter and Mary Steed individually, as the suit was brought in the name 
of their LLC, Lewiston Vineyard. Bennett was not joined in the action. 
2 While an appraisal had been conducted at the time of the 2000 sale, the appraiser did not give tbe land a value 
since there were no comparables. The low appraisal created significant difficulties for GAH in building its phase II 
projects and the delays it experienced resulted in considerable added expense and lost revenue. . 
This letter is significant because Judge Stegner determined it represented the date of discovery of the fraud and 
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February deposition was and she admitted to knowledge prior 
listing, among other particulars. During lunch, Joel told Frantz that they now know more about her 
involvement and that he would file a claim against her. Frantz then sends two emails requesting 
Bennett be brought in, as it was now evident that she bore equal or greater responsibility for the 
fraud perpetrated on himself and GAH. Late in the month. Joel responded to Frantz: telling him 
they would discuss what to do with Bennett when he returned from vacation. 
Frantz began feeling put off by WKDT and did not understand why Bennett had not been brought 
into the litigation. In March, he was told that Hazel was researching whether a viable claim existed 
against Shelley. The following month, Bennett made a request to be bought out of her ir.terest in 
GAH. Time passed with little activity between April and September (in August, however, 
according to Judge Stegner's ruling, the statute of limitations ran on the fraud claim against 
Bennett). 
In late September in conjunction with negotiating with Bennett over the value of her shares, Hazel 
threatened to initiate suit. Finally, in January 2007, Hazel notified Frantz of his decision that a 
winnable cause of action did not exist against Bennett He advised that the statute of limitations ran 
on a claim for breach of her duties as a real tor in 2004; that the only potentially viable action 
remaining was fraud; but that there would not be any insurance coverage for that claim. He further 
notified Frantz that Bennett would not accept any buyout unless she received a release and 
re.commended that Frantz release Bennett from liability and pay her $33,580 for her GAR interest. 
Also in January, Joel asked Steed to engage in mediation, but Steed's attorney declined because 
discovery had almost been completed and a motion for summary judgment had already been filed. 
He chose to wait and have the summary judgment motion heard. 
In February, Frantz emailed Joel, letting him know that he had consulted with his attorney/partner 
John Geddes who disagreed with WKDT's conclusion. He advised that since Joel believed the case 
against Bennett was unfruitful and unethical, other counsel had been hired. 
Once this office was retained, a Complaint against Bennett was prepared and filed in April, which 
alleged causes of action for negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, and fraud. In May, however, the 
judge presiding over the Steed matter (Judge Brudie) entered summary judgment against Frantz and 
GAH. Brodie's written opinion stressed Bennett's involvement and knowledge and his conclusion 
that Steed had every reason to believe Bennett told Frantz and the other signatories about the prior 
listing. Any ability to have Steed and Bennett joined in fue same action vanished at this point. 
As for fue Bennett matter, Rudy Verschoor of Ramsden & Lyons appeared on her behalf and filed 
motions for summary judgment based on statute of limitations grounds. He revised his motion to 
encompass only the fraud claim, and Judge Stegner granted the requested relief in December 2007. 
Thereafter, a decision was made to stipulate to a dismissal of the Bennett case as the attempt to 
mitigat.e WKDT' s malpractice had failed. 
~040/ 
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2008 
is the position office that WKDT committed malpractice and/or ethical violations in 
representation of Frantt and GAH in at least the following particulars: (1) representing these 
individuals while a known conflict of interest existed given Bennett's position as a shareholder in 
Bennett Lumber, (2) failing to join Bennett in the Steed action or allege a civil conspiracy theory, 
(3) failing to pursue recourse against Bennett in a timely manner, and (4) by generally deviating 
from the applicable standard of conduct owed by a reasonably prudent attorney representing a client 
in the same or similar circumstances. Once you have had a chance to consider this letter, I would 
appreciate your independent assessment of WKDT"s actions. Should I happen not to be available 
when you call, feel free to talk with Bruce Owens. 
Very truly yours, 
OWENS & CRANDALL, PLLC 
REGINA M. MCCREA 
RMM:bbs 
i(fJ U4l./U 
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A TTO R N E YS AN D CO U NSELO RS 
SHELA R. SCHWAGER 
EMAIL: S5CHWAGER@HAWU'YTI10XELt.COM 
DIRECT DIAL: 208.338.4928 
OIR.ECT FAX: 208.954,5261 
VIA FACSIMILE: 509.623.1660 
AND U.S. MAIL 
Mr. Barry W. Davidson 
Davidson Backman Medeiros PLLC 
601 W. Riverside Ave., Suite 1280 
Spokane, Washington 99201-0611 
June 28, 2010 
Re: Outstanding Obligations owed to Idaho Independent Bank 
Dear Barry: 
877 Main Street, Suite 1000 
P.O. Box 1617 
Boise, Idaho 83701d1617 
T 208.344.6000 
haw!eytroxeU.com 
As you know, this firm represents Idaho Independent Bank ("TIB" or 11Bank") with 
regard to the outstanding obligations due and owing by Eagle Ridge on Twin Lakes, Inc. ("Eagle 
Ridge") (the "Borrower"); and Marty D. Frantz ("M. Frantz") and Cindy M. Frantz ("C. 
Frantz") (co1lective1y referred to as "Guarantors"). 
On or about December 14, 2006, Eagle Ridge executed a Promissory Note in favor of TIB 
in the original principal amount of $3,750,000.00 with interest accruing at a variable interest rate, 
wherein Eagle Ridge agreed to pay monthly interest only payments with all principal, interest, 
and fees due and payable on the April 14, 2008, maturity date ("Loan No. 1191309"). On or 
about July I J, 2007, Eagle Ridge executed a Promissory Note in favor of JIB as a renewal of 
Loan No. 1 J 191309 to increase the principal amount of the note from $3,750,000.00 to 
$4,500,000.00 with interest accruing at a variable interest rate, wherein Eagle Ridge agreed to 
pay monthly interest only payments, 'With the all outstanding principal, interest, and fees due and 
payable on April 14, 2008. On or about April 17, 2008, Loan No. 1191309 was subsequently 
modified by a Change in Tenns Agreement wherein the maturity date was extended to June 15, 
2008, and the interest rate floor was changed from 9.25% to 6.25%, with all outstanding 
principal, interest, and fees due on the June I 5, 2008, maturity date. On or about June 18, 2008, 
Eagle Ridge executed a Promissory Note in the principal amount of $4,500,000.00 with interest 
accruing at a variable interest rate, wherein Eagle Rjdge agreed to pay monthly interest only 
payments, with all outstanding principal, interest, and fees due and payable on the December 31, 
2008, maturity date. On or about January 21, 2009, Eagle Ridge executed a Promissory Note in 
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the principal amount of $4,500,000.00 with interest accruing at a variable interest rate, wherein 
Eagle Ridge agreed to pay monthly principal and interest payments in the amount of $31,560.46, 
commencing February 15, 2009, with all outstanding principal, interest, and fees due and 
payable on January 15, 2010. On or about March 11, 2010, Loan No. 1191309 was further 
modified by a Change in Terms Agreement wherein Eagle Ridge agreed the maturity date was 
extended from January 15, 2010, to April 15, 201 o; and agreed to pay one regular principal and 
interest payment of $31,560.46 on March 15, 2010, with all principal, interest, and fees due on 
April 15, 20 l 0. 
liZ] 044/078 
On or about December 14, 2006, Eagle Ridge granted a Mortgage in favor of IIB on real 
property located at NNA, Twin Lakes, Idaho ("Eagle Ridge Real Property"), more particularly 
described in the Mortgage recorded on December 19, 2006, as Instrument No. 2073190000 
records of Kootenai County, Idaho ("Eagle Ridge Mortgage"), as modified by a Modification of 
Mortgage recorded July 13, 2007, as Instrument No. 2110523000, records of Kootenai County, 
Idaho, to increase the principal amount of the Promissory Note and Eagle Ridge Mortgage from 
$3,750,000.00 to $4,500,000.00 securing the obligations due and owing under Loan No. 
1191309 and any other obligations owed to IIB by Eagle Ridge. 
On or about December l 4, 2006, with reaffinnations thereafter, M. Frantz and C. Frantz 
each executed separate Commercial Guarantees in which each absolutely, unconditionally, and 
continually guaranteed the full and punctual payment, performance, and satisfaction of all 
indebtedness owed or that became owed by Eagle Ridge to JIB. 
The Eagle Ridge Real Property is hereinafter referred to as "Real Property." The above 
defined Promissory Note, Mortgage, modifications, Commercial Guarantees, and all related loan 
documents to Loan No. 1191309 are collectively referred to herein as "Loan Documents." 
As of June 24, 2010, and pursuant to the terms of the Loan Documents, Loan No. 
1191309 has matured, has not been paid, and as a result the Loan is in default. The payoff of 
Loan No. 1191309 is as follows: 
Loan# 1191309 
Principal Balance $4,297,396.63 
Accrued Non-Default 
Interest 49,420.06 
Default Interest 125,683.93 
Late Charges 414,869.81 
Prior and Estimated 
Attorney Fees and Costs 8,000.00 ---------Tot a 1 $4,895,370.43 
Aggregate Default Per 
Diem $2,472.47 
Aggregate Non-Default Per 
Diem $676.99 
0 15:01 FAX PAINE HAMBLEN 
Apparently the parties had reached a workout resolution, but after IIB retained legal 
counsel to draft such documentation, your clients declined to execute, which results in the 
outstanding legal fees set forth above. 
Based upon the failure to pay Loan No. 1191309 in full at maturity, demand is hereby 
made that the remaining unpaid obligation due and owing under Loan No. 1191309 in the 
amount of $4,895,370.43, plus accruing interest, attorney fees, and costs. If the amounts owed 
under Loan No. 1191309 are not paid or mutually acceptable payment arrangements for the 
balance of Loan No. 1191309 are made by 10:00 a.rn. on July 9, 2010, then I will recommend to 
IIB that it immediately proceed with its legal rights to collect the obligations due and owing by 
Eagle Ridge and Guarantors, which may include foreclosure of the Real Property and a 
concurrent collection action against the Guarantors. IIB reserves whatever rights the uncured 
default has on under loan obligations owed to JIB. Further, as you know, if IIB is required to 
pursue further legal action, it is entitled to and will seek reimbursement for all of its damages, 
including but not limited to, reimbursement of attorney fees pursuant to the Loan Documents and 
the applicable Idaho Code, as well as any costs of collection and post-judgment interest. 
JIB does not take this action lightly and we are willing to discuss reasonable payment 
alternatives that adequately protect the Bank; however, these discussions need to take place prior 
to 10:00 a.m. on July 9, 2010. I may be reached at (208) 388-4928. 
Sincerely, 
LEYLLP 
Sheila R. Schwager 
SRS/ 
cc: Mr. Michael Dolez.al 
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MARTIN D. FRANTZ, an individual, and ) 
CYNTHIA M. FRAN'IZ, an individual, ) 
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Affidavit of Merlyn W. Clark 
sworn states 
1. I have been a partner of the law firm of Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley LLP 
("Hawley Troxell"} since approximately 198 L I make this affidavit and the statements 
contained herein based upon my personal knowledge. 
2. I have reviewed the Motion to Disqualify Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley, LLP 
(''Motion") filed in this Adversary Proceeding, the Declaration of Regina M. McCrea and 
Exhibits A, B and C attached thereto and the Declaration of Martin Frantz filed in support of the 
Motion. It is my understanding that Martin D. Frantz and Cynthia M. Frantz. are the Debtors in 
the above captioned bankruptcy case and are the Defendants in the above referenced Adversary 
Proceeding. I will hereinafter refer to Martin D. Frantz and Cynthia M. Frantz as "Debtors." 
3. In 2009 I was hired by the law firm of Owens & Crandall (O&C") soley to 
perform services as a testifying expert witness in a legal malpractice lawsuit filed by O&C on 
behalf of their clients Martin Frantz and his company, Guardian Angel Homes Lewiston, LLC as 
case number CV -08-2630 in Kootenai County District Court. in the State of Idaho ("Malpractice 
Lawsuit''). 
4. I have never had an attorney-client relationship with Debtors, Martin Frantz or his 
company, Guardian Angel Homes Lewiston, llC. 
5. I was retained by O&C to perform services as a testifying ex.pert witness in the 
Malpractice Lawsuit. I never acted as a consulting ex.pert or a co-counsel with O&C for their 
clients in the Malpractice Lawsuit. 
6. A true and correct copy of my May 19, 2009 Affidavit is attached to this Affidavit 
as Exhibit A. set forth in my Affidavit dated May 19, 2009, the report setting forth my then 
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Affidavit When I signed my May 19, 2009 Affidavit, it was my understanding that the law firm 
of Owens & Crandall would use my Affidavit in any way that they deemed appropriate in the 
Malpractice Lawsuit, including disclosing that Affidavit and my attached written report to 
opposing counsel in the Malpractice Lawsuit. I had no expectation that my Affidavit and the 
accompanying written report attached as Exhibit 2 would remain confidential. 
7. Copies of the invoices for my services as a testifying expert witness in the 
Malpractice Lawsuit are attached to this Affidavit as Exhibit B. All of the invoices relating to 
my services were addressed and sent to O&C. 
8. A true and conect copy of a letter sent to me by Regina M. McCrea, an attorney 
with the Owens & Crandall law firm dated July 30, 2009, with my handwriting across the first 
page in the upper right hand corner is attached to this Affidavit as Exhibit C. 
9. I am now aware that Hawley Troxell represents Idaho Independent Bank ("IIB") 
in the above captioned adversary proceeding. I have never had a discussion with anyone at 
Hawley Troxell regarding the information that I learned in providing expert witness services for 
O&C in the Malpractice Lawsuit until the motion to disqualify Hawley Troxell was brought to 
my attention. 
10. I have never had any conversations with any other lawyer at Hawley Troxell 
regarding the testifying expert witness services that I provided to O&C described in my May 4, 
2009 ~ritten report until the motion to disqualify Hawley Troxell was brought to my attention. 
11. I have never bad any conversation or other communication with Debtors and I 
have never discussed anything related to the Malpractice Lawsuit with Debtors. All 
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engagement with O&C were public records and are listed in my Opinions letter dated May 4, 
2009. I never in the course of my engagement with O&C received any confidential information 
ielating to Debtors. 
12. On April 15, 2009, I had a telephone conversation with Bruce Owens and Regina 
McCrea in the course of my engagement with O&C. During that conversation I expressed an 
opinion that the Witherspoon firm had a conflict of interest when it represented Debtors and was 
informed by Mr. Owens and Ms. McCrea that the consequences of the conflict were unknown. I 
was also asked by Mr. Owens and Ms. McCrea whether attorney fees are recoverable in a tort 
action and I agreed with Mr. Owens and Ms. McCrea that attorney fees are not recoverable in a 
tort action. At no time during that telephone conversation or at any other time did I receive any 
confidential information about the Debtors. 
13. I have reviewed Exhibit C to the McCrea Declaration. I have no recollection of 
discussing the issue of damages with Mr. Owens and/or Ms. McCrea other than to tell them I 
could not provide expert testimony on the issue of damages. 
14. During my communications with Mr. Owen and Ms. McCrea, we discussed the 
fact than any information that I received would be discoverable in the Malpractice Lawsuit by 
the defendants in that case and that they should not provide me any information they would not 
want defendants to discover. 
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SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN before me this /~ day November, 2014. 
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Name: Tammy N. Dettman -
Notary Public for Idaho 
Residing at Boise, Idaho 
My commission ex.pires 05/30/2020 
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true copy of the foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF MERLYN W. CLARK by the method indicated 
below, and addressed to each of the following: 
Jonathon Frantz 
Frantz Law, PLLC 
307 N. Lincoln St., Ste. A 
Post Falls, Idaho 83854 
Jonathon@cdale2:al.com 
Stephen B. McCrea 
608 Northwest Blvd., Suite 101 
P.O. Box 1501 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816-1501 
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OWENS, 
M. MCCREA, ISB 
&CRANDALL, 
North Lakewood Drive, 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83814 
Telephone: (208) 667-8989 
Facsimile: (208) 667-1939 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
MARTY D. FRANTZ and CINDY FRANTZ, 
husband and wife; Guardian Angel Homes, CASE NO. CV 08-2630 
L.L.C., an Idaho Limited Liability Company; 
Guardian Angel Homes Lewiston l, L.L.C., an 
Idaho Limited Liability Company; and Human 




WITHERSPOON, KELLEY, DA VEl\TPORT 
& TOOL, P.S. a Washington corporation, 
Defendant 
WITHERSPOON, KELLEY, DAVENFORT 
& TOOL, P.S. a Washington corporation, 
Counter-Plaintiff. 
vs. 
rvfARTY D. FRANTZ and CINDY FRANTZ, 
husband and wife, 
Counter-Defendants 





I, Merlyn W. Clark, an adult over the age of eighteen years, first duly sworn on oath, 
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years. I am a senior 
paitner with Hawley Trax.ell Ennis and Hawley LLP where I handle complex. civil litigation. I 
.. 
udditionally act as a mediator, arbitrator, and instructor. 1 have attached a synopsis of my 
credentials to this affidavit, as Exhibit "L" 
3. I was asked to assess the duty the Defendant owed to the Plaintiffs' herein, the 
breach of that duty, if any, and the ex.tent that any breach constituted a proximate cause and/or a 
substantial factor in causing Plaintiffs' damages. Attached to this affidavit as Exhibit "2" is a 
true and correct copy of my current opinions in this matter including the basis and reasons 
therefore and the data or other information I considered in fanning the opinions. 
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MERLYN W. CLARK, ESQ. 
HA ,vLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP 
8771\iain Street, Suite 1000 
P.O. Box 1617 
Boise, ID 83701-1617 
Phone: 208-388-4940 Fax: 208-388-4877 
mwc(a).bteh.com 
PROFESSIONAL QUALIFICATIONS 
• Undergraduate - University of Idaho College of B\1siness. 
• Legal - University of Idaho College of Law (J.D., 1964). 
Continuing Legal · satisfied all continuing legal education requirements of the Idaho 
State.Bar and Idaho Supreme Court Rules governing the practice oflaw in Idaho. 
BAR ADMISSIONS 
• Idaho State Bar since 1964 (Bar No. l 026). 
Federal Distiict Court ofldaho, United States Court of Federal Claims, Ninth Circuit 
Court of Appeals, and United States Supreme Court. 
PRACTICE AREAS 
Civil litigation and appellate practice in state and federal courts, and before 
administrative agencies since 1964. 
• Mediator - Certified Professional Mediator since 1995. 
• Arbitrator - Member of the National Rosters of Commercial Arbitrators and Mediators 
and Empioyment Arbitrators and Mediators of the ,d..merican Arbitration Association and 
Member, National Panel of Arbitrators and Mediators of the National Arbitration Forum. 
• Neutral Evaluator, Discovery Master, and Hearing Officer. 
TEACHING 
• Adjunct Professor of Negotiation and Settlement Advocacy, The Straus Institute For 
Dispute Resolution, Pepperdine University School of Law, June 2000. 
Adjunct Instructor of Negotiation Skills at University of Idaho College of Law, 2000. 
Adjunct Instructor of Mediation Advocacy Skills at University ofldabo College of Law, 
2002. 
Adjunct Instructor of Trial Advocacy Skills at University ofldaho College of Law since 
1996. 
• Adjunct Instructor of Effective Advocacy in Arbitration, The Northwest Institute For 
Dispute Resolution, University ofldaho College of Law, 2000 and 2002. 
• lnstmctor of evidence and civil procedure for the Idaho Judiciary at new Judges 
Orientation, Magistrate Judges Institute, and District Judges Institute annuaHy since 
1992. 
vs No 
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PROFESSIONAL BACKGROUND 
Hawley TroxeH Ennis & Hawley LLP, Boise, ID, 1979 -present: Mr. Clark is a senior 
partner with extensive experience managing complex civil litigation in state and federal 
courts, and before administrative agencies. He has successfully argued many cases 
before the appellate courts ofidaho. His clients have included Certain Underwriters at 
Lloyds of London, Kerr-McGee Chemical Corp., Midas Realty Corp., Del Monte Foods 
Corp., H. F. Magnuson, Mayflower Contract Services, Inc., The Terteling Company, Inc., 
J.C. Murgoitio dba Murgoitio Farms, Rosebud Operating Services, Inc., Baker-Boyer 
National Bank, Micron Technology, Inc., Cougar Mountain Forms & Supplies, Inc., 
Morton International, Inc., PolyOne Corporation, Lear Siegler Services, Inc., Idaho Land 
Title Association, Meridian School District, Belo Corporation, Idaho Health Facilities 
Autbority, Blue Cross ofidaho, McCann Ranch & Livestock Co., Special Olyrnpics 
World Winter Games, Inc., and as a Special Deputy Artorney General providing services 
in select matters to the Idaho Department of Correction, Idaho Department of Risk 
Management, Idaho Department of Health and Welfare, State Board of Tax Appeals, and 
certain Justices of the Idaho Supreme Court. 
Alternative Dispute Resolution Practice. Mr. Clark has served as an arbitrator and 
mediator for public and private parties since 1989. In 1995, the Idaho Mediation 
Association certified his qualifications as a Professional Mediator. He is on the rosters of 
approved mediators of the United States District Court, District of Idaho and all Idaho 
state courts. Mr. Clark has mediated more than 700 disputes involving a broad range of 
claims and issues.' He regularly serves as a mediator for federal, state and local agencies. 
He has presided as the sole arbitrator and as the panel chair or a panel member in more 
that 70 arbitration proceedings. His practice includes all forms of alternative dispute 
resoh,ition, including arbitration, mediation, negotiation, neutral evaluation, fact fo1ding, 
hearing officer services, and training. 
Private Practice in Lewiston Idaho: From 1964 until 1979, Mr. Clark was in private 
practice in Lewiston, Idaho. During that time his clients included real estate brokers, a 
title insurance company, insurance brokers, construction companies, auto dealerships, 
small businesses, and the Lewiston Police Officers Association. 
Prosecutorial Service: In addition to private practice, Mr. Clark served as Special 
Deputy Lewiston City Attorney from 1969 to 1971. He also served as Deputy 
Prosecuting Attorney for Nez Perce County from 1969 to 1973 and as Prosecuting 
Attorney of Nez Perce County from 1973 to 1977. In addition tQ prosecutorial duties, 
Mr. Clark provided legal services to the Board of County Commissioners and other 
county officials on matters of employment law, municipal law, construction law, 
environmental law, real estate, eminent domain, taxation, insurance, and contract law. 
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• American Bar Association (11:ember, ADR Section and Litigation Section). 
American Bar Foundation (Fellow). 
• Idaho State Bar (Member, ADR Section Governing Council); (Chair, Litigation Section 
2005-2006, 2007 to present); (Commissioner 1977:-1979); (Chair, Evidence Committee 
1980-1985). 
Idaho Law Foundation (Dir. 1980-83; President 1984-1986). 
• American Arbitration Association (Member, National Rosters of Commercial Arbitrators 
and Mediators and Employment Arbitrators and Mediators). 
National Arbitration Forum (Member, National Panel of Arbitrators and Mediators). 
• American Association For Justice (fom1erly 1[~ociation of Tria1 Lawyers of 
America). 
• Idaho Trial Lawyers Association. 
• Idaho Association of Defense Counsel. 
• American Inn of Court No. 130 (Member Emeritus) (President 1996-1997). 
• American College of Trial Lawyers (Fellow) (State Chair 1998-2000). 
• University. ofidaho College of Law Advisory Council (Emeritus) (Chair 1999:.2000). 
Idaho Partners Against Domestic Violence (Co-chair since L994). 
Idaho Mediation Association (Certified Professional Mediator since 1995). 
Association for Conflict Resolution. 
• American College of Civil Trial Mediators (Fellow) 
Idaho Fish and Wildlife Foundation (Member, Board of Directors). 
Women's and Children's Alliance, Inc. (Member, Board of Directors). 
Idaho Association of Commerce and h1dustry (Member). 
Men Today, Men Tomorrow (M:ember, Steering Committee). 
HONORS 
• Member, University ofidaho Law Review, 1963-1964. 
Member, Silver Lance, University of Idaho scholastic honorary, 1964. 
Recipient, One of Twenty Outstanding Seniors Award, University ofidaho Class of 
1964. 
Recipient, Award of Appreciation presented by Board of Commissioners of the Idaho 
State Bar, 1984. 
Recipient, Award of Legal Merit presented by University ofidaho Co1lege of Law, 1988. 
Recipient, Distinguished Service Award presented by the Idaho Supreme Court, 1988. 
Recipient, Distinguished Lawyer Award presented by the Commissioners of the Idaho 
State Bar, 2001. 
Listed in Who·s Who In America and Who's Who h1 American Law. 
Listed in The Best Lawyers in America (Alternative Dispute Resolution; Business 
Litigation and Commercial Law sections), published by Woodward/White, Inc. 
Listed in Chambers USA: America's Leading Lawyers (Commercial Litigation), 
published by Chambers USA. 
Listed in Mountain States Super Lawyers ( Alternative Dispute Resolution and Business 
Litigation), published by Law & Politics. 
Listed in Bench.mark: America's Leading Litigatio11 Firms and Attorneys (Highly 
Recommended), published by Legal Media Group. 
vs 
05/07 /2 015 15:0 3 FAX PAINE HAMBLEN LLP 
) 
I 
r:=i~P 1 3.n7Q?"1-TI M nnr. flfi -1 l=ilerl 11 /11/14 
Affidavit of Merlyn W. Clark 
Entered 11. 3/14 14:51:13 
Page 13 of 49 
MERLYN W. CLARK 
Mr. Clark is a senior partner in generai litigation, with emphasis on business 
entities, commercial and contractual law, real estate, eminent domain, natural 
resources, eoviroomental law and public land use law. Practice also in.eludes 
education law. 
SIGNIFICANT CASES OR ASSIGNMENTS 
From 1964 to 1968 Mr. Clark associaied in private practice with General Counsel 
for Potlatch Corporation, Lewiston, ldaho and provided legal services to that 
corporation on matters of environmental law, fmance, corporation law, insurance, 
taxation, real estate and commercial law. 
Desc 
From 1968 to 1979 when lie joined Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley, Mr. Clark maintained a private general practice 
oflaw in Lewiston, Idaho. 
From 1969 to 1971 Mr. Clark served as Special Deputy Lewiston City Attorney, Le\\~Ston, Idaho and provided legal 
services to the city on matters of law enforcement, real estate and municipal law. 
From 1974 to 1976 Mr. Clark served as Prosecuting Attorney for Nez Perce County, Idaho and in addition to law 
enforcement responsibilities, served as legal advisor to the Board of County Commissioners and other county officials 
on matters of environmental law, finance, municipal law, real estate, eminent domain, taxation., insurance and 
commercial law. 
Since 1985 Mr. Cl.ark has served as counsel to the Idaho Health Facilities Authority providing legal services to the 
Authority on matters of municipal law, finance, insurance, real estate, lender liab il ity and environmental law. Mr. Clark 
also serves as special counsel to the Meridian School District on select matters . 
Mr. Clark has significant experience in the management, trial and resolution of complex civil and criminal matters on 
behalf of plaintiffs and defendants in state and federal courts, before juries and judges. Mr. Clar.k has also appeared and 
successfully argued matters before tbe appellate courts of Idaho. 
Mr. Clark has training and experience in arbitration and mediation, and has served as a mediator for the Fourth Judicial 
District Court of Ada County in 1990 and 1991, and for private parties. 
PROFESSIONAL ACTIVITIES 
Commissioner, Idaho State Bar, 1977-1979. Chairman, Evidence Committee of the Idaho State Bar, 1980-1985. 
Member, Idaho Supreme Court Evidence Rules Advisory Committee, 19&6 to presertt. Member, Idaho Supceme Court 
Civil Rules Advisory Committee, 1975-1986. Member, Idaho Law Folllldation (President, 1984-1986); Clearwater Bar 
Association 1964-1979 (President 1969-1971). Chairman, Nez Perce County Zoning Board of Appeals, 1970-1973. 
Member, Litigation Section, Real Property, Probate and Trust Law Section, and Natural Resources, Energy, and 
Environmental Law Section of the American Bar Association; Idaho Trial Lawyers Association; The Association of 
Trial Lawyers of America; Idaho Association of Defense Counsel. Master Lawyer, The American Inns of Cm.ut 
Foundation, Boise CXXX. Member, Idaho Council on Industry and the Environment. Interim Idaho State Bar 
Delegate to House ofDelegates ofthe American Bar Association (1991). 
EDUCATION 
Law School : University of Idaho College of Law (Juris Doctor, 1964 ). 
Undergraduate: University of Idaho College of Business 
~UViJIVIV 
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Bar 
States 
since the Federal District Idaho since 
::iup1ren1e Court for the Ninth Circuit and 
Member, University of Idaho Law Review, 1963-1964, Member, Silver Lance, University of 
Idaho scholastic honorary, 1964. Recipient, Oue of Twenty Outstanding Seniors Award, 
University of Idallo Class of 1964. Recipient, Award of Appreciation presented by Board of 
Commissioners of the ~daho State Bar, 1984. Recipient, Award of Legal Merit presented by 
University of Idaho College ofLaw, 1988. Recipient, Distinguished Service Award presented by 
Idaho Judicial Conference, 1988. 
Prosemting A ttomey, Nez Perce County, Idaho 1974-1977. 
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Thun;day Oe.cember 18, 2008 
Attorneys & 
Paralegals j ___ _ 
I 
! 
Merlyn W. Clark 
Partner 
Telephone: (208) 388-4836 
Boise. IP 
Merlyn W. Clark. admitted to bar, 1964, Idaho. · - · ·· · · · ·· .. · .-· · 
Education: University of Idaho (J.D., 1964). Recipient, Award of Legal Merit, University of Idaho 
Law School, 19BB. Member, ldaha Law Review 1963·1964. Author: "Water Pollution Law in 
Idaho,• 1 Idaho law Review 1, 1964; "Idaho Rules of Evidence: Their Effect on .Idaho Law; 22 
Idaho Law Review l, 1985; "Wetlands: Compensation for 'Taking' by Denial of the Section 404 
Permit," 28 Idaho I.aw Review, 1993. Prosecutor, Net Perce County, 1974·1976. Member, 
Supreme Court Civil Rules Advisory Committee, 197 5·1987. Supreme Court Evidence Rules 
Committee, 1986-1992. Director, 1980·1988 and President, 1984·1986, tdaho Law Foundation. 
Commissioner, 1977-1979 and Chairman, Evidence Committee, 1980·1985, ldaho State Bar. 
Certified Proresslonal Mediator, Comrnerclal Panel and Employment Panel of Arbitrators and 
Mediators, American Arbitration Association. Fellow, American College of Trial Lawyers. Fellow, 
the American Bar Foundation. Master of the Bench, The American Inns of Court Foundation. 
Memberships: American Bar Association; Idaho State ear, Chair Litigation Section, 2005. 
Practice Areas: Alt~rnative Dispute Resolution; Ciyil & CQmm.illiil..1..Ullil~ 
Mr. Clark is a senior litigator, an e)(perienced arbitrator, and certified professional mediator. He 
focuses his practice on complex civil litigation involving real property, contract and commercial 
law, business entities, and employment law. Mr. Clark Is a fellow of the American College of Trial 
Lawyers and Is listed In the business litigation section of The Best Lawyers in America. He has 
argued more than 25 cases to the Idaho Supreme Court. Mr. Clark's practice includes alternative 
dispute resolutlon as an advocate fer clients and as an arbitrator and mediator. He ls a member 
of the Panel of Commercial Arbitrators and Mediators and the Panel of Employment Arbitrators 
and Mediators of the American Arbitration Association . He Is also on the roster of mediators for 
the United States District Court of Idaho and the Idaho state courts. 
Boise, ID Hailey, IO Pocatello. ID Reno. NV 
(,OB) 344-6000 (208} 726•1700 (208) l33·084S (77S) 829•9944 
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MERLYN W. CLARK 
ADMITTED TO PRACTICE LAW IN IOAHO 
EMAIL: MWC@HTEH.COM 
DIRECT DIAL: (206) 388-4836 
May 4, 2009 
VIA E-MAIL 
Suite 1000 
P.O. Box 1617 
Idaho 83701-1617 
Fax {208) 342-3829 
www.hteh.com 
Mr. Bnice Owens 
Ms. Regina McCrea 
Owens & Crandall, PLLC 
CONFIDENTIAL AND PRIVILEGED 
COMMUNICATION 
1859 North Lakewood Drive, Ste 104 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814 
Re: Frantz, et al. v. Witherspoon, Kelley, Davenport & Toole, P.S., Kootenai 
County Case No. CV 08-2630 
Dear Mr. Owens and Ms. McCrea: 
You have engaged my services as an expert witness to provide advice and 
testimony on the subject of the alleged professional malpractice asserted against 
Witherspoon, Kelley, Davenport & Toole, P.S.(the "Witherspoon firm") by Marty D. 
Frantz, et al. ("Frantz") in the above-referenced action. I write to offer my preliminary 
opinions after reviewing the documents you have provided me. 
Documents Revie,Yed 
I have reviewed the following documents: 
• Deposition of Marty D. Frantz dated September 29, 2008 with Exhibits l 
through 6 
a Deposition of Marty D. Frantz, Volume II dated October 1, 2008 with Exhibits 
7 through 24 
• Deposition of Mark Ellingsen dated October 9, 2008 with Exhibits 25 and 26 
• Deposition of Joel Hazel dated October 9, 2008 
0 :04 FAX tlAJlill LJ:m 
• Complaint and Demand for Jury trial in Kootenai County Case No. CV 08-
2630, Marty D. Franz, et al v. Witherspoon, Kelley, Davenport and Tool, P.S. 
• Answer to Complaint, Counterclaim and Demand for Jury Trial in Kootenai 
County Case No. CV 08-2630 
• Answer to Counterclaim in Kootenai County Case No. CV 08-2630 
• Clerk's Record on Appeal, Volumes I and II, in Supreme Court Case No. 
34392, Lewiston Vineyard, LLC, vs. Marty D. Franz, et al. 
• Mutual Release of all Claims dated April 22, 2008 re Nez Perce County Case 
No. CV 05-1476 (designated as Case No. 34392 before the Supreme Court of 
Idaho) 
• In Latah Cotmty Case No. CV 2007-361, Marty D. Franz, et al. vs. Shelley 
vs 
Bennett, et al., the following documents: 
1. Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial dated 4/12/07 
2. Answer and Demand for Jury Trial 4/25/07 
3. Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment 6/20/07 
4. Affidavit of Shelley L. Bennett in Support of Defendant's Motion for 
Summary Judgment 6/21/07 
5. Affidavit of Marty Frantz in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for 
Summary Judgment 7/31/07 
6. Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for 
Summary Judgment 7 /31/07 
7. Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion to Strike Portions 
of the Affidavit of Marty Frantz 8/03/07 
8. Affidavit of Rudy J. Verschoor in Support of Defendant's 
Memorandum in Reply to Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition to 
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment 8/03/07 
9. Defendant's Memorandum in Reply to Plaintiffs Memorandum in 
Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment 8/03/07 
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10. Defendants' Revised Motion for Summary Judgment 11/13/07 . . ~ 
Ii. Statement of Undisputed Facts in Support of Defendants' Revised 
Motion for Summary Judgment 11/13/07 
12. Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Revised Motion for 
Summary Judgment 11/13/07 
13. Affidavit of Shelley L. Bennett in Support of Defendants' Revised 
Motion for Summary Judgment 11/13/07. 
14. Affidavit ofThomas W. Whitney in Support ofDefendants' Revised 
Motion for Summary Judgment 11/13/07 
15. Affidavjt ofRudy J. Verschoor in Support ofDefendants' Revised 
Motion for Sunu11ary Judgment 11/13/07 
16. First Amended Complaint and Demand for fory Trial 1 l/27/07 
17. Answer to Amended Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial 11/28/07 
18. Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Revised 
Motion for Summary Judgment 11/30/07 
19. Affidavit of R. Bruce Owens in Support of Plaintiffs' Memorandum 
in Opposition to Defendants' Revised Motion for Summary 
Judgment 11/30/07 
20. Supplemental Affidavit of Marty Frantz 11/30/07 
21. Defendants' Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion to 
Continue Hearing on Defendants' Revised Motion for Summary 
Judgment 12/07 /07 
22. Memorandum in Reply to Plaintiffs' Response to Defendants' 
Revised Motion for Sununary Judgment 12/07/07 
23. Order Granting Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 
1/2/08 
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25. Defendants' Revised Motion for Summary Judgment Regarding 
Count 1 (Negligence) 1/8/08 
26. Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Revised Motion for 
Summary Judgment re: Negligence Claim 1/8/08 
• In Kootenai County Case No. CV 08-2630: 
1. Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment 
2. Defendant's Statement of Undisputed Material Facts 
3. Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion for Summary 
Judgment 
4. Affidavit of Tom Wolny 
5. Affidavit of Joel P. Hazel in Support of Defendant's Motion for 
Summary Judgment 
6. Affidavit of Peter C. Erb land in Support of Defendant's Motion for 
Summary Judgment 
7. Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary 
Judgment 
8. Affidavit of Regina M. McCrea 
9. Reply Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion for Summary 
Judgment 
10. Affidavit of Peter C. Erb land in Support of Defendant's Reply 
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment 
Assumptions of Facts 
From my review of these documents I have reached some tentative assumptions of 
facts that form the factual basis for my preliminary opinions. 
1. Marty D. Frantz and Cindy Frantz, Gary D. Ghramm and Linda Ghramm, Robert J. 
Kannapien and Sheri Ka..rmapien, and Randy McKahan and Kathy McKahan are the 
members of Guardian Angel Homes, LLC ("GAH"), an Idaho limited liability 
company. Marty Frantz ("Frantz") has been in the real property development 
business since the later l 970's and has developed multiple multi-unit housing 
projects in the early 1980's in the Western United States. In the late 1990's, Frantz 
began developing assisted living facilities in the Pacific Northwest. 
2. GAR develops and operates assisted living residences in the Inland Northwest. 
GAH has developed facilities under that name in Richland, Washington, Liberty 
Lake, Washington, Post Falls, Idaho and Lewiston, Idaho. 
3. Human Resource Construction, Inc. ("HRC") is an Idaho corporation located in 
Kootenai County, Idaho. HRC is a partner of GAH. The majority owners of HRC 
are Marty and Cindy Frantz. HRC develops properties and constructs facilities for 
GAH. 
4. GAH and HRC are joint venturers in the development and construction of an 
assisted living facility in Lewiston, Idaho. 
5. GAH Lewiston 1, LLC ("GAH Lewiston") is an Idaho limited liability company, 
which owns and operates an assisted living facility in Lewiston, Idaho. 
6. Bennett & Associates, Inc., whose name after February 21, 2007, is Team [daho 
Real Estate, Inc., ("'Team Idaho") is an Idaho corporation and doing business in 
Moscow, Idaho. 
7. Sh.elley Bennett ("Ms. Bennett'1 is a principle of Team Idaho. She is an Idaho 
licensed real estate broker, whose principle place of business is in Moscow, Idaho. 
8. Walter M. Steed and Mary Steed are members of Lewiston Vineyard, LLC 
("Lewiston Vineyard"). 
9. Witherspoon, Kelley, Davenport & Tool, P.S. ("Witherspoon firm") is an Idaho 
professional corporation with its principal place of business in Kootenai County, 
Idaho. It is a law firm. 
10. Mark Ellingsen and Joel Hazel are lawyers who are licensed to practice law in the 
State ofldaho and are members of th.e Witherspoon firm. 
11. In the spring of 1999, GAR was considering developing an assisted living facility in 
the Moscow, Idaho area. To that end, Robert Kannapien ("Kmmapien") and Gary 
Ghramm ("Gbramr.u"), traveled to the Moscow area looking for property and went 
into the real estate office of Ms. Bennett They discussed their plans with 
rAA l~O. 
Ms.Be11J1ett, a licensed real estate agent and broker .. On June-17, 1999, GAH 
entered into an exclusive buyer agreement with Ms. Bennet and engaged her to 
assist them in finding property suitable to iheir purpose. Ka.nnapien and Glu·amm 
indicated they were open to buying property in either the Moscow or Lewiston area 
and told Ms. Bennett their preferred arrangement was to find an investor who 
wanted to partner with them in the project. 
12. Kaimapien and Ghranun infonned Ms. Bermett they had paid in the range of $4.25 
per square foot for similar property i11 Liberty Lake, Washington and the Post Falls 
area and that was their price range. 
13. Ms. Bennett found a couple of parcels in Moscow that GAB was interested in 
within that price range but no sales occurred. The search was then widened to 
incltide Lewiston, Idaho. 
14. In a chance meeting with Walter Steed ("Steed"), whom Ms. Be11nett was 
acquainted with, Ms. Bennett learned that Steed owned property in Lewiston, Idaho 
that likely met the need of GAR. Ms. Bennett and Steed drove to the Steed 
property in Lewiston and looked at it. 
15. Ms. Bennett was excited about the property and believed that it was perfect for the 
GAH project. 
16. Steed asked Ms. Beru1ett what her clients were willing to pay for the property and 
Ms. Bennett told him that the OAH principals would pay $4.25 to $4.50 per square 
foot and Steed replied that he would sell the property for that price. 
17, Ms. Bennett saw the Steed property in Lewiston in the late summer or early fall of 
1999. During that visit, she saw a large Ray J. White Realtor sign on the property. 
Either prior to or during Ms. Bennett's first visit to the Steed property> she was told 
by Steed that the listing with Ray J. White was about to expire and Steed wanted to 
wait for that to occur, after which he would list the property with her. 
18. The property had been listed with Ray J. White for nine years at a price less than 
$4.25 per square foot and no serious offers were received during the tenn of the 
listing. 
19. In Nove11.1ber of 1999, Ms. Bennett returned to the Steed property with Frantz, 
Kannapien and Gbramm. At that time1 the Steed property was listed with Ray. J, 
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property re:man1ed listed with-the White agency until January, 2000, when the 
listing contract terminated. 
20. GAB was very interested in the Steed pro:perty. Shortly after Ms, Bennett made the 
introduction to Steed and showed the property, the GAH principles became 
involved Ln the negotiations. Frantz was interested in bringing Steed in as a partJ.1er 
and conducted negotiations directly with Steed. Frantz provided Steed with the 
closing documents from the Post Falls transaction, which closed at $4.25 per square 
foot. Steed told Frantz he was willing to take that amount. The only price offered 
by GAR was $4.25 per square foot and there were no other negotiations regarding 
the purchase price. 
21. Frantz told Ms. Be:nnett that as long as the property appraises for the sale price, he 
did not have a problem with the price, but if it does not appraise for the sale price, 
he would have a problem with the price. He made a similar statement to Steed. 
22. Steed did not want to pay Ray J. White a commission on the GAB transaction 
because the White Agency did not find GAH and the property had been listed for 
several years with no viable leads. Steed decided to let the listing with White expire 
before pursuing the transaction with GAH. After the \Vhite listing expired, Steed 
signed a limited dual agent agreement with Ms. Bennett. 
23. G.AH and Steed entered into a written agreement for GAH to buy Steed's prope1ty 
for approximately $502,000, which equated to about $4.25 per square foot in an 
agreement dated April 18, 2000. The agreement was a total purchase price of 
$531,702.00. The additional $30,000.00 was Ms. Be1mett's real estate commission, 
taken in the form of membership units in the newly fon:ned GAR Lewiston. 
24. GAH's lender engaged the services of an appraiser to determine the market value of 
the property as part of the loan process. The appraisal was completed in August of 
2000 and the report was provided to GAR. The land appraised for $520,000. 
25. The sale of the Steed property to GAH closed in August of 2000. Part of the 
co11sideration for the $502,000 land price was an unsecured promissory note 
payable to Lewiston Vineyard :in the amonnt of $220,702.00, which was signed 
personally by Frantz, Gbramrn, McKahan, Kannapien and their spouses. The note 
was due in one lump sum on July li 2005. 
26. Ms. Bennett received her real estate commission in the amount of approximately 
$30,000 in the form of membership units in GA.i.°tf Lewiston. 
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27. Ms. Bennett never i11forn1ed GAH or its principles that immediate1y prior to the 
time she obtained the dual agency listing agreement with Steed in January of 2000, 
the Steed property had been listed with Rayl White or that it was listed with Rayl 
White for a sale price of $359,000. 
28. There is 110 evidence that Ms. Bennett made any effort to determine whether the 
sale price of the Steed property could be negotiated at an amount less than $4.25 per 
square foot. 
29. Ms. Be1mett failed to exercise reasonable skill and care in the performance ofhor 
duties to GAR by failing to disclose the material facts of the listing between Steed 
and Ray J. White to GAR, prior to the sale to GAH. 
30. Ms. Bennett failed to promote the best interests of her client, GAH, in good faith, 
honesty and fair dealing, by failing to disclose the material facts of the listing 
between Steed and Ray J. White to GAH prior to the sale to GAR 
31. Ms. BetJnett bad an interest to conceal the details of the listing between Steed and 
Ray l White fra.m her client, GAH, because a lower sale p1ice would have redu.ced 
the amount of her sales commission from the sale by Steed to GAR. 
32. By her failure to exercise r~asonable skill and care in the performance of her duties 
to GAH and her failure to promote the best interests of her client in good faith, 
honesty and fair dealing, Ms. Bennett denied her client the opportunity to negotiate 
and purcbase the Steed property at a price lower than what was paid at closing. 
33. GAH Lewiston built a multimillion dollar assisted living facility on the property 
bought from Steed. In 2003, GAR Lewiston decided to expand. GAH Lewiston 
sought financing for the expansion. The project, including the real property, was 
appraised by the same appraiser as before. When the second appraisal was 
delivered in March of 2003, the appraised value of the land was significantly lower 
than $4.25 per square foot and GAH' s lender was initially unwilling to provide the 
loan because the project did not have sufficient value. F'ra11tz disagreed with the 
appraisal and wrote the lender providing additional information. 
34. Frantz and the appraiser ultimately convinced the lender that the project value was 
within the valuation for the financing of the expansion. The previous appraisal was 
amended by the appraiser. The valuation, based upon an income capitalization 
approach, which was the basis for the loa11, was stated as $10,230,000.00. The loan 
to GAR was granted and recorde4 on November 3, 2003. 
35. D11ring the process of,obtaining the loan-, Frantz learned i.nformation that convinced 
him that Steed had defrauded GAR regarding the price/value of the property during 
the land transactio11. Frantz was infonned that, based on comparable properties in 
the area, the land was valued at $1.15 per square foot rather than $4.50 per square 
foot, which Steed had allegedly represented to Frantz. Frantz began trying to 
negotiate a reduction in the amount due on the urJ.secured promissory note, which 
was due and payable in full on July 1, 2005. 
36. In a letter dated August 7, 2003 to Steed, Frantz stated he has compelling evidence 
that Steed and Ms. Bennett must have known the $4.50 p1ice per square foot was 
nearly four times the sale price of otber available land in the area. Judge Stegner 
used this date as the commence111ent of the statute of limitations for a fraud claim 
against Ms. Bennett when he granted summary judgment dismissing the claims of 
GAH agai11st Ms. Bennett. 
37. When he wrote the letter dated August 7, 2003 to Steed, Frantz had no specific 
knowledge that Ms. Bennett knew about the tenns of tbe listing between Ray J. 
White at1.d Steed and had failed to disclose such u1aterial facts to GAH prior to the 
sale. At the same tin.1.e Frantz was attempting to negotiate a reduction in the amount 
ofthe note with Steed, he stated in e-mail communications to Ms. Bennett that he 
trusted her and had confidence in her integrity, telling her that be believed she was 
"100% innocent and in fact will be financial]y impacted the same as us since you 
are a partner." 
38. As the July 1, 2005 maturity date on the promissory note approached, Frantz had 
not reached any settlement with Steed. Co11cemed about litigation, Frantz consulted 
with legal counsel. 
39. On May 2, 2005, Frantz first contacted Mark Ellingsen at the Witherspoon fim1. 
During this meeting, Frantz was infonued that the Witherspoon firm represented 
Ms. Bennett's father, Frank Bennett and entities he controlled, but did not represent 
and had never represented Ms. Bennett personally. Mr. Frantz was informed by the 
Witherspoon fmn that the Witherspoon firm did not have a conflict of interest with 
the representation of GAH and its principles in a matter i.11 which Ms. Bennett 
would be an adverse party. 
40. In May of 2005, relevant documentation relating to the purchase of the Steed 
property, including the letter from Frantz to Steed dated August 7, 2003, was 
delivered to the Witherspoon finn. 
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41. The Witherspoon firm's attorneys infonned Frantz that its rc;presentation of Frank 
Beru1ett and the entities he controlled would not influence the firm's representation 
of Frantz and GAB. 
42. One of the entities controlled by Frank Bennett and represented by the Witherspoon 
fmn was Bennett Luniber Products, Inc. Ms. Bennett owned 5.96% of the 
outstanding non-voting shares of Bennet1 Lumber Products, Inc. as of May 1, 2005 
and 5.93% of the outstanding nonvoting shares as ofFebr.uary 15, 2006. Ms. 
Bennett never served as an officer or director of Bennett Lumber Products, Inc. or 
any of the related entities. 
43. Joel Hazel ran a conflict check in the Witherspoon fom system for Shelley Bennett 
and it failed to reveal any conflict of interest with her name. 
44. Tom Cochran, a men1ber of the Witherspoon finn, who handled Frank Bennett's 
matters, was consulted by Joel Hazel as to whether the firm had represented Ms. 
Bennett Mr. Cochran told Mr. Hazel the firm had not represented Ms. Bennett. 
Mr. Hazel told Mr. Cochran that he (the Witherspoon firm) might have to sue Ms. 
Bennett and Mr. Cochran said "do what you have to do." There is no evidence that 
the Witherspoon finn contacted it's client, Frank Bennett, to i11forn1 him that it 
might sue his daughter on behalf of Frantz or inquired whether he approved of such 
action or whether he would waive any conflict of interest if a lawsuit was filed 
against his daughter by the Witherspoon finn. There is no evidence that Frank 
Bennett or the entities he controlled authorized Mr. Cochran to waive a conflict of 
interest on behalf of Frank Bennett or the entities he controlled that were clients of 
the Witherspoon fim1. 
45. Mr. Hazel has stated under oath that the Witherspoon fom's representation of Frank 
Beonett and Beilllett Lw11ber Products, Inc. did not have an effect upon the 
Witherspoon firm's decisions or judgment regarding potential claims against Ms. 
Bennett and that Mr. Hazel would have filed suit against Ms. Bennett ifhe believed 
that was a viable and winnable cause of action against her. 
46. DuriTJ.g his first contact with the Witherspoon fim1, Frantz stated he did not believe 
that Ms. Bennett had engaged in any wrongdoing and he did not want to involve her 
in litigation. 
4 7 Initially during the representation of GAH, the Witherspoon attorneys told Frantz 
that their best case was against Bennett. As early as May 10, 2005, Frantz was told 
by the Witherspoon firm that he had a very weak case against Steed and there was 
significant risk of having to pay Steed's attorney fees if Frantz: did not prevail. 
No, 
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48. In May of 2005, Frantz talked to Ms. Bennett about the situ.ation and she denied any 
wrongdoing and pointed the finger at Steed. 
49. On May 18, 20051 Frantz: infonned Mr. Ellingsen that he believed that Ms. Bennett 
was being truthful with him abont her lack of involvement in any fraud related to 
the purchase of the Lewiston property. 
50. On June 2, 2005, Frantz had dinner with Steed in Lewistmi. to discuss the situation 
and Steed did not implicate Ms. Bennett of any wrongdoing. 
51. On June 13, 2005, Frantz wrote an e-mail to Ms. Bem1ett, which he copied to the 
Witherspoon firm, stating to Ms. Bennett: "You have so much integrity and are 
such a pleasure to work with again. I wish l could say the same for Walter. I will 
do everything possible to avoid litigation, but in the unlikely event it does go there, 
! want to assure you that Ibave full confidence in you ai1d your integrity and would 
never jeopardize our excellent business relationship or ever consider litigating au 
innocent party. You are 100 percent innocent and in fact will be financially 
impacted the same as us since yon are a partner." 
53. On July 1, 2005, the promissory note matured and remained unpaid. On July 5, 
2005 1 Lewiston Vineyard filed suit against the makers of the promissory note for 
failure to pay it. The Witherspoon firm appeared in the action to defend all the 
makers of the note. 
54. On January 13, 2006, Frantz e-mailed Witherspoon attorney, Mark Ellingsen, 
asking for a claim. to be filed against Ms. Bennett, stating: "Shelly as a professional 
laud dealer should have known that multi-family la11d in Lewiston was $Ll5SF ... 
we relied on her professional representations that market price was $4.50SF."· 
55. On January 24, 2006, Frantz e-mailed the Witherspoon finn, stating be thinks Ms. 
Bennett is guilty of gross negligence for not checking the MLS and finding the Ray 
J. White listing. He asks for advice. 
56. On February 151 2006 the deposition of Ms. Shelly was taken by Mr. Hazel. During 
the deposition, Frantz first learned that Ms. Bennett had failed to disclose her 
knowledge of the Ray J. White listing during her representation of GAH. 
57. Witherspoon lawyers told Frantz during and immediately after Ms. Bennett's 
deposition that they would research any causes of action that could be brought 
against Ms. Bennett and that he would file an action against Ms. Bennett for fraud, 
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but expressed concerns about the statute oflimitations because of the passage of 
time. Shortly after the deposition of Ms. Bermett, Witherspoon lawyers advised 
Frantz that the applicable statute of limitations had expired on all causes of action 
against Ms. Bennett except fraud. 
58. On Febmary 15, 2006, Frantz e~mailed the Witherspoon. firm stating that he 
believed Ms. Bem1ett to be as responsible as Steed and a co-conspirator. 
5 9. On F ebrnary 24, 2006, Mr. Hazel en1ailed Frantz stating he would talk to Frantz 
about what to do regarding Ms. Be1mett when he returns :from vacation on March. 6, 
2006. 
60. In March of 2006, Frantz was told by the Witherspoon finn that Mr. Hazel was 
researching whether a vi.able claim existed against Ms. Bennett. 
61. Frantz told Mr. Hazel that he wanted Mr. Hazel to fi1e litigation. against Ms. Be1mett 
regardless of whether Frantz would win or lose, no matter how long it took and no 
matter how much the cost. :Mr. Hazel advised Frantz that he did not have a 
wiilllable case against Ms. Bennett for fraud and that it would be unethical for Mr, 
Hazel to proceed against her. Mr. Haze1 refused to follow the direction of his client 
in the prosecution of the case. Mr. Hazel refused to abide by his client's decisions 
concerning the objectives of the representation. No action was filed by the 
Witherspoon firm against Ms. Bennett. 
62. Fra:ntz had meetings with Witherspoon lawyers along with his business partners 
John Geddes and Randy }.1.cKahan on at least tlrree occasions when Witherspoon 
lawyers info1med Frantz that he did not have a "winnable" case against Ms. 
Bennett. The first meeting where Witherspoon lawyers informed Frantz and 
Geddes that they did not have a winnable cause of action against Ms. Bennett took 
place shortly after Ms. Bennett's deposition. 
63. On August 7, 2006, the statute of limitations for a fraud claim against Ms. Bennett 
expired. As of this date, the Witherspoon finn had not filed a third-party claim for 
fraud against Ms. Beonett in the Lewiston Vineyard lawsuit or filed an independent 
action for fraud against Ms. Bennett 011 behalf of Frantz. 
64. Attorney Hazel told Frantz on multiple occasions that he was not going to file a 
lawsuit against Ms. Bennett. At some point in tirne during the representation of 
Frantz, Witherspoon attorneys suggested to Frantz that he get a second opinion on 
whether he had a winnable case against Ms. Bennett. At no time prior to the 
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substitution of Owens and Crandall ("Owens") did the Witherspoon firm offer or 
attempt to withdraw as counsel for Frantz, et al. 
65. 011 J a:nuary 18, 2007, Mr. Hazel e-mailed Frantz confuming their prior discussions 
that a winnable cause of action did not exist against Ms. Bennett. He informed 
Frantz that the statute of limitations on a claim for beach of duties as a realtor ran in 
2004; that the only potentially viable action remaining is fraud, but that there would 
not be any insurance coverage for a fraud claim. He also states that Ms. Bennett 
refuses to accept the buyout of her units in GAH Lewiston. unless she receives a 
release of all potential claims against her and recommends that GAH release Ms. 
Bennett from liability in exchange for her releasing the $33,580 interest she owns in 
GAH Lewiston. Mr. Hazel did not advise Frantz that the statllte of limitations for a 
.fraud claim against Ms. Bennett had expired on August 7, 2006. 
66 At no thne did the Witherspoon fim1 infom.1 Frantz or any of the GAB principles 
that the statute oflimitations upon the claim of fraud against Ms. Bennett would 
expire on August 7, 2006 or any other date. 
67. On February 9, 2007, Frantz e-mailed Mr. Hazel, informing him that John Geddes 
had completed his research on the viability of a claim for fraud against Ms. Bennett 
and disagrees with the Witherspoon lawyers that no claim exists. He further states 
tbat other counsel has been hired. 
68. On February 14, 2007, Owens substituted in for the Witherspoon firm in the 
Lewiston Vineyards v. Frantt, et al. lawsuit. 
69. Ou April 13, 2007, Frantz, et al., represented by Jay Sturgell, filed ao action in 
Latah County agai11st Ms. Bennett and Bennett & Associates, Inc., alleging 
negligence, fraud, breach of fiduciary duties and unclean hands. Some time prior to 
November of 2007, Owens substituted in the action for Jay Sturgell. 
70. On May 29, 2007, Judge Brudie entered summary judgment in the Nez Perce 
County case of Lewiston Vineyard v. Frantz et al., against Frantz, et al. The 
judgme11t was appealed by Frantz, et al. The case was subsequently settled by the 
parties wbi1e the appeal was pending in April of 2008. 
71. 011 December 14, 2007, Ju.dge Stegner entered partial summary judgment i11 the 
Latah County case of Frantz, et al. v. Ms. Ber.nett and Bem1ett & Associates, Tnc., 
disrnissing the claims for fraud, breach of fiduciary duty and unclean hands. A 
motion of Plaintiffs to amend to assert a claim of civil conspiracy was denied. On 
. J auuaiy 13, 2008, an Am.ended Order was entered by Judge Stegner fixing August 
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7, 2003 as the date on which the statute oflimitations for'fraud began running. The 
remaining claim for negligence was voluntarily dismissed by Plaintiffs. 
Legal Authorities Reviewed 
I have also reviewed some legal authorities and other documents that are relevant to 
the issues presented in this matter. They include: 
• Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct,. effective 7/1/04 
• Model Rules of Professional Conduct, annotated 
• Selected Idaho Supreme Court decisions 
• Mallen and Smith, Legal Malpractice (2009 Edition) 
• Restatement of the Law Third, The Law Governing Lawyers (2000, Snpp. 2007) 
• 7 Am Jur 2d, Attorneys At Law (1997, Supp. 2008) 
• Idaho Code, Tit1e 54, Ch. 20, Idaho Real Estate License Law 
• Idaho Code, Title 5, Ch. 2, Limitation of Actions 
Legal Principles and Rules 
Before expressing my preliminary thoughts, it may be use:f\11 to express some 
general p1inciples a.11d rules upon which my preliminary thoughts are based. 
Standards of Conduct: The Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct (the "Idaho 
Rule$") define proper conduct of attomeys for purposes of professional discipline. 
Although ethical and disciplinary regulations are intended for the protection of the public, 
in most jurisdictions, including Idabo, such provisions do not in themselves create remedies 
for damages agrunst a wrongdoing attomey. They provide a pub lie remedy but not a private 
remedy or cause of action if violated. However, the Idaho Rules further provide that "since 
the Rules do establish standards of conduct by lawyers, a lawyer's violation of a Rule may 
be evidence of the applicable standard of conduct." 
Notwithstanding that a violation of ethical standards, standing alone, is not 
sufficient to support civil liability, many courts have ruled that they are relevant to the issue 
of what duty an attorney owes to a client and allow evidence of a violation of tbe rules of 
professional conduct on the issue of professional negligence. See, e.g., Cummings v. Sea 
Lion Corp., 924 P.2d 1011 (Alaska 1996); Mainor v. Nault, 101 P Jd 308 (Nev. 
2004)(alleged violation of ethics rules did not create a cause of action for civil damages in 
legal malpractice action; however, the rules served as evidence of the standard of care 
owed by attorneys, and expert witnesses in legal 111alpractice action were entitled to base 
their opinions regarding standard of care on Supreme Court ethics mles). 
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No Idaho decision·directly on point has been located. In Pichon v. Benjami1i, 108 · 
Idaho 852, 702 P.2d 890 (Ct. App. 1985), the Idaho Court of Appeals rejected the argument 
that the adoption of the Code of Professional Resp011sibility was dependent upon statutory 
authority and therefore a breach of the Code created "statutory liability. '1 In this case, 
Plaintiff alleged that her attorney violated the Code provisions relating to conflicts of 
interest and breached the duty of care owed to Plaintiffby providing legal services for her 
while the alleged conflict of interest was extant. She asserted that'the attomey violated a 
provision of the Idaho Code of Professional Responsibility for attorneys. Arguh1g that the 
Code was adopted by the Court pursuant to statutory authorization, Plaintiff urged the 
Court to fmd that the code creates a "liability by statute." The Court rejected her 
hypothesis-that the Code was promulgated pursuant to statute, bees.use the regulation of 
the practice oflaw is 2Il inherent power of the judiciary. The Court held, ''The adoption of 
the Code of Professional Responsibility was not dependent upon statutory authority and did 
not create any ''statutory liability/' 108 Idaho at 853, 702 P .2d et 893. 
Relevant Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct 
Rule 1. 1: Competence. 
A lawyer shall provide competent representation to a client. Competent representation 
requires the legal knowledge, skill, thorol1.ghness and preparation.reasonably necessary for 
the representation. 
Rule 1.2: Scope of Representation. 
(a) Subject to paragraphs ( c) and ( d), a iawyer shall abide by a client's decisions 
conceming the objectives of representation ai1d, as required by Rule 1.4, shall consult with 
the client as to tbe means by which they are to be pursued. .... 
Rule 1.4: Communication. 
(a) A lawyer shall: 
(1) promptly infonn the client of any decision or circumstance with respect to 
which the client's informed consent, as defined in Rule 1.0(e), is required by these 
mles; 
(2) reasonably consult with the client about the means by which the client's 
objectives are to be accomplished; 
(3) keep the client reaso11ably informed about the status of the matter; 
(4) promptly comply with reasonable requests for i11f0l'mation; including a request 
for an accounting as required by Rule l .5(f); and 
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(5) consult with the client about any relevant limitation on the lawyer's conduct 
when the lawyer knows that the client expects assistance not pennitted by the Rules 
of Professio11al Conduct or other law. 
(b) A lawyer shall explain a matter to the ex.tent reasonably necessary to pemrit the client 
to make infom1ed decisions regarding the representation. 
Rule 1.7: Conflict of Interest: Current Clients. 
(a) Except as provided in paragraph (b), a lawyer shall not represent a client if the 
representation involves a concurrent conflict of interest. A concurrent conflict of interest 
exists if: 
(1) the representation of one clie11t will be directly adverse to another client; 
or 
(2) there is a significant 1isk that the representation of one or more clients will be 
materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to another client. a fo11ner client 
or a third person or by the personal interest of the lawyer1 including family and 
domestic relationships. 
(b) Notwithstanding the existence of a concun-ent conflict of interest under paragraph (a), a 
lawyer may represent a client if: 
(1) the lawyer reasonably believes that the lawyer will be able to provide 
conipetent and diligent representation to each affected client; 
(2) the representation is not prohibited by law; 
(3) the representation does not involve the assertion of a claim by one client against 
another client represented by the lawyer in the same litigation or other proceeding 
before a triblll.1al; and 
(4) each affected client gives infonned consent, confirmed in writing. 
Rule 1.10: Imputation of Conflicts of Interest: General Rule 
(A) While lawyers are associated in a firm, none of them shall knowingly represent a client 
when any one of them practic.i11g alone would be prohibited from doing so by Rules 1. 7 or 
1.9, unless the prohibition is based on a personal interest of the prohibited lawyer and does 
not present a significant risk of materially limiting the representation of the client by 
remaining lawyers in tbe firm. 
Standard or Duty of Care: 
Legal malpractice actions are an amalgam of tort and contract theories. Johnson v. 
Jones, 103 ldaho 702, 652 P.2d 650 (1982). The elements of a legal malpractice action are: 
(1) the existence of an attorney-client relationship; (2) the existence of a duty on the part of 
the lawyer; (3) the breach of the duty or of the standard of care by the lawyer; and (4) the 
MA U // 1ttu :1u rn nu. l'Jo. 
failure-to perform the duty must have been a proximate cause of the damages suffered by · 
the client Id.; See, also, Blough v. Wellman, 132 Idaho 424,974 P.2d 70 (1999). 
To comply with the duty of care, an attorney must use and exercise the degree of 
care, skill, diligence, and knowledge commonly possessed and exercised by a reasonable, 
care:fol and prudent lawyer. See e.g., Sun Valley Potatoes, Inc. ,1. Rosholt, Robertson & 
Tucker, 133 Idaho 1, 981 P.2d 236 (1999). 
Moreover, the scope of the attorney's contracti1al duty to the client is defined by the 
purposes for which the attorney is retained. An attorney is under no duty to provide legal 
services or legal advice that is outside the scope of the specific engagement with the client. 
Sec, e.g., Johnson v. Jones, 103 Idaho 702,652 P.2d 650 (1982). 
Causation: 
Two factors are imperative in legal malpractice based upon negligence, (1) that the 
trial attorney was negligent in the preparation, investigation, or trial of a case; and (2) bis 
negligence was the proxµnate cause of the injury. Jarman v. Hale, 112 Idaho 270, 731 P.2d 
813 (Ct. App. 1986); Nepanuse1to v. Hanse11, 140 Idaho 942, 104 P.3d 984 (Ct. App. 2004). 
The client, in an attorney malpractice action, has the burden of proving not only the 
negligence of the attorney, but also that the negligence was the proximate cause of the loss 
of aright to recover in the underlying case. Jordan v. Beeks, 135 Idaho 586, 21 P.3d 908 
(2001 ). The correct proximate cause standard is whether the attorney's alleged negligence 
altered the clients' chance of success in the underlying litigation. Id. 
Preliminary Thoughts and Opinions 
My preliminary thoughts and opinions about the a11egations against t11e 
Witherspoon firm with respect to the issue of alleged malpractice are as follpws: 
Attorn ev~Cli ent Relationship: 
1. An attorney-client relationship existed between the Witherspoon firm and 
Frantz, et al. from the date that the Witherspoon fim1 agreed to represent Frantz, et al. in 
the Nez Perce County action until Owens was substituted in for the Witherspoon firm. 
Failure to Complv with Duties re Conflict of Interest: 
2. A lawyer is required to exercise independent professional judgment on 
behalf of a client. The. prohibition of an atto1ney representing conflicting interests is 
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deriving from the age-old maxim, "No roan shall serve two masters." 2 Legal Malpractice, 
§ 17 .1 (2009 Ed.). "The proscription against representing conflicting interests is intended 
to avoid interference \vith the fidt1.ciary obligations of undivided loyalty, confidentiality and 
competent representation for each client." Id., § 17. 2. 
3. "There is a body of 1aw examining the subjective co111ponent of conflicting 
interests. Courts have found conflicting interests where there was a violation only of the 
duty of undivided loyalty and no interference with competent representation. Thus, one of 
the evils of a conflict is the failure of a lawyer to exercise undivided loyalty. Analysis of 
such a risk does not depend on whether the clients have similar interests in the litigation or 
the subject matter, but solely whether there is any distraction from the undivided loyalty 
owed eacb client. The fiduciary obligations mandate that a client can expect undivided 
loyalty fro:m. the chosen attomey. Loyalty may be divided though the clients are represented 
in unrelated, different proceedings," Id., p. 916. 
4. Loyalty and independent judgment are essential elements in the lawyer's 
relationship to a client. Concurrent conflicts of interest can arise from the lawyer's 
responsibilities to another client or a third person. Here, the attorneys were sufficiently 
concerned about the conflict between their duties to Frantz;, et al. and Frank Bennett and tbe 
entities he controlled that they discussed among them.selves whether a lawsuit against 
Frank Be1mett's daughter would create a problem for the firm. Tb.ey never concluded it 
would not; they concluded the attorney for Frantz, et al. should "do what you have to do," 
a tacit admission that accepting the engagement croated a very real concern about their 
ability to provide jndependent judgment and loyalty to both clients. Any decision to sue 
Ms. Bennett would have raised the same concem. One cannot reasonably believe that a 
decision to sue the daughter of a significant client of the, firm would not be affected by the 
impact that decision may have on the significant client and his or its business or that the 
duty ofloyalty to Frank Bennett and bis controlled e11tities would not adversely affect the 
Witherspoon furn' s ability to provide competent and diligent representation to Frantz et al. 
5. The Witherspoon firm had a duty to decline the engagement to represent 
Frantz, et al. because there existed a significant risk that the representation of Frantz, et a.l. 
would be materially limited by the responsibilities of the Witherspoon finn to a another 
client, i.e., Frank Bennett, the father of Ms. Bennett, and his controlled entitiesJ which 
included Bennett Lumber Products, Inc., in which Ms. Bennett owned 5.93 to 5.95 % of the 
outstanding shares of non-voting stock. 
6. By not declining the representation, the Witherspoon :finn had a dnty to 
obtain an infonned consent confirmed in writing from Prank Ben.nett and the entities he 
controlled and from Frantz, et al. before accepting tbe engagement to represent Frantz, et 
aL in the Nez Perce County action. 
l VUt,,./ ! vv 
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7. The Witherspoon firm violated the duty to obtain informed consent in 
writing from both Frank Bennett and the entities he controlled and fi:0111 Frantz, et al. when 
it accepted the engagement to represent Frantz, et a]. in the Nez Perce County action. 
There is no evidence that any written consent to the conflict was obtained from either set of 
clients. Absent those written consents, the engagement should have been declined by the 
Witherspoon firm. 
8. By failing to obtain. the infom1ed consent of both clients confim1ed in 
writing and failing to decline the engagement) the Witherspoon firm failed to use and 
exercise the degree of care, skill, diligence, and knowledge commonly possessed and 
exercised by a reaso11able, careful and pnident lawyer. 
9. The Witherspoon firm could not avoid the conflict of interest by having 
different attorneys represent the different sets of clients because the conflict of interest of 
one member ofa law firm is imputed to all members of the law finn. 
Failure to Comply with Duties to File Claim Before Statute of Limitations Ex:Qired 
and Failure to Inform the Client re St.atute of Limitations for Fraud 
10. The most common error by a litigation attorney is the failure to properly 
advise or file the client's claim or cause of action within the time required by a statute of 
limitations. 4 Legal Malpractice, § 31.18 (2009 Ed.)( citing Farnsworth v. Ratliff 134 
Idaho 237,999 P.2d 892 (2000). 
11. In my opinion, the failure of Ms. Bennett to disclose the material facts of the 
listing between Steed and Ray J. White to GAR, prior to the sale to GAR, constituted 
actionable fraud or constructive fraud. Her actions were further negligent and that claim 
could have been filed within four years of Frantz, et al., sustaining damage under Idaho 
Code 5-224. 
· 12. An Idaho lawyer is required to provide competent representation to a client. 
Competent representation requires the legal knowledge, ski11, thoroughness and preparation 
reasonably necessary for the representation. 
13. It is reasonable to expect a competent Idaho lawyer to know or to learn in 
the course ofrepresentation of a client that the statute oflimitations for fraud under Idaho 
law is three years from the date of discovery of the fraud or the date that facts are learned 
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14. The Witherspoon firm bad a duty to dete1mine when the statn.te of 
limitations for a claim of fraud against Ms. Bennett wou.ld comrnence to run and would 
e">.l)ire and to act accordingly to protect their client, Frantz et a\ from the corn:eg_uences of 
allowing the statute oflimitations to expire before bringing an action against Ms. Bennett 
for fraud. 
15. The duties owed to a client include the duty to reasonably consult with the 
client about the i:neans by which the objectives of the engagement are to be accomplished 
and to keep the client reasonably infonned about the stattis of the matter. The Witherspoon 
fmn failed to detemiine when the statute of limitations for a claim of fraud against Ms. 
Bennett would expire, failed to infonn the client, Frantz et al., what tlut date would be, and 
failed to give the client, Frantz et al, the opportunity to obtain other counsel to file an action 
to prosecute the claim of fraud against Ms. Bennett prior to the date it expired, Rather, the 
Witherspoon attorneys silnply refused to file an action for fraud against Ms. Bennett, 
without explaining to the client, Frantz et al. that the statute of limitations would expire 011 
August 8, 2006. As a consequence, the action that was subsequently filed against Ms. 
Ben11ett was ba1Ted. 
16. The Witherspoon firm was engaged to represe11.t Frantz, et al. on May 2, 
2005 and had an adequate opportunity to investigate the facts before the statute of 
limitations expired. Had they done so, they would bave or should have k:11own about the 
letter dated August 7, 2003 from Frantz to Steed in which Frantz states that Ms. Bemiett 
must have known the price of available land was less than $4.50 per square foot. That fact 
was the basis for Judge Stegner to find the statute oflimitations started to nm on that date 
and expired on August 7, 2006. Knowledge of that fact should have alerted the 
Witherspoon furn that the statute of li01itations commenced on August 7, 2 003 and would 
expire on Augi.1st 7, 2006. 
17. By failing to inform Frantz et al., that the statitte of lim.itatio11s would expire 
on August 7, 2006, the Witherspoon firm failed to use and exercise the degree of care, skill, 
diligence, and knowledge commonly possessed and exercised by a reasonable, careful and 
prudent lawyer. 
;Failure to Comply with Duty to Abide bv a Client's Pecisfoq 
18. The duties owed to a client include the d'uty to abide by a client's decision 
concerning the objectives ofrepresentation and to consult with the client as to the means by 
which they are to be pursued . 
' i 
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19. . Paragrap~ (a) of Rule 1.2, lR.P.C., confers upon the client the ultimate 
authority to detennine the purposes to be served by legal representation, within the limits 
imposed by law and the lawyer's professional obligations. 
20. In this matter, the client, Frantz, directed the Witherspoon finn to file 
against Ms. Bennett. The Witherspoon attorneys refused to abide by the client's decision 
to file an action against Ms. Bennett in January of 2006. By failing to file and failing to 
withdraw to allow Frantz et al. to obtain other counsel to do so, the Witherspoon finn 
allowed the statute of limitations for fraud against Ms. Bem1ett to expire and-deprived 
Frantz et al. of the opportunity to pursue an action for fraud against Ms. Bennett. 
21. By failing to file against Ms. Bem1ett as a third party complaint or in an 
independent action, the Witherspoon firm failed to use and exercise the degree of care, 
skill, diligence, and lmowledge commonly possessed and exercised by a reasonable, carefh) 
aud pmdent lawyer. 
Causation 
The failure of the Witherspoon fin:n to comply with its duties as outlined above 
dep1ived Frantz et at of the opportunity to pursue an action for fraud against Ms. BeIU1ett. 
Reservation 
I have not completed my review of the relevant documents and authorities and 
reserve the right to revise or add to my prehminary thoughts as more infom1ation is 
obtained by me. 
Very truly yoLtrs, 
HAWLEY TROXE LENNIS & HAWLEY LLP 
L VV,Jt 1 '"' 
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ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS 
Bruce Owens 
Owens & Crandall, PLLC 
1859 North Lakewood Drive, Ste 104 
Coeur d 1Alene, ID 83814 
January B 1 2009 
INVOICE NO.: 212552 
FIL~ NO.: 42643-0013 
BILLING ATTY: MWC 
The enclosed bill is for services rendered for the period ending Dec 31, 2008. 
The breakdown of your account is as follows: 
RE: Owens & Crandall( PLLC-Expert Witness re Franz v. 
Witherspoon Kelley 
'}ANCE FORWARD 
TOTAL CURRENT LEGAL SERVICES: 
$0.00 
$90.00 
$90.00 TOTAL FOR THIS BILL 
TOTAL CURRENT CH'ARGES AND BALANCE FORWARD $90.00 
Payment should be made to 
Hawley T~oxell Ennis & Hawley LLP 
All invoices are due & payable upon receipt. 
Thank you for keeping your account current. 
ACCOUNTS 30 DAYS PAST PDE WILL BE CHARGED 
1% PER MONTH {12% ANNUAL PERCENTAGE RATE) 
OF THE UNPAID AMOUNT. 
04: 1 No, 
Coeur 
INVOICE DATE: Jan 
INVOICE . : 2125 
64 -
9 
For Professional Services Rendered Through Dec 3l, 2008 







Receive and review e-mail from R. 
McCrea re players, facts and 
issu~s involved in litigation 
against Witherspoon firm; arrange 
for conflict of interest query. 




0.30 Hrs $300/hr 
0.30 H:rs 
Legal Services Summary 
Merlyn w. Clark 0.30 hours at $300.00 = 
Client Charges 
Total Client Charges 
TOTAL THIS BILL 













Owens & Crandall, PLLC 
Merlyn w. Clark 
1859 North Lakewood Drive( Ste 104 
Coeur d 1Alene 1 ID 83814 
l' VVJ/ l VJ 
ATfORNEYS AND CO(JNS1'; 
Remit to: 
Mam Sui'te 1000 
Post Office 'l;IRX 1617 
Bowe, Id~o 837iil-16t7 
EIN: 82.02.5~ 
208.344,0000 • Fax 20·8.954.ifa'g;i 
www.hawleytroxcll.co:di. 
May 11, 2009 
INVOICE NO.: 216792 
FILE NO.: 42643-0013 
BILLING ATTY: MWC 
Th.e enclosed bill is for services rendered for the period ending Apr 30, 2009. 
Th.e breakdown of your account is as follows: 
RE: Owens & Crandall, PLLC-Expert Witness re Franz V. 
Witherspoon Kelley 
D""'."ior Balance Owing 
. ) 




TOTAL CURRENT LEGAL SERVICES: 
$0.00 
$10,664.00 
$10,664.00 TOTAL FOR THIS BILL 
TOTAL CURRENT CHARGES AND BAI.J'lJitCE FORWARD $10,664.00 
Payment should be made to 
Rawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley LLP 
All invoices are due & payable upon receipt. 
Thank you for keeping your account current. 
ACCOUNTS 30 DAYS PAST DUE WILL BE CHA.RGED 
1% PER MONTH (12% ANNUAL PERCENTAGE RATE) 




Far Professional Services Rendered Through Apr 30, 2009 



















Preview materials received from 
counsel. 
Review materials received from 
c;ounsel. 
Review materials received from 
counsel. 
Review materials received from 
counsel. 
continue to review documents 
received from counsel; review 
relevant Idaho court decisions 
and authorities on standards of 
practice; analyze facts and law; 
receive and review c~ronology of 
.events. 
Review documents received from 
counsel; review Idaho statutes on 
duties of ~ealtors; review Idaho 
Rules of Professional Conduct: 
analyze facts and formulate 
opinions; telephone conference 
with B. Owens and R. McCrea re 
issues and opinionsi begin 
a report. 
Hours Rate 
4.50 Hrs $310/hr 
s.oo Hrs $310/hr 
7.50 Hrs $310/hr 
4.50 Hrs $310/hr 
7.70 Hrs $310/hr 
5.20 Hrs $310/hr 








: 12 PM 
( NON -J,..DR) 
Services Summary 
Merlyn W. Cla:{k 
Client Charges 
Total Client Charges 
TOTAL THIS BILJ'.i 
TOTAL AMOUNT DUE 
) 
Meriyn W. Ciark 
.40 ,0 
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June 2, 2009 
Bruce Owens 
Owens & Crandall, PLLC 
1859 North Lakewood Drive, Ste 104 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814 
INVOICE NO.: 217713 
FILE NO.: 42643-0013 
BILLING ATTY: MWC 
The enclosed bill is for services rendered for the period ending May 31, 2009. 
The breakdown of your account is as follows: 
RE: Owens & Crandall, PLLC-Expert Witness re Franz V. 
Witherspoon Kelley 
}Or Balance Owing 
Less Payments Applied Since Last Invoice: 
BALANCE FORWARD 
TOTAL CURRENT LEGAL SERVICES: 
TOTAL FOR THIS BILL 







Payment should be made to 
Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley LLP 
All invoices are due & payable upon receipt. 
Thank you for keeping your account current. 
ACCOUNTS 30 DA~S PAST DUE WILL BE CHARGED 
1~ PER MONTH (12t ANNUP.L PERCENTAGE RATE) 
OP THE UNPAID AMOUNT. 
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For Professional Services Rendered Through May 31,,2009 






















Begin research and drafting the 
report to B. Owens and R. McCrea. 
Continue research and drafting 
report to B. Owens and R. McCrea. 
Continue to research and draft 
report. 
Continue to research and draft 
preliminary opinions report. 
Continue to research and draft 
Preliminary Opinions Report. 
Continue to research and draft 
Preliminary Opinions Report; 
telephone call to R. McCrea re 
report. 
Telephone conference with R. 
McCrea re expert witness report; 
draft corrections to report and 
transmit final preliminary report 
to R. McCrea. 
Receive and review 
Merlyn Clark re expert report to 
be filed with court; execute the 
Hours Rate 
2.50 Brs $310/hr 
· 2.80 Hrs $310/hr 
8.80 Hrs $310/hr 
3.50 Hrs $310/hr 
o.~o Hrs $310/hr 
2.80 Hrs $310/hr 
0.50 Hrs $310/hr 














Legal Services Summary 
Merlyn W. Clark 
Client Charges 
Total Client Charges 
TOTAL THIS BILL 




22.40 Hrs $6,944.00 
22.40 hours at $310,00 = $6,944.00 
$0.00 
$6,944.00 
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Exhibit "C" 
P. 1 1 
MAY/ 07/2015/THU 04: 12 PM 
Case 1'?·07024~TLM 
R Bruce Owft\~·+ 
J ~ J:Y ). Crn.n chll V 
. J t.tfii!y R.. Owc'ti:I 
· µcg1n n.M, Mcf;cci+ 
Linsey E. M::t.tt.l~On .. ':; . .... ·. . 
-Civil. 'r r1,t Spccialin 
4'1J,CN.J i1i1P [!.;WA 
-,LJc:tfutdlii lD, WAW.CA 
JuJy 30, 2009 
}1A F ACS1MJLE 
M etJy 11 Clark 
Hawley Tro'.){c::11 
FAX No. .I., V l V/ i. V'-' 
oc 66-1 Filed 11/13/14 
ff davit of Meriyn 'vV. Ciark ~~~e;~\1 4 ~ /1), =f 
/ !596 N. W2yne Drive, 5uY~~~f. 
•
·" · · ·~· - ---- Hoyden , Idaho 83~)5 ,4. ;?-? c/3 -/ 3 Ph ne (208) G67.89~~
/- Fnx (20~) 667-1939 
"'WW.i;,w'en<1C.tnndull .,oin 
Attorneys At Law 
877 W Mafo St. , S1e 1000 
PO Box 16J7 
Boise, JD 83701-] 617 
R0: Frnntl, el al. v, Wi1herspoon Ktlley 
DL:&r Merlyn: 
The abovewreferenced manor was successfol ly resolved following mcrdialion this week. l w~m 10 
thW'lk )'OlJ on behalf of my diem for the valuable assjstance you provjded on this difficuJL case. 
The Jnwsu.it settled in 1w smr1Jl way because of your input. 1 understand thaL au) Olltsta.nding 
balance remajns unpaid. WouJd yo1.1 contact me at your earliest convenience to djscwss the same. 
Very uuly yours, 
OWENS & CRANDALL, PL1 .. C .. . ~ . . . ' . . 
RMM:bhs 
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Sherfy fylohtosa ., ·: 
From: Sarah Dillon 
Friday, 31, 2009 PM 
To : SHerry Montosa; 81lllno 
SLibJect:·RE: Please advise what is still owed on 42643·13 
Martin Frantz vs Hawley Troxell, etal 
7/?,. nnnq 
Docket No. 43576-2015 
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~ Please consider the environment before printing tliis email. 
Sherry Montosa 
Alternative Disputc Resolution CoordlnrJtor 




HA "\VLEY TROXELL 
Attorne)··s and Counselors 
U l 0/ l UJ 
OIL 
This e-mail message from tha law firm o1 Hawley Troxell Ennis & H.iwley, LLP Is Intended only for named roclplenls. It contalne lnrormation that may 
t>e confidential, privileged. attorney work product, or otherwise exempt from CliSclosure under appllcable law. If you have received this message In 
orror, are not a named recipient, or are not the employee or aaent responsible for da!i~ering this message to a named recipient, be advised Iha! any 
review. disclosure. use, dlssemlneUon, distributloo. or reproduction of this rnessa9B or Its contents is s1,1c1iy prohlbllad: Please notify us fmmedlalely at 
208.344.6000 II you have received this message in error, and delete the message, 
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UNlTElJ STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT 
DISTRICT OP IDAHO 
(Boise) 
) 
MARTIN D. FRANTZ and CYNTHIA M. )) 
FRANTZ, ) 








STIPULATED ORDERGRANTlNG MOJiONS FOR2004 l£XAMINATI0N OF DEBTORS 
Upon consideration of the Amended Motion For 2004 Examination of Debtor Cynthia M. 
Frantz, filed by Creditor, Idaho Independent Bank ("1IB"), by and through its attorneys of 
record, Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley LLP, on November 23, 2011, (Docket No. 30); the 
Amended Motion for 2004 Examination ofDebror Martin D. Frantz, filed on November 23, 
201 l (Docket No. 29); the Objection to Motions for 2004 Examinations of Debtor filed on 
December 7, 2011 (Docket No. 33); The Declaration of Marty Frantz in Support Objection to 
Moti~ns for 2004 Examinations, filed on December 7, 2011 (DocketNo .. 33·1); The Response to 
Qb]e~_ti.~R ~o M~tions for 2004 Examinations, filed on December 23, 2011, (Docket No. 49); The 
Affidavit of Sheila R. Schwager in Support of the Response to Objection, filed on December 23, 
2011, (Docket No. 49-1); The Affidavit of Nicholas G. Miller in Support of the Response to 
Objection, filed on December 23, 2011 (Docket No. 49·2); and in consideration of the Debtors' 
representations through their attorney of record, Tyler S. Wirick, at the hearing hellon 1anuary 
I' 
No. 
04: 13 PM rnx No. r.ULl/lUJ 
Case 11-21337-TLM Doc 54 Filed 01/30/12 Entered 01/30/'12:08:07 Desc Main 
Document Page 2 of 3 
17,°1012, in which the Debtors withdrew their objections to the Motions far the 2004 
Examinations and affirmatively represented that there is no conflict of interest in Hawley Troxell 
Ennis &·Hawley LLP ("Hawley Troxell") representing IIB in this bankruptcy case against the 
D~btors; and in executing this Stipulated Order, the Debtors hereby acknowledge and represent 
that Hawley Troxell has not and does not represent the Debtors in any matters and therefore 
there is no conflict of interest in the attorneys of Hawley Troxell representing IIB against the 
Debtors in this bankruptcy case and any other dispute against the Debtors; and in further 
consideration of the stipulation reached between the parties that if an agreement is not otherwise 
reached between TTB and the Debtors in writing as to the re•scheduling of the two respective ··: 
2004 Examinations; that the Debtors shall submit to an examination at a mutually agreed upon 
tim·e and place between February 10, 2012 and March 15, 2012, and shall produce the requested 
documents at least ten (14) days prior to the scheduled examinations; and after considering the 
reco·rd herein, this Court finds good cause: ' I 
• ,,' J • •• • • ' ,, 1: 
· . JT IS HEREBY ORDERED, AND THIS DOES ORDER, that IIB's Motion 'for'the 2004· 
i ·, I ' I ,p• 
Examination of Martin D. Frantz and IJB's Motion for the 2004 Examination of Cynthia M. 
Frantz is hereby granted) pursuant to the terms set forth in this Stipulated Order. 
//end of text// 
DATED: January 27, 2012 
Martin Frantz vs eta! Docket No. 43576-2015 
·::· 
·, 
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Document Page 3 of 3 
Stipulated and Approved By: 
Isl 
Sheila R. Schwager 
Hawley Troxell Ennis &. Hawley, LLP 
Attorneys for Idaho Independent Bank 
&,._ _________ _ 
Tyler S. Wirick 
Law Offices of Tyler S .Wirick, PLLC 
Attorneys for Martin D. Frantz and Cynthia M. Frantz 
Acknowledged and Agreed: 
Isl ------------Martin D. Frantz 
Isl __________ ~ 
Cynthia M. Frantz 
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Jonathon Frantz !SB No. 9129 
Frantz Law, PLLC 
307 N. Lincoln St. 
Suite A 
Post Falls, ID 83854 
Telephone: (208) 262-3893 
Facsimile: {208) 262-3894 
j onathon@cdalegaLcom 
No. 
Filed 10/31/14 Entered 
Document Page 1 of 20 
Attorney for Marin D. Frantz and Cynthia M. Frantz, Defendants 
UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT 
DISTRICT OF IDAHO 
J.nRe: CaseNo. 11-21337-TLM 
\ . 
MARTIN D. FRANTZ and CYNTHIAM. 
FRANTZ, Chapter 7 
Debtors. 
IDAHO INDEPENDENT BANK, an Idaho 
corporation. Adversary Proc. No. 13-07024-TLM 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MARTIN D. FRANTZ, an individual, and 
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TROXELL 
"Frantzes") by and through their attorney of record, Jonathon Frantz of Frantz Law, PLLC, and 
hereby moves this Court to disqualify Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley, LLP as attorneys for 
Idaho Independent Bank ("IIB") based on the following: 
INTRODUCTION 
On October 3, 2014, the FraJ1tzes moved to continue the trial and pretrial order. See Dkt. 
3 8. A portion of that motion was based on the fact that the Frantzes believe that Hawley Troxell 
Ennis and Hawley, LLP ("HT"), attorney for plaintiff, llB, may be in possession of confidential 
information. See Dkt. 38 pp. 4~5. At the time, the Fnm.tzes had not yet been able to ascertain 
whether or not HT had breached confidences because the file containing the relevant documents 
was archived by the Frantzes' fonner attorneys at Owens & Crandall, PLLC. The Prantzes have 
since gained access to the file at Owens & Crandall, PLLC and have been. able to identify that 
HT possesses confidential knowledge pursuant to HT's prior representation of the Frantzes. As a 
result, the Frantzes now move to disqualify HT based on the foregoing, 
HT's PR10R DEALINGS ,VITH T!!,f; FRANTZES 
FACTS 
Sometime around 2000, Marty Frantz ("l\farty"), or an entity that Marty controlled, 
entered into an agreement to purchase land for the develop1nent of a Guardian Angel Homes 
assisted living facility in Lewiston, Idaho ( which facility is hereinafter the "G.AH Lewiston" 
facility). Walter Steed ("Steed") was the seller and Shelley Bennett (''Bennett") was Marty's 
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to light a potential with the land valuation. After looking into the issue, Marty discovered 
what he believed to be fraud on the part of Steed in the sale of the land to GAR Lewiston. 
Regardless, the appraiser switched valuation methods from the sales-comparison approach to the 
income approach, which required an in-depth look at GAH Lewiston's finances. GAH Lewiston 
ultimately received its financing. 
Thereafter, Marty hired an attorney to file litigation against Steed. That attorney was 
from the Witherspoon, Kelley Firm, Coeur d'Alene, Idaho (''Witherspoon Kelley"). Later in 
that lawsuit, Marty discovered that Bennett had colluded with Steed to increase the price of the 
laud Marty requested Witherspoon Kelley to also file suit against Bennett, however, 
Witherspoon Kelley vacillated. By the time Witherspoon Kelley included Bennett in the suit, the 
statute of limitations had passed and Marty lost on all counts against Bennett At some point, 
Marty learned that Witherspoon Kelley represented Bennett's father in several matters. As a 
result, Marty filed a malpractice case against Witherspoon Kelley in 2008. Marty hired Bruce 
Owens and Regina McCrea of Owens & Crandall, PLLC to represent himself and GAH 
Lewiston against Witherspoon Kelley. 
Shortly after filing suit against Witherspoon Kelley, Marty closed the sale-leaseback of 
GAR Lewiston, which is the subject of intense scrutiny in this case. The sale-leaseback of GA...q 
Lewiston generated more than $3m in capital, a substantial portion of which Marty alleges he 
invested into Eagle Ridge on Twin Lakes, Inc., which is also the subject of :intense scrutiny in 
this case. 
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2009, 
was 
Marty's expert witness. Mr. Clark was hired to be a consulting expert witness as well as a 
consulting expert. See Declaration of Regina McCrea, Exhibit B, 11 ("Yau have engaged my 
r. U!..// l Uj 
serv'ices as an expert witness to provide advice and testimony ... ") ( emphasis added). While the 
matter on which Mr. Clark was to testify involved whether or not Witherspoon Kelley committed 
malpractice, in order to form a basis for the manner in which Witherspoon Kelley committed 
malpractice, Mr. Clark had to review a large amouut of documents related to GAH Lewiston to 
become faurilia:r with the project. Id. Mr. Clark, however, was also consulted ou the matter of 
damages, which involved a review of confidential fmancial information regarding GAH 
Lewiston. 
On May 4, 2009, Mr. Clark prepared a 21 page preliminary report, at the top of which 
Mr. Clark had type written "CONFIDENTIAL MTJJ PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATION." 
Furthermore, on May 26, 2009 MartypersonallypaidHawleyTrox.ell's $10,664 bill for the 
preparation of that report which included time spent in a telephone conference with Mr. Owens 
and Ms. McCrea consulting on damages. Later, that matter would end up settling and Mr. Clark 
would never testify. 
ARGUMENT 
HT entered into an Attornev-Client Relationship with the Frantzes 
It is axiomatic that the existence of an attorney-client relationship is a question of fact. 
Sto1fer v. Dwelle, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 112336, 2014 WL 3965033 (D. Id.aha Aug. 13, 2014). 
While such a relationship is "generally formed by assent by both. the putative client and 
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(internal quotation marks omitted). "An attorney-client relationship may also be formed if 
the attorney fails to clarify whom the attorney is representing where ... one of the,parties could 
reasonably believe that the anomey is repreSenting that person.' s mterests." Id. (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
Oue such way an attomey-client relationship is formed. by :mutual assent is when an 
attomey accepts representation as a consulting expert, which has been construed as functioning 
as the client's co-counsel. See Richmond, Douglas R,, Article: Lawyers as Witnesses, 36 NML. 
Rev. 47, 62 (2006) (citing, ABA Comm_ on Ethics andProflRespousibility, Formal Op. 97-407 
(1997) [hereinafter, "Op. 97-407"]; see also Herrick Co. v. Vetta Sports, l1ic., 1998 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 14544, 1998 WL 637468 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 14, 1998) (assuming that a consulting expert 
shares an attomey~client refationship with the party that retains the expert)). After all. the 
purpose of a consulting attorney-expert and co-counsel are virtually identical "Co-counsel" has 
been defined as "au attorney who assists in or shares the responsibilities of representing a client. 
"Co~co1.U1sel," Merriam-Webster's Dictionary of Law, 1996, A consulting attorney-expert assists 
the primary attorney in representing a client. 
Conversely, the ABA Comm. on Ethics and Profl Responsibility (the ''ABA 
Committee") clarified that, "A Lawyer Serving Solely as a Testifying Expert as Distinct from an 
Expert Consultant Does Not Thereby Occupy aLawyer-Oien.tRelationship ... " Op. 97-407 at 
p. 3. Said another way, in order to prevent the formation of an attomey-clientrelationship the 
attorney-expert must solely be a testifying expert. The ABA Cornmittee further recognized that 
an attomey~expert hired for the sole purpose of testifying often cau bleed into the of expert 
MOTION TO DISQUALIFY HA\VLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY, 5 
No. 
I 
No. r UL::!/ l Uj 
M 
Document 
talces place when an attorney-ex.pert does not properly define his or her role and thereby gamers 
confidential information pertaining to the case. Id. at 6. The burden is upon the attorney-expert 
to "show that the [attorney expert) has taken reasonable measures under the circumstances to 
communicate" that no attorney-client relationship exists. See Idaho Rules of Pro fl Conduct 
Rule 5. 7 official cmt. 7. 
When an attorney-expert's roles blur together, the attorney-ex.pert will be bound by all 
the rules of professional conduct. Op. 97-407 at 6. This blending can occur even though. the 
principal purpose of the attorney-expert is to testify. Jd_ \Vhen the mixing of roles talces place, 
the attorney-expert "then must exercise special care to assure that the law finn and the client are 
fully informed and expressly consent to the lawyer con.tmuing to serve as a testifym.g expert ... " 
Id. Even if the attorney-expert so discloses, however, he or she is still "bound by the [rules of 
professional responsibility] relating to conflicts of mterest and imputed disqualification. .. " Id. 
Furtb.ennore, the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals has issued an opinion wherein that court assumed 
that an attorney-client relationship existed with the party retaining him as an expert, Abbott v. 
IRS, 399 F.3d 1083, 1085-87 (9th Cir. 2005). 
In the case of HT and the Frantzes, the Fra:ntzes and Mr. Clark had a relationship that 
permitted the Frantzes to have a reasonable expectation that their communications with Mr. 
Clark would remain in confidence. Mr. Clark entered into an attorney-client relationship with 
the Prantzes because he was engaged as both a consulting attorney-expert and a testifying 
attorney-expert. His engagement letter begins 0 "You have engaged my services as an expert 
witness to provide advice aud testil.nony ... " (emphasis added), Furthennore, both Owens & 
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with Owens & Crandall on the matter of damages. Pursuant to that consultation, 1\1:r. Owens and 
, Ms. Mc.Crea had communication regarding strategies and practices to prove the damages 
suffered by GAH Lewiston and :Marty. 
Moreover, during the course of those conversations, Mr. Clark accepted confidential 
financial iuf ormation from the Frantzes regarding the operations and financial viability of GAH 
Le'Wiston, The Frantzes, or their attomeys, in no way limited the :financial information or other 
documents provided to Mr. Clark. 
Conversely, Mr. Clark did not in any way limit the representation strictly to that of a 
testifying attomey~expert. Mr. Clark only provided the Frantzes with one single document, his 
draft report. Now here in Mr. Clark's report does Mr. Clark limit his engagement to testifying. 
To tb.e contrary, Mr. Clark expresses that he has been engaged to "provide advice and testimony 
on fue alleged professional malpractice asserted against Witherspoon Kelley ... " ( emphasis 
added). Attorney's provide advice to their clients; expert witnesses provide testimony and 
opinions, Even if Mr. Clark in some way attempted to disclaim any status as an expert 
consultant, the burden is upon him to communicate the absence of au attorney-client relationship. 
Mr. Clark undertook no such disclaimer. 
It is also noteworthythat :Mr. Clark is an expert with regard to attorney's rules of ethics 
and resultant obligations, self-evident by the fact that he holds himself out as such. See 
http://WW\v.hawleytroxeltcom/people/merlyn-w-clark/. As a result, it should be inferred that 
Mr. Clark is aware of the boundaries within which he operated as an attorney~expert. It is 
axiomatic that, "each person is charged with knowing the law:' How true that then, when 
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consultant. As provided by the ABA Committee, an attomey-clien.t relationship ensued. 
'While it is true that the ABA Committee holds no precedential value, the 9th Circuit has 
implicitly gone even further than the ABA Colllluittee in Abbott by assuming that all attorney~ 
expert witness arrangements create an attomey-client relationship. Just as the court in Abbou 
reviewed the attorney-expert's conduct under the rules of professional conduct, so too should this 
Court review HT's condnct in light of the Idaho rules of professional conduct. 
Resultantly, HT entered into an attorney-client relationship with the Frantzes in 
2009 and their relationship is governed by the Idaho Rules of Professwnal Conduct. 
:S:t's Current Representation of IIB is Substantially Related to HT's Former 
;Representation of the Frantz:e,t 
Idaho Rules of Prof I Coudµct Rule l.9(a) states: "A lawyer who has formerly 
represented a client in a matter sha.11 not thereafter represent another person in the same or a 
substantially related matter in which that person's interests are materially adverse to the interests 
of the fonner client. , ." (emphasis added). "Substantially related" is further defined in Rule 1.9 
cmt 3, "Matters are 'substantially related' for purposes of this Rule if they involve the same 
transaction or legal dispute or if there othe:i:wise :is a substantial risk that confidential factual 
information as would normally have been obtained in the prior representation would materially 
advance the clienf s position in the subsequent matter." Comment 3 then adds, 
A former client is not required to reveal the confid.ential information learned by 
the lawyer in order to establish a substantial risk that the lawyer has confidential 
information to use in the subsequent matter. A conclusion about the possession 
such information may be based on the nature of the services the lawyer provided 




04:14 PM l\Jo r U5LI JU5 
C Filed Entered 
Document Page 9 of 20 
ill 
. The 9th Circuit Court has co.nfinned the application of LR.P.C L9 cmt. 3 as follows, "If 
client in later, adverse representation, a substantial relation between the two cases is presumed." 
Trone v. Smith, 621 F.2d 994,998 (9th Crr. 1980). In short, if an attorney received, or could 
have received, confidential inion.nation from the prior case that is relevant to an issue in the 
current case, than. the matters are substantially related_ Id.; see also, Gov't of India v. Cook 
Indus., Inc., 596 P.2d 737, 739 (2d Cir. 1978). Said another way, ''the relationship is measure by 
the allegations in the complaint and by the nature of the evidence that would be helpful in 
establishing those allegations. Trone, 621 F-2d at 1000. 
In the case at hand, it is not hard to see the :nexus between the two matters. Mr. Clark, in 
his representation, received confidential financial infonnation regarding the value and operations· 
of GAH Lewiston and its second phase expansion. In the current litigation, HT represents DB in. 
claiming, mter alia, that the assets listed in Marty's financial statement are materially inaccurate. 
See Complaint (Dkt. I) 1~ 20, 114 ("In requesting the Twin Lakes Construction Loan, tl:te 
Debtors submitted a. signed financial statement in which they represented and certified that as of 
December 31, 2005 .. Guardian.Angel Homes [was] valued at $4,645,908 .. In obtaining the 
Twin Lakes Construction Loan ... the Debtors made a statement in writing regarding [the value 
of Guardian Angel Homes] that [was] materially false when made."). 
Furthermore, much of the discovery that HT has conducted has been in relation to the 
value of the GAH projects, including GAH Lewiston. See Memorandum in.Support of Motion 
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Those documents [which Plaintiff seeks an order compelling Defendants 
to produce] are as follows: 
7) Copies of all appraisals for GAH Lewiston ... , 
8) Copies of all documents related to the sale and leaseba.ck of GAH 
Lewiston facility that occurred in September or October 2008 ... ; 
9) Audited Financial Statements for GAH Lewiston (2004-present) ... ; 
l 0) All GAH Lewiston Audited Financial Statements from 2004 to 
present; 
11) Tax returns for GAR Lewiston for 2004, 2005, 2012, and 2013 ... ; 
13) Copies of all documents showing payments to Tailored Management 
Services by GAH Lewiston ... ; 
14) Copies of all Operating Agreements and all Amendments to those 
Operating Agreements for GAh Lewiston ... ; 
17) All emails and other fonn of written communications ... regarding the 
following: GAH Lewiston ... ; 
19) All GAH Lewiston 2 [which refers to the GAH Lewiston second 
phase] Audited Financial Statements from 2004 -present ... 
r. LJjj/ l Uj 
See also, Memorandum in Support of Motion to Compel Production ofDoscuments (Dkt. 43-1) 
p. 9 (Plaintiff's Request for Production No. 41: "Please produce any and all documents that you 
utilized or referenced to detennine the value of [GAH Lewiston]"). 
Furthermore, in the deposition that HT took of Marty on August 9 • l O, 2014, the 
following terms were referenced: 
· A) "sale-leaseback" (referring to the GAH Lewiston sale-leaseback): 29 times; 
B) "GAR" (referring to Guardian Angel Homes): 57 times; 
C) "Guardian" (refening to Guardian Angel Homes): 10 times; 
D) "Lewiston" (referring to GAH Lewiston): 62 times; 
E) "Angel'' (referring to Guardian Angel Homes): 10 times. 
MOTION TO DISQUALIFY HA \VLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HA ,VLEY, LLP~ 10 
u 
GAR Lewiston values and transaction related to GAH Lewiston). The allegations contained m 
the Complaint, the amount of coverage GAH Lewiston received in Marty's deposition, and the 
motion HT filed to compel production of docurneiits all demonstrate tbat the value of GAH 
Lewiston and the transactions related thereto ( all of which took place prior to lvf:r. Clark's 
representation of Marty and GAR Lewiston) are a very integral part of this litigation. 
t'. 4/ l 
Moreover, in the depositions of Jonathon Frantz, Tyson Frantz and Mathew Frantz (taken 
during the week of October 27, 2014) HT questioned the deponents at length regarding GAH 
Lewiston (because those depositions were so recent, transcripts are not yet available). As a 
result, the matter for which Mr. Clark represented Marty and GAR Lewiston is substantially 
related to the current matter. More particularly, the confid.ential information that 1vfr. Clark 
received (information regarding GAH Lewiston values and operations) goes to the very heart of 
this litigation in which IIB is claiming that Marty overvalued the GAH Lewiston asset. Bearing 
in mind that the ethical rules are violated even when there is a ''substantial risk" or a "reasonable 
probability' that confidential infonna.tion substantially related to the matter at hand could have 
been received, the issue is even more poignant when it has been shown that th.ere was a 
disclosure of confidential information. 
The Frantzes did not Dela! in Bringing this Motion 
It is well-settled that a primary concern of the courts when reviewing a motion to 
disqualify is with abuse of the disqualification procedure. It is likely that HT will question why 
it took the Frantzes so long to bring this motion. In that regard, it should be noted that the 
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representation IIB's action to collect on the personally guarantees; those two matters were 
not substantially related because GAR Lewiston was not at issue in that former litigation. 
Likewise, the substantially related :requirement was lacking when HT, for IlB, filed a cla1rn in the 
bankruptcy estate because the claim had nothin.gto do with GAB Lewiston's financial 
information. 
Conversely, as outlined above, the confidential information Mr. Clark possesses is now 
implicated in this proceeding that HT is conducting for llB. Thus, any alleged delay could only 
exist for as long as this non-dischargeability litigation has ensued. 
Furthermore, Marty has, over his career, employed m one fashion or another scores of 
attorneys in the northwest and Alaska (nearly all of which have been transactional attorneys). 
Moreover, Marty knows his attorneys by their personal names, not by therr firm names. As a 
result, it is difficult for Marty to keep track of all the attorneys b.e has employed. It was not until 
recently that Marty discovered that:rvir. Clark was an attomeyfor HT. On August 7, 2014 Marty 
discovered the $10,664 bill he paid directly to HT for lvb:. Clark's services. It was at that time 
that Marty realized that Mr. Clark was an attorney for HT. Less than !'No months later the 
Frantzes raised the issue with the court in their Motion to Continue Trial and Pretrial Order (Dkt. 
38). As a result, the Frantzes did not delay in bringing this actioR 
Regardless, even if the Frantzes did delay (which they did not), there is no duty on the 
Frantzes to be aware of attorneys conflict of interest. Conversely, HT is required by the Rules of 
Professional Conduct to ensure there are no conflicts. I.R.P.C. Rule 1.9. HT has a duty to 
ensure compliance with the professional rules of conduct. Marty is under no obligation. 
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affirmative duty to ensure that it is complying with the rules of professional conduct 
Furthermore, HT had an opportunity to review this issue in 2011 when the debtors 
initially objected to HT's representation of ITB in the u.nderlying bankruptcy case. While 
discussed further below, !IT represented over and over again that the Frantzes had never been 
clients of HT. Not once did HT mention the connection between the Frnntzes arid Mr. Clark 
Presumably, at that time, HT performed a conflicts check. How then, IIB failed to bring Mr. 
Clark's representation to light at that time remains to be seen. Had IIB followed the Idaho Rules 
of Professional Conduct, there would have been no delay in bringing this matter before the court. 
The Frantzes did not Knowingly Waive their Conflict with HT 
HT will certainly point to the Stipulated Order Granting Motion for 2004 Examination of 
Debtors in support of their contention that there is no conflict. See Dkt. 54, Case No. 11-21337 
("the debtors hereby acknowledge and represent that Hawley Troxell has not and does not 
represent the Debtors in this banl<ruptcy case and any other dispute against the Debtors ... "). 
However, this alleged waiver is not valid because it was not made lmowingly. 
LR.P .C. l .9(b )(2) allows an attorney to represent a client against a former client unless 
the fonner client "gives informed consent, confumed in writing." Furthermore, "if the attorney 
fails to adequately inform the client of the conflict, then the waiver may be invalid." Storfer, 
supra at 25. A former client is only informed when the conflicted attorney makes a "full 
disclosure of all the material facts." Unified Sewerage Agency v. Jelco, Inc., 646 F.2d 1339, 
1352 (9th 1981). Under such a requirement, no further analysis need be conducted. 
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Idaho 857, 863 Conversely, was not mutual error (i.e. was aware of Mr. 
Clark's connection with the Frantzes .but failed to disclose the relationship), then HT would be in 
severe violation of other professional co11ductrnles (i.e. lR.P.C. 4.1). The Frantzes assume, 
however, that ITT had somehow failed to discover their connection with Mr. Clark (the Frantzes 
are not presently alleging that HT subversively wrote the particular language of the stipulated 
order in order to avoid this current issu.e). IfHT, with its conflict check systems in place, failed 
to find the connection, then the Frantzes should not be faulted with failing to recall the 
connection either. As a result, it was a mutual mistake of fact and should be voided. 
Uj// [Uj 
Second, even were the stipulation a waiver, it is inconceivable that HT made a full 
disclosure of all the material facts. The issue in which the Stipulated Order Granting Motion for 
2004 Examination of Debtors arose related to HT' s representation of a corporation in which 
Marty was a O. 032 % shareholder. It had absolutely nothing to do with Mr. Clark's 
representation of the Frantzes. Further, at no point in any conversation or the stipulation was Mr. 
Clark ever mentioned or discussed. As a result, it would be impossible for such a waiver to be 
valid. As a result, no waiver has ever been obtained. 
Disqualification of HT is an Appropriate Remedy 
Wbile disqualification is a severe remedy, it should be granted freely when the "former 
representation is 'substantially related' to the current representation." Trone, supra at 998 (citing 
Gas-A-Tron of Arizona v. Union Oil Co. of California, 534 F.2d 1322, 1325 (9th Cir. 1976)). 
This 1s because of the immense value our legal system places on the preservation of secrets and 
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998-99. The focus of the substantial relation test is to ensure that there likely is a possible breach 
of con:fidence. If the courts were to allow such breaches, clients would be more likely to hesitate 
in disclosing all pertinent information because it may be used against them someday. If clients 
were to lose faith in the confidentiality of the statements ma.de to counsel, attorneys would not be 
able to adequately represent their clients. In short, the legal system as we know it would break 
down. 
The 9th Circuit Coun has even remanded cases with an order to disqualify counsel with 
the understanding that its decision will impose "hardship" and a "burden on both the [litigant 
whose attorney is disqualified] and the court" which "is bound to be substmtiaL" Id. at 1002. 
In the case between HT and the Frantzes, there is a clear breach of confidences which is 
very perti.nent to the case at hand. HT has inside information regarding the values and operations . . 
of GAH Lewiston and was in fact consulting with. Marty and GAR Lewiston in 2009, post-sale-
lease-back of GAR Lewiston. As outlined above, such iufonnation is highly relevant to IIB in 
its non-d.ischarageablility litigation against the Frantzes. Moreover, while disqualification will 
be a burden, it is one that HT has placed upon itself. Had HT reviewed its relationship with the 
parties ( or given heed to the information it did review) at the outset of this litigation, as it is 
supposed to do, it would have realized there was a conflict of interest and that it was 
possesm 011 of confidential infonnation. Had it done that, it could have handed this portion of the 
case off to another finn, By so doing, HT would have alleviated any resultant burden caused by 
this matter. The breach of confidence by HT should not be allowed to stand merely because 
Marty, who has no duty to monitor the firms his attorneys have worked did not discover until 




information disclosed to HT by Marty, HT should be disqualified. 
HT's INTERACTIONS WITH THE FRANTZES HIRED EXPERTS 
FACTS 
HT, too, has a.cqurred confidential information from its inappropriate interactions with 
P. 0 l 03 
the Frantzes' consultants. Begi:rming in 2006, Mr. Rand Wichman was hired as a consultant by 
Marty and/or Eagle Ridge on Twin Lakes, Inc. ("Eagle Ridge"). See Declaration of Martin 
Frantz, Ex. B (invoices from Rand Wichman Planning, LLC and statements showing billing m 
excess of $11,000 from July 2006 to March 2007). At approximately the same time, Marty and 
Eagle Ridge hired Mr. Mike Reagan as an attomey for the Eagle Ridge development. Wbile Mr. 
Wichman was hired to secure additional lot lines for Eagle Ridge, he was present in many 
meetings between Marty, Mr. Reagan, and himself. During those meetings, the three often 
discussed confidential information, such as el\:penditures on properties not encumbered by IIB. 
Additionally, with Mr. Wichman present and participating. Marty and Mr. Reagan would discuss 
confidential matters involving the properties that were outside of IlB 's mortgage and costs 
related to :improving the properties outside of IIB' s mortgage. 
lv1r. Wichman also attended various "project coordination meetings'' which discussed the 
overall development strategy for Eagle Ridge. See Declaration of Marti.II. Frantz, E~ B. 
Furtb.enuore, Mr. Wiclunan would often participate in meetings alone Wlth 111'. Reagan in his 
capacity as consultant for Eagle Ridge. Id. ("11/14/2006 mtg at County with Mike (Reagan) on 
lot line adjustments;" 1/21/2006 ru.tg at Lakes Hwy, phone call- Mil<:e [Reagan]"). 
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witness and disclosed Mr. Wichman as such in September 2014. 
ARGUMENT 
HT Should be Disqualified, for Knowingly Hiring the F.rantzes' Consultant 
An attorney who knowingly hires an opposing party's former e1\.pert, consultant or 
employee should be disqualified if the fonner expert, consultant or employee had confidential 
information. Collins v. State, 18 Cal.Rptr. 3d 112 (3d Dist Ct App. 2004) (citing Shadow 
Traffic Networkv. Superior Court, 24 Cal.App. 4th 1067 (1994)). This results from the 
"paramount concern ... to preserve public trust in the scrupulous administration of justice and 
the integrity of the bar." Id. at 120. Further, "the important right to counsel of one's choice must 
yield to ethical considerations that affect the fundamental principles of our judicial process." Id. 
The overarcbing principle is the protection of confidential information. 
Corumunications between employees and outside consultants are covered by the 
corporate attorney-client privilege. United States v. Graf, 610 F. 3d 1148, 1159 (9th Cir. 2010) 
(adopting In re Bieter Co., 16 F.3d 929 (8th Cir. 1994). As a result, any co1mnunications by and 
between Marty, Mr. Reagan and :Mr. Wichman are con:fid.ential and/or protected by the attamey-
client privilege. In such circumstances. a presumption arises that the expert has disclosed the 
confidential information to his subsequent employer. Collins, 18 C:::al.Rprtr. 3d at 123-24. Such 
a presumption is necessary "because the party seeking disqualification will be at a loss to prove 
what is kno-wn by the adversary's attorneys and legal staff." Id. 
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even were aware 
the mdustry and my familiarity with the Eagle Ridge Development Project. .. I was 
requested to review draw requests, conduct site inspections . to opine on whether the 
construction loan proceeds were expended on the 104 Acres tb.at is the subject of [I]B's] 
mortgage ... and whether the infrastructure was completed as represented." See Declaration of 
Jonathon Frantz, Bx. B. Moreover, HT, for IIB. had already received in discovery the bills and 
statements that Mr. Wichman had sent to Eagle Ridge. In fact, as indicated above, Mr. Wichman 
acknowledges in his report that, iu part, he was selected specifically because of his fonner 
relationship with Eagle Ridge. 
Furthermore, in the capacity as an agent/consultant for Eagle Ridge, Mr. Wichman met 
individually with Mr. Reagan, Eagle Ridge's attorney for purposes related to the development 
and construction of Eagle Ridge. Further, Mr. Wicl:unan was integral to the planning of Eagle 
Ridge as to the setup of the 104 Acres and the 50 Acres. These issues are very much at issue in 
this matter. 
In its Complaint for nondischargeability, IIB has alleged "Construction Proceeds Not 
Fully E1..:pended on Mortgaf!ed Property, As Represented" (no emphasis added). See 
Complaint (Dkt. 1) ~167 - 80 (alleging that the Frantzes spent loan proceeds on the 50 Acres 
instead of the 104 Acres, which 104 Acres was encumbered by IIB). Furthermore, the 
expenditure of funds on the 50 Acres and the draw requests have been the subject of much 
scrutiny by HT and IIB. The deposition of Martin Frantz and Jonathon Frantz explored these 
issues. Further, there have been repeated discovery requests aimed at obtaining information 
related to the expenditures on Eagle Ridge and the draw requests submitted by Eagle Ridge. As 
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Thus, there is a presumption that HT has learned of the confidential information Mr. 
Wichman possessed. Furthennore, HT knew of the former relationship. Resultantly, HT should 
be disqualified for its acquisition of confidential information from former consultant, Mr. 
Wichman. 
CONCLUSION 
HT, as a result of the foregoing, should be disqualified for 1) its breach of confidences 
and 'Violation of the rules of ethics, and 2) knowingly employing Mr. Wichman as an expert 
witness. 
DATED THIS 31st day of October, 2014. 
FRANTZ LAW, PLLC 
By: · /s/ Jonathon Frantz 
JonathouFrantzISB No. 9129 
Attomey for Defendant 
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Certificate of Electronic Service 
with the Clerk Court in the above-captioned matter using the CM!ECF system, which sent 
electronic notice to J oh.n F. Kurtz, Jr. and Sheila Rae Schwager, both on behalf of Idaho 
Independent Bank. 
DATED this 3181 day of October, 2014. 
By · / s/ Jonathon Frantz 
Jonathon Frantz, ISB No_ 9129 
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INTRODUCTION 
This memora..'1dum is filed in opposition to the Defendants' Martin D. Frantz and Cynthia 
M. Frantz's ("Debtor's") Motion to Disqualify Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley, LLP ("HT") as 
attorneys for Idaho Independent Bank ("IIB") in this adversary proceed1ng. In support of the 
Motion, Debtors argue th.at HT should be disqualified for two reasons. First, the Debtors seek 
disqualification because one of HT's partners, Merlyn W. Clark ("Clark"), previously pe1formed 
services as an expert witness in a malpractice lawsuit that had been filed by the Debtor Martin 
Frantz arising out of the purchase of an assisted living facility known as GAH Lewiston 
(''Malpractice Lawsuit"). Second, the Debtors seek disqualification because HT retained 
Rand F. Wichman ("Wichman") to testify as an expert witness in this case. 
Tbis is the second time that the Debtors have sought to disqualify HT in the Debtors' 
bankruptcy case. On January 30, 2012, this Court entered a Stipulated Order Granting Motions 
for 2004 Examinations of Debtors ("Stipulated Order'') express! y providing that the Debtors 
"affirmatively represented that there is no conflict of interest in Hawley Troxell Ennis & 
Hawley, LLP ("Hawley Troxell") representing DB in this bankruptcy case against the Debtors .. 
. . " The Stipulated Order, which was signed by both of tb.e Debtors, also expressly provided that 
"Debtors hereby acknowledge and represent that Hawley Troxell has not and does not represent 
the Debtors in any matters and therefore there is no conflict of interest in the attorneys of Hawley 
Troxell representing 1IB against the Debtors in this bankruptcy case and any other dispute 
against the Debtors. , .. " Based on the Stipulated Order alone, the Debtoxs' Motion, which is 






should be denied. 
Moreover1 as discussed below. the Debtors' MoUon is not supported by the facts or the 
law. First, Debtors' argument that Oark had been hired by the Debtors as "consulting expert," 
and was thereby fuuctioning as the "client's co-counsel" is a mischaracterization of the services 
provided by Clark, who was hired as a testifying expert witness in the Malpractice Lawsuit by 
Owens & Crandall. Second, the contention that Clark was provided with confidential 
information that is relevant to this adversary proceeding is false and misleading. 
Similarly, the contention that HT should be disqualified because Wichman had 
previously provided consulting services for Debtors is witbollt merit As with Clark, Debtors 
make the false and misleading argument that Wichman bad communications with Debtors' 
attorney, Mike Reagan, in which they discussed information relevant to Wichman's testimony as 
an expert witness in this case. 
Subsequent to filing the Motion, the Debtors filed a motion to disqualify Wichman as an 
expert witness in this case. Because the standard for disqualifying a law firm for hiring an expert 
witness must be higher than disqualifying an expert witness, lIB has filed a separate 
Memorandum in Opposition to Motions to Disqualify Rand Wichman and Hawley Troxell Ennis 
& Hawley, LLP. As discussed therein, the services provided by Wichman for Martin Frantz 
involved efforts to obtain lot line adjustments and permits from Kootenai County for the Eagle 
Ridge Subdivision, which is unrelated to the expei-t testimony that he is expected to provide in 
this case. As set forth in Wichman's Expert Report, his ex:pe1t testimony will be that Mr. Martin 
Frantz obtained more than .3 million in draw requests for loan that were 
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testimony is not to the services Mr. Wichman to Martin more 
than five years ago. 
A. Standards for Disqualification of Attorneys and Expert Witness 
The authority of a. trial court to disqualify an attorney derives from the power inherent in 
every court [t]o control in furtherance of justice, The conduct of its wio.i.sterial officers." Ih.:!:l!E1 
States v. Wunsch, 84 F.3d 1110, 1114 (9th Cir.1996). The court applies state law in determining 
motions to disqualify counsel. In te Cntv. of L.A., 223 F.3d 990, 995 (9th Cir.2000). 
Because motions to disqualify a.re often tactically motivated and can be disruptive to the 
litigation process, disqualification is a drastic measure that is generally disfavored and imposed 
only when absolutely necessary. See Optyl Eyewear Fashion Int'l CoJp. v. Style Cos., Ltd., 760 
1
,.. ) I,:.2d 1045, 1050 (9th Cir.1285) (recognizing that because of the potential for abuse, 
disqualification motions "should be subjected to particularly strict judicial scnitiny'' ( citations 
) 
/ 
and quotes omitted)). Nevertheless, "the paramount concern must be the preservation of public 
tiust both in the scrupulous administration of justice at1d in the integrity of the bar." State Farm 
Mut. cl,uto. Jns. Co. v. Fed. Ins. Co .. 72 Cal. App.4th 1422. i428, 86 Cal.Rg_tr.2d 20 (1999). In 
considering a motion to disqualify, the disnict WL1rt must make findings supported by substantial 
evidence. The People ex rel. Dep't of.Corps. v. SpeeDee Oil Change Sys .. Inc .. 20 Cal.4th 1135, 
1143. 86 Cal.Rptr.2d 816,980 P.2d 371 (1999). 
B. Statement of Facts 
Merlyn Cl,!rk as the Expert Witness 
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witness in an attorney malpractice lawsuit filed by Mr, Martin Frantz against the law firm of 
Witherspoon & Kelly. The Debtors argue that as a result of that relationship, Clark obtained 
confidential information protected by an attorney-client privilege that is relevant to this case. 
Both of those claims are unsupported by the record in this case. 
IIB has filed the Affidavit of Merlyn C. Clark ("Clark Aff.") in which Cla:rk explains 
l' vv 
why there is no basis for the Debtors' arguments. Clark was hired by the law firm of Owens & 
Crandall solely to perform services as a testifying expert witness in the Malpractice Lawsuit filed 
by Owens &Crandall on behalf of their clients' Martin Frantz and his company, Guardian Angel 
Homes Lewiston, LLC as case number CV-08-2630 in Kootenai County District Court, in the 
State of Idaho. ClarkAff. 13. Clark never acted as a consulting expert or as CO·counsel with 
Owens & Crandall. Clark Aff., 1 5. Clark never had an attorney-client relationship with the 
Debtors, with Martin Frantz or wich his company, Guardian Angel Homes Lewiston, LLC. Clark 
Aff. '][4. 
The written report that Clark prepared .in his role as a testifying expert 'Nitness ("E:xpert 
Report") was sent to Owens & Crandall with an Affidavit of Merlyn W. Clark, expressly setting 
forth what he was asked to assess by Owens & Crandall ("Affidavit"). Clark Aff. <][6, Ex. A. 
When Clark signed his Affidavit for Owens & Crandall L1nder penalty of perjury, attaching the 
Expert Report, it was his understanding that the law firm of Owens & Crandall could use bis 
written repo1t in any way that they deemed appropriate in the Malpractice Lawsuit, Including 
disclosjng the written report to opposing counsel in that Malpractice Lawsuit. Id. As a result, 
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Clark never had any conversation or other communication with either cf the Debtors and 
as a result never discussed anything related to the Malpractice Lawsuit with either of the 
Debtors. Clark Aff., q[ 11. All of Clark's communications relating to hls engagement with 
Owens & Crandall were wjtb Bruce Owens and Regina McCrea. Clark Aff., 'J{ 11. All of the 
written documents that Clark received and reviewed in the course of his engagement with Owens 
& Crandall were public records and ai·e expressly identified listed in his Expert. Report dated 
May 4, 2009. Id. Clark never received any confidential in.formation about the Debtors. Clark 
Aff. 'J[ 11. 
Further, during Clark's communications wlth Mr. Owen and Ms. McCrea, they discussed 
the fact that any information that Clark received would be discoverable in the Malpractice 
Lawsuit by the defendants io that case and that Mr. Owen and Ms. McCrea should not provide 
Clark with any information that they did not want the defendants to discover. Clark Aff. qr 14. 
Malpractice Lawsuit 
Cornrnencing on page two of their Motion, the Debtors describe the Malpractice Lawsuit. 
In addition to providing a brief description of the cJaims in. the Mal.practice Lawsuit, the Debtors 
have filed the Declaration of Martin Frantz and the Deel aration of Regina McCrea (''McCrea 
Dec."), to which she attached a December 16, 2008 letter to Clark from Owens & Crandall 
containing a ''basic outline of the facts'' related to the malpractice claim against Witherspoon 
Kelly. A revjew of that Jetter clearly demonstrates that the facts in that case ha'Ve no relationship 
to the facts and issues presented in this case. 
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Aff., and in the public records, both the December 16, 2008 letter to Clark and the 
Ex.pert Report from Clark to Owens & Crandall, wbich set forth bis ''preliminary opinions." 
Significant,fttlere was oo attempt by the Debtors to file the letter and Expert Report under seal. 
The Debtors base the Motion on their conclusory contention that because rhe Malpractice 
Lawsuit involved the GAH Lewiston facility and IIB has sought discovery related to the GAH 
Lewiston facility, that the infonnation provided to Clark must be slJbstantiallyrelated to the 
issues in this case. This contention is false. 1IB does not dispute that it has conducted discovery 
regarding both the value of the GAH Lewiston facility at the time that lIB made the loans and 
credit cxtensjons that are the subject of this adversary proceeding and as to the GAH Sale-
Leaseback transaction that occurred in October of 2.008. However, that discovery is completely 
unrelated to any issue or facts related to the Malpractice Lawsuit. See Affidavit of John F. Kurtz, 
Jr. ("Kurtz Aff.'') 1JI 3-10. 
According to Ms. McCrea' s December 16, 20081etter1 the malpractice claim against 
Witherspoon Kelly was based on their failure to file a fraud claim against the realtor (Benett) 
who sold the Debtors their interest in GAH Lewiston an August 22, 2000. McCrea Dec., Exh. A 
at p. 2. In particular, the malpractice claim was based on the fact that Witherspoon Kelly failed 
to advise the Debtors of a potential fraud claim on which the statute of Umitations ran in August 
of 2006. Id., p 4. Nothing that occurred during those time periods bas any relevance to the 
claims asserted by IIB io this case. See Kurtz Aff. 
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IlB has sought production of appraisals for the GAH Lewiston facility related to DB's 
claim that the Debtors should be denied discharge pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 52J(a)(2), based on 
Debtors submission of materially false financial statements to JIB. The evidence at trial will 
focus primarily on the Debtors' financial statements repre~enting that they had paitnership 
interests in twenty-three Rural Development Apartment buildings that they valued at 
approximately $3.8 million and then subsequently claimed were worthless when they filed for 
bankruptcy. Nevertheless, the Debtors did value the Lewiston GAH facility as having a value of 
$10,971,429 pursuant to a "Bank appraised value 10.5%," in a December 31, 2006 Financial 
Statement provided to rm and a vafoe of $13,070,000 pursuant to an "Appraised value (based on 
banks capitalization rate of 10.5%) as of December 31, 2008." Kurtz Aff. 'JI 8. 
) As a result of those two ''Bank appraised" values, IIB reqL1ested the production of those 
appraisals to inquire whether those appraisals existed and whether the financial statements 
matched the value set forth in the appraisal, as represented to JIB. Those appraisals were the 
subject of the Order Granting the Motion to Compel. The Malpractice Lawsuit simply has no 
relationship to tbe issue of whether the Debtors had bank appraisals showing the values they 
represented they did in 2006 through 2008. Kurtz Aff. 'll.'JI 8, 9; McCrea Dec. 
The Debtors arguments that discovery regarding the GAB Lewiston Sale-Leaseback, 
which occurred in October of 2008, somehow has a relationship to infonnation related to the 
Malpractice Lawsuit is similarly withotJt merit. The GAR Lewiston Sale-Leaseback is relevant 
in this case for three reasons. First, Debtors continued to show an ownership interest in GAH 
Lewiston with equity of $1,559,250 on their December 31, 2008 financial statement, even 
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show that the Lewiston Sale-Leaseback transaction was structured in such a way that 
the Debtor Martin Frantz ultimately executed a $3. l million promissory note as part of that 
transaction, resulting in a $3. 1 million liability that was not disclosed on the Debtors' financial 
statements submined to IIB. Third, the GAH Lewiston Sale-Leaseback transaction is releva11t to 
IIB' s claim that Debtors made fraudulent representations to ITB of how the monies from any sale 
of the GAH Lewiston interest would be applied against the loans owed ro IlB. The GAH 
Lewiston Sale-Leaseback transaction has no relationship to the Malpractice Lawsuit. Kurtz Aff. 
i 10~ McCrea Dec. 
tJo Attorney-Client Relationship Between Hawlev Troxell and Debtors 
Furthermore, there is no credible evidence that Clark had an attorney-client relationship 
with the Debtors. There is no suggestion in the McCrea Dec., that Clark formed an attorney-
client relationship with tho Debtors, or as her co-counsel, See McCrea Dec. To the contrary, 
Ms. McCrea acknowledges in her Declaration at paragraph 3 that: "Mr. Owens and I retained 
Merlyn Clark (an attorney with Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley, LLP) to serve as an expert 
witness in this Case." McCrea Dec., 'l[ 3. Ms. McCrea attaches a copy of the Expert Report in 
which he identifies all of d1e information upon which he relied in providing his ex.pert opinion. 
McCrea Dec., Exs. A, B. As expJained in the Affidavit of Mr. Clark filed by lIB in support of 
this opposition, all of the information that he reviewed was in co1..1rt records and nothing that he 
reviewed was confidential1• Clark Aff. n 11 & 14, Ex. A. 
the cooclusion of the matter, Ms. McCrea sent Mr. Clark a Jetter informing hiin the ma.Her had been resolved and 
she wanted to thank him "on behalf of my clie11L" Clark Aff., Ex. C. Of course, she did not thank Mr. Clark on 
behalfof "our" cliem, because Mr. Clark was not an acrorney of hercllencs. 




and had a phone conference with Mr. Clark to discuss his preliminary opinions. She then 
states that "in that conversation (as reflected in my notes and emails), we also.discussed the 
damages that were potentially recoverable as a consequence of the malpractice." Ms. McCrea 
does not attach her notes, but does attach an email exchange between herself and Martin Frantz 
discussing the potential damages in the Malpractice Lawsuit. McCrea Dec, Ex.. C. Clark 
disputes that he ever discussed damages with Ms. McCrea and Mr. Owens, other than to discuss 
that attoi-ney fees are not normally awarded in a tort claim, and that he would not provide ex.pert 
testimony on damages. Clark Aff.1jl 12, j 13. In any event, whether such a conversation is 
claimed to have occurred is not relevant to Debtors' Motion. A review of the email ex.change 
clearly shows that there is no correlation between the damages issue in the Malpractice Lawsuit 
and the issues raised by DB regarding the GAH Lewiston interest in this case. See McCrea Dec., 
and Kurtz Aff., 
Moreover, the Debtors provide no· explanation as to how the damages in the Malpractice 
Lawsuit ha"Ve any correlation or relevance to the issue of whether they misrepresented that an 
appraisal existed at the value set forth in the financial statements for the GAH Lewiston facility, 
on the financial statements provided to IIB. Of course, the inelevance of the "damages" claim in 
the Malpractice Lawsuit to the issues presented in this case is further underscored by the fact that 
the Debtors have filed a copy of the emrul exchange in the public record of this case. 
DISQUALIFY HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & 
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A. The Stipulated Order Signed by the Debtors Precludes the Motion to 
Disqualify. 
As mentioned above, this is the second time that Debtors have sought to disqualify HT as 
attorneys for IIB in this bankruptcy case. On January 30, 2012. this Court entered a Stipulated 
Order Granting Motions for 2004 Examinations of Debtors, which was signed by both of tlle 
Debtors and their attorney of record, Tyler S. Wirick, in which they "affirmatively represented 
that there is no conflict of interest in Hawley Tro:x.eU Ennis & Hawley, LLP ("Hawley Troxell") 
representing IIB in this bankruptcy case against the Debtors ... :' The Stipulated Order also 
expressly provided that "Debtors hereby acknowledge and represent that Hawley Troxell has not 
and does oot represent the Debtors in any matters and therefore there is no conflict of interest in 
the attorneys of Hawley Troxell representing IIB against the Debtors in this bankruptcy case and 
any other ruspute against the Debtors .... " See Doc. 54, Case No. 11-21337-TLM and Doc. 47, 
Case No. 13-07024-TLM. Based on the Stipulated Order alone, Debtors' Motion, which was 
filed just one month before the trial in this adversary :proceeding is scheduled to begin, should be 
denfod. 
The Debtors argue that they should not be bound by tbe Stipulated Order because Martin 
Frantz had mistakenly forgotten that Clark had provided expert testimony in the Malpractice 
Lawsuit and the first time they would realize it was an issue was when the Complaint was filed 
in this action. First, the StipL1lated Order was not limited to representation under a certain issue. 
Instead, the Debtors expressly stated, "Debtors hereby acknowledge and represent that Hawley 
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Proceeding was filed on August 23, 2013, which is more than a year ago. wait until eve 
of trial to make these unfounded arguments is clearly an impermissible delay tactic. 
In any event, the Debtors attempt to set aside that order at this late date is prohibited. 
Bankruptcy Rule 9024 provides that Rule 60 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure applies in 
cases under the Bankruptcy Code. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) provides that relief 
may be sot1ght from an order for certain specified reasons. However, Rule 60(c) provjdes that a 
motion under Rule 60(b) must be made within a reasonable time, and for reasons (1), (2) and (3), 
which includes ''mistake,'' the motion must be filed "no later than a year after tbe entry of the 
judgment or order 9r the date of the proceeding." The Stipulated Order was entered on January 
30, 2012. As a result, even if Debtors had filed an appropriate motion to set aside the Stipulated 
Order that motion is time barred. 
B. HT Never Had an Attorney-Client Relationship with Debtors. 
The Debtors contend that Clark formed an attorney-client relationship with them by 
0 
agreeing to perform services as an expert witness in the Malpractice Lawsuit. In suppo1t of that 
contention, the Debtors focus on a letter written by Clark to Owens & Crandall in which he 
stated: ''You have engaged rny services as an expert witness to provide advice and testimony.'' 
The Debtors emphasize the word "advice" and contend that Clark was consulted on the matter of 
damages, which they claim "involved a review of confidential financial information regarding 
GAH Lewiston.'' Further, the Debtors reference the Expert Report, which stated at the top of the 
1 The Debtors' argument 1.hat HT was responsible to tell chem about the representation is without meriL There was 
. llil aLtomey clien( relationship to tell the Debtoi·s about, which is why their acknowledgment made in 2012 made 
sense. 





personally paid bill for Clark's services. Motion at p. 4. Based on the above, the 
Debtors contend Clark was acting as .a "consulting expert," which they assert is the eqnivalen£ as 
the "client's co-counsel." 
The Debtors' contention that Clarkfonned an attorney~client relationship with them is 
without merit. As discussed above, Clark was xetained by the law firm of Owens & Crandall 
solely to provide services as a testifying e:itpert wlmess. Clark Aff., 'If 3. Clark never formed an 
attorney-client relationship with the Debtors and was retained exclusively by Owens & Crandall 
to pe1form testifying expert witness services in the Malpractice Lawsuit. Clark Aff. fl 3-5. 
It should be noted that Debtors present no evidence from Owens & Crandall that Clark 
pc1formed services as an "expert consultant" or as "co-counsel" with them for their clients in the 
Malpractice Lawsuit. To the contrary, Ms. McCrea states "Mr. Owens and I retained Mer]yn 
Clark (an attorney with Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley, LLP) to serve as an expert witness in 
this case." McCrea Dec., Cjf3. 
The Debtors cite the ABA Comnlittce on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal 
Opinion 97-407 (1997). However, that Formal Opinion does not support the Debtors' claim in 
this case that Clark had an attorney-client relationship with them and, instead leads to the 
opposite conclusion. The Formal Opinion provides in relevant part as follows: 
The Committee believes, however, as long as the lawyer's role is limited to 
service as a testifying expert and this is expJained at tbe outset, the client of the 
law firm which has engaged the testifying expert's services cannot reasonably 
expect that the relationship thus created is on of client-lawyer. A lawyer who is 
employed to testify about requirements of the law or standards of legal practice, 
for example, acts like any non-lawyer expert witness. 
Formal Opinion at p. 4. 
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discovery materials, suggest factual support for bis expected testimony, exchange with the law 
firm legal authority applicable co his testimony and help the law firm to define potential areas for 
further io.quiry in his role as an expert witness. Id. at p. 4. 
The Formal Opinion also recognizes that because the communications between the 
retaining iaw firm arid the testifying expert are discoverable, the maintenance of tbe required 
confidentiality in an attorney-client relationship cannot be attained. Id. at p. 4. 
The Formal Opinion then addressed the situation when the attorney's role is no longer 
that of a testifying expert witness: 
In contrast, protection of client confidences, in-depth strategic and tactical 
involvement in shaping the issues, assistance in developing facts that are 
favorable, and zealous partisan advocacy are characteristic of an expert 
consultant, who ordinarily is not expected to testify. That role at least implicitly 
promises the client all the traditional protections under the Model Rules, including 
those governing counseling and advocacy, confidentiality of information and 
loyalty to the client. In short, a legal consultant acts like a lawyer representing 
the client, rather than a witness. 
There is simply no evidence that Clark performed the function of a "legal consultant." 
Clark was hired exclusively as a testifying expert witness who was never provided with a..ny 
confidential information. See Clark Aff., and McCrea Dec. 
The remalning auth01ities relied upon by the Debtors provide no support for their claims. 
The Debtors cite Herrick Co., v. Vetta Spor·ts, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14544, WL 637468 
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 14, 1998). However, that case simply bolds that the attorney-client privilege 
will be deemed waived when a client designates his lawyer as an expert witness. 
Ftlltber, che Debtors grossly mischaracterlze the Ninth Circuit decision in Abbott v. 
Unired State IRS, 399 F. 3d 1083, 1085-87 (9th Cir. 2005). The Debtors first argue that the COLU-t 




subsequently argue that Abbott assumed "that attorney ex.pert witness arrangements create an 
attorney-client relationship." Motion at p. 6 & 8. In Abbott, the appellant taxpayer sought to set 
aside an adverse ruling by the Tax Court against her on the grotJnds that her attorney bad also 
worked as a consultant for the Internal Revenue Service on. a matter that was unrelated to her 
case. The Ninth Circt1it rejected the taxpayer's argument that her lawyer violated ABA Model 
Rule of Professional Conduct l.7(a) because her lawyer's representation of the IRS ''was not 
directly adverse" to her. The Court found the cases to be entirely unrelated. Similarly, the 
Court found that no violation of the California State Bar Rules of Professional Conduct had 
occuned. Debtors willingness to grossly miscbaracterize the decision in Abbott is only further 
evidence of the frivolous nature of their arguments. 
Finally, Debtors citation to Idaho Rule of Professional Condllct, 5.7, which deals with a 
lawyer's responsibilities regarding "law-related services," is also without merit. Formal Opinion 
97-407, at p. 8, states that a clear majority of the Committee Members found that a testifying 
e~pert' s role as a witness excludes not only an attorney-client relationship, but also a "law-
related service provider relationship." 
C. The Debtors Contention that HT's Representation of JIB is Substantially 
Related to Clark's Expert Witness Services is Unsupportable and Should Be 
Rejected. 
As discussed above, no attorney-client relationship ever existed between Clark and 
Debtors. As a resLlJt, this Court does not need to address the Debtors' argument that Idaho Rule 
of Professional Conduct Rule 1.9, which deals with duties to former clients, prohibits HT from 
representing DB in this advei·sary proceeding. 
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particular, Debtors' claim that HT is prohibited from representing IIB because the Malpractice 
Lawsuit was a "substantially relared" to this adversary proceeding, is without merit. In making 
that argument, the Debtors quote part of the definition of "substantially related" which is defined 
in Comment 3 to Rule 1.9. Yet, RuJe 1.9 and Comment 3 provide no St1pport for the Debtors. 
Comment 3 provides in relevant part: 
Matters are ''substantially related" for purposes of this Rule jf they involve the same 
transaction or legal dispute or if there otherwise is a su bstantia] risk that confidential 
factual info1mation as would normally have been obtained in the prior representation 
would materially advance the client's position in the subsequent matter. ... Information 
that has been disclosed to the public or to other parties adverse to the former client 
ordinarily will not be disqualifying; .... Information acquired in a prior representation 
may have been rendered obsolete by the passage of time, a circumstance that may be 
relevant in determining whether two representations are substantially related. 
The Malpractice Lawsuit and this lawsuit are not "substantially related." There is 
nothing in this record establishing that there is a "substantial risk" that confidential factual 
information as would normally have been obtained in the Malpractice Lawsuit that would 
materially advance the client's position in this IlB 's position in this case. See Kurtz Aff., Clark 
Aff., and McCrea Dec. 
As Clark explained, tbe Expert Report that Clark prepared in his role as a testifying 
expert witness is attached to the Affidavit that he provided to Owens & Crandall, as Exhibit 2. 
Clark Aff. ljf 6. When Clark signed the Affidavit under penalty of perjury, attaching his Expert 
Report, it was his understanding -that the law firm of Owens & Crandall could use bis written 
report in any way that they deemed appropriate in the Malpractice Lawsuit, including disclosing 
the Ex.pert Report to opposing counsel in the Malpractice Lawsuit. As a result, Clark understood 
that there was no expectation that his Expert Report would remain confidential. Id.· 
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that any info1mation that Clark received would be discoverable in Malpractice Lawsuit by the 
defendan.cs in that case and that Mr. Owen and Ms. McCrea should not provide Clark with any 
information that they did not want the defendants to discover. Clark Aff. <J[ 14. 
Clark never bad any conversation or other communication with the Debtors and as a 
resul~ never discussed anything related to the Malpractice Lawsi1it with the Debtors. Clark Aff., 
'11 11. All of Clark's communications relating to bis engagement with Owens & Crandall were 
with Bruce Owens and Regina McCrea. Clark Aff., 'JI 11. All of the written documents that 
Clark recejved and reviewed in the course ofhjs engagement with Owens & Crandall were 
public records and identified in his Expert Report dated May 4, 2009. Clark Aff., Ex. A. Clru:k 
never received any confidential information abot'lt the Debtors. Clark Aff. g( 11. 
FL1rther, there is no correlation of the faces and issues in the Malpractice Lawsuit an.d the 
claims being pursued by IIB. Debtors argue that because DB has condncted discovery about 
GAR Lewiston and the GAH Lewiston Sale Leaseback: that occurred in October of 2008, that 
there must be some correlation between the information that Clark learned in the Malpractice 
Lawsuit and the claims being pursued by DB. 
The reason that IIB has made a claim against the Debtors related to the GAH Lewiston 
facility and GAH Lewiston Sale Leaseback has no relationship to any of the facts and issues 
presented in the Malpractice Lawsuit. Kurtz Aff. q( 'I[ 2-10. There certainly has been no showing 
of the substantially related requirement of Comment 3 to Rule 1. 9. 
At page nine of the Motion, the Debtors state, without any citation to the record, that 
Clark, in his representation, received confidential financial infom1atlon regarding the value and 
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certainly appears intended to mislead this Court. The only information that Clark received was 
described in his written repor:t arid as Clark has stated in his Affidavit, he never received 
confidential information relating to tbe Debtors. Clark Aff. q[<JI: 6, 11, 12, 14. As discussed above 
and in the Affidavit of John F. Kurtz, Jr., tbe facts and issues in this case are simply not related to 
the facts and issues in the Malpractice Lawsuit. 
At page nine of the Motion, the Debtors cite Trone v. Sml1.h, 621 F. 2d 994 (9th Cir. 1980) 
and Government of India v. Cook Industries, Inc., 569 F.d 737 (2°d Cir. 1978). Neither of those 
decisions supports the Debtors' Motion. In Trone, the Ninth Circujr reversed the disfJict court's 
refusal to grant a motion to disqualify plaintiff's counsel, Wyman Bautzer, in a lawsuit brought 
by a trustee in bankruptcy against Defendant C. Arnold Smith, arising om of the Westgate 
scandal. In Trone, the Njnth Circuit stated that the relevant test for disqualification is whether 
the former representation is "substantially related" to the CulTent representation, citing Gas-A· 
Tron of Arizona v. Union. Oil Co. of Califomia, 534 F. 2d 1322, 1325 (9Lh Cir. 1976), cert. 
denied, 429 U.S. 861 and Goverrunem of lndici, supra. In Trone, it was undisputed the Wyman 
Bautzer law firm had previously represented Defendant C. Arnold Smith. 
As recognized in Trone, "the most important facet of the professional relationship served 
by this rule of disqualification is the preservation of secrets and confidences communicated to 
the lawyer by the client." The Trone court further stated that: "If there is a reasonable 
probability that confidences were disclosed which could be used against the client in lacer. 
adverse representation, a substantial relationship between the two cases is presumed." 
professional preserved by the disqualification rule." In finding that disqualification was 
appropriate in that case, the court found that the district court had "failed to give adequate 
consideration to the nature and scope of Wyman's prior representation of Smith." Id. at 1000~ 
The Ninth Circuit found that there had be a close relationship between the matters 
involved in the two representations; and that although the two representations were not identical, 
"their relationship is strong." The court stated: "It could reasonably be said that during the prior 
representation the attorneys were trying to acquire information vitally related to the subject 
matter of the pending litigation." Id., at 1000. The court further found that Wyman had an 
opportunity to learn of Smith's, Westgate's and USNB's policies, practices and procedures. The 
court then concluded that the "ethical obligations inherent io the professional relationship 
between attorney and client require us to protect against any possibility that this information, if 
acquired, might be used against a former client." Id. at 1000. 
In Goveniment of India, supra, a case cited favorably b.y the Ninth Circuit in Trone, the 
Second Circuit explained the "substantial relationship" test for disqualification. The court 
recognized the "high standard of proof' for disqualification is required because of a client's 
"right to freely choose his counsel," and the balance against the need to maintain the highest 
standards of the profession. 569 F. 2d at 739. The Court went on to state at pages 739-740, that: 
Such considerations have resulted in honing the "substantial reJationship" test in this 
Circuit to granting disqualification only upon a showing that the relationship between 
issues in the prior and present cases is "patently clear." (citation omitted). Put more 
specifically, disqualification has been granted or approved recently only when the issues 
involved have been ''jdentical" or ''essentially the same." (citatjons omitted) 
MEMORANDUM IN" OPPOSITION TO MOTION DISQUALIFY HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & 
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merely acted as a testifying expert witness. However, in no event has there been any showing 
that be received confidential information or that there is a "substantial relationship'\ between 




For the reasons set forch above, IIB and HT respectfolly submit that the Debtors' Motion 
to disqualify HT based on Clark's involvement as an expert witness shonld be denied. Funber, 
as set forth in the Memorandum In Opposition to the Motion to Disqualify Rand Wichman, as an 
Expert Witness, the Motion to disqualify HT based upon the valid retention of Mr. Wichman 
should also be denied. 
' 11-
DATED THIS/) day of November, 2014. 
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP 
n F. Kurtz, Jr., ISB # 2396 
Attorneys for Plaintiff Idaho Independent Bank 
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Frantz Law, PLLC 
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PROCEEDINGS BEGAN AT 2:00:06 P.M. 
* * * * * 
THE CLERK: Good afternoon. This is Mel -
MR. JONATHAN FRANTZ: Hello. 








MR. JONATHAN FRANTZ: Yeah. Hi, Mel. How are you? 
TBE CLERK: Great. Thank you for calling in. I 
10 have Ms. Schwager on the line. And do I have Mr. Tim Kurtz 
11 on the line? 
MR. TIM KURTZ: Yes, I'm here. Thank you. 12 
13 THE CLERK: Great. Thank you all for calling in 
14 and we'll begin in just a moment. 
15 (Pause in the proceedings) 
16 TEE COURT: Good afternoon, counsel. This is Judge 
17 Myers. Thank you for calling in. I appreciate it. 
18 This is in the matter of Idaho Independent Bank 
19 versus Frantz, Adversary 13-7024. 
20 Before me are two motions, Docket Numbers 55 and 59, 
21 both brought by the defendants. They seek to disqualify 
22 plaintiffs' counsel, Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley, and to 
23 disqualify the plaintiff's expert, Rand Wichman. 
24 The motions were heard on December 1 and 2. There 
25 were other motions in this adversary also heard on those days 1 
Idaho Inaependent Bank v. Martin Frantz 
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3 two pending and yet solved motions. 
4 The context of the dispute is clear. This cause 
5 was set down for a week long trial to commence December 1. 
6 That initial trial setting was made almost a year in advance. 
7 Several amendments to the order setting trial were made on 
8 the parties requests and stipulations{ generally dealing with 
9 discovery and trial preparation, but the trial date never 
10 varied. 
11 In October the defendants filed the first of 
12 multiple motions seeking to continue the trial and to obtain 
13 related relief. On October 20, at hearing, I denied those 
14 motions. That result was followed by the defendants' motion 
15 to disqualify Hawley Troxell a little over a week later and a 
16 ~eek after that came the motion to disqualify Wichman as an 
17 expert witness. 
18 On September 17, I entered an oral ruling noting 
19 that the motion~ could well be viewed as strategic rather 
20 than meritorious and designed solely to gain the relief that 
21 failed motion to continue the trial didn't 
22 !ndeed, defendants' counsel in the October hearing 
23 acknowledged considering but not bringing the motion to 
24 disqualify Hawley Troxell because at that point in the game, 
25 as you said, it was a little late. 
P. 
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3 s, whenever 
4 violations are made 1 s this Court 1 s to examine the 
5 charge since its this Court that must supervise the conduct 
6 of the members of its Bar. I, there , look closely at the 
7 assertions, the objections, the declarations, and 
8 affidavits that were submitted by parties. 
9 I noted that defendants bore the burden of 
10 establishing good cause for the request of disqualification. 
11 And I noted under the rules, contested matters that raise 
12 factual issues require proof. Unfortunately, affidavits 
13 and the declarations did not provide an adequate settled 
14 record. I would have been called upon to make inferences 
15 and weigh testimonial assertions in the affidavits without 
16 the benefit of observing the witnesses or hearing their 
17 testimony under cross-examination, as well as their direct 
18 testimony. I simply couldn't resolve the motions on that 
19 basis. 
20 So while I noted at that prior ruling that the 
21 showing by de in their submissions was s 
22 compelling or even preponderating and were not then adequate 
23 to justify granting the motions, they would be provided an 
24 opportunity to present evidence to prove them up. As I noted 
25 in November this approach was taken not just because of the 
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3 motions on burden of type bass and on then 
5 entire case and hanging over the plaintiff 1 s law rm which 
6 would prevail( but under a ruling based more on defective, an 
7 eleventh hour approach to the issue than on the merits ruling. 
8 So the motions were set down for December 1 and I reluctantly 
9 v~cated the trial setting. 
10 The parties were required to disclose evidence by 
11 November 25 at 5:00 p.m. Mountain time. The plaintiff 
12 complied with that deadlinei the defendants did not. Docket 
13 75, the defendants' witness disclosure was filed 16 minutes 
14 late and their exhibit disclosure filed the following day. 
15 As discussed at the time, the hearing on the 
16 motions commenced on December 1. The plaintiff did not 
17 exercise the right that it had to ask for exclusion of the 
18 defendant's untimely disclosed witnesses and exhibits. I 
19 think it was clear that consistent with the Court's comments 
20 at the November hearing, plaintiff's counsel wanted the 
21 matter heard and resolved on the evidence and on 
22 and not on a default ruling. 
merits 
23 My view in November ~as that I needed to hear the 
24 testimonial assertions of Merlyn Clark, Marty Frantz, Regina 
25 McCrea, and Rand Wichman in court, subject to cross-
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3 res any or ambigu s that arise. 
4 The hearing became far more involved and extensive, 
5 in large due to number of exhibits the parties 
6 offered. In my view many of the exhibits were purely 
7 collateral, some immaterial. This was, recall, simply a 
8 hearing on two disqualification motions, not a trial or a 
9 preliminary trial of the causes under the complaint or the 
10 defenses to the complaint. Many of the exhibits ultimately 
11 were of value only in corroboration or impeachment and a few 
12 were particularly noteworthy in that regard. But of course, 
13 I was required to and I have evaluated all of the exhibits 
14 that were admitted. This of course, prohibited entry of a 
15 decision on December 2 while I was in Coeur d'Alene, but I am 
16 ready to issue a decision now having considered all the 
17 testimony 1 the exhibits, and the briefing that were filed 
18 that was filed and also the oral arguments that were made. 
19 And I've also independently reviewed the authorities. My 
20 oral ruling complies with 9014 and 7052 of the Bankruptcy 
21 Rules. 
22 I' take up rst Docket 551 the disqualification 
23 of Ha~ley Troxell. 
24 The defendants' motions to disqualify Hawley 
25 Troxell as counsel for the plaintiff urges that 
DV-13-7024-TLM 
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in s proceedings in our 
4 local Bankruptcy Rule 9010 l(g). 
5 The defendants assert that in 2008, Merlyn Clark, a 
6 partner at Hawley Troxell formed an attorney-client 
7 relationship with Marty Frantz. Idaho Rule of P 
8 Conduct 1.9 instructs that a lawyer who has formerly 
sional 
9 represented a client in a matter shall not, thereafter, 
10 represent another person in the same or a substantially 
11 related matter in which that person's interests are 
12 materially averse to the interest of the former client, 
13 unless the former client gives informed consent confirmed in 
14 writing. 
15 The plaintiff responds to this contention by noting 
16 that in 2008, Merlyn Clark was retained and acted solely as a 
17 testifying expert witness and did so on the subject of 
18 professional malpractice in Marty Frantz' State Court lawsuit 
19 against Witherspoon Kelley in which Mr. Frantz was 
20 represented by Owens & Crandall. The plaintiff argues that 
21 Mr. was not retained as co-counsel, nor did in any 
22 way act as an attorney to Mr. Frantz. Thus plaintiff argues 
23 no attorney-client relationship was ever formed. 
24 The defendants respond that Clark, even if 
25 initially hired as an expert witnesst became a consulting 
DV-13-7024-TLM Ictaho Independent Bank v. Martin Frantz 
Judge's Oral Ruling 
12/10/14 





At hearing Mr. Clark was and direct and 
5 credible in his testimony. He testified, and the Court finds 
6 and concludes that his role in the malpractice litigation was 
7 solely that of a testifying expert witness. In that capacity 
8 he prepared an affidavit, Exhibit 200, to which he attached 
9 his expert opinions. Within that report M:r. Clark listed all 
10 the information he reviewed and considered in forming his 
11 opinion, as would be required for expert disclosures. No 
12 confidential information was there listed. Indeed 1 Mr. Clark 
13 stated that he did not receive any confidential information 
14 while evaluating the malpractice case as a testifying e~pert 
15 witness in such case. 
16 Mr. Clark was also clear that not only did he not 
17 review confidential information, he discussed with Owens & 
1s
1 
Crandall the fact that any information provided to him would 
19 be subject to discovery by the State Court defendants and 
20 thus, obviously, should not be included in any of the 
21 information provided to him. Such a warning is consistent 
22 with the limited role of a testifying expert witness, not one 
23 as a retained attorney or as co-counsel. 
24 The defendants have placed a great deal of emphasis 
25 on the words, quote 1 "confidential and privileged," close 
DV-13-7024-TLM Idaho Independent Bank v. Martin Frantz 
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3 was quote, "as an witness to advice and 
4 testimony on subject of alleged professional 
5 malpractice,u close quote, as in Exhibit 200 at 9. 
6 Mr. Clark credibly testified the word, 
7 "advi was effect, as in advising Owens & Crandall what 
8 he would be able to testify to and what his opinion would 
9 be. Moreover the confidential and privileged nomenclature 
10 was intended, consistent with the rules that Mr. Clark and 
11 Owens & Crandall understood to reflect the fact that if they 
12 decided not to disclose him as a testifying expert witness; 
13 the report he created would not be subject to discovery. In 
14 this context and given the whole of the evidence about the 
15 retention and use of Mr. Clark by Owens & Crandall, the use 
16 of the term "confidential" does not and did not create an 
17 attorney-client relationship. 
18 The Court has also considered carefully the 
19 testimony of Ms. McCrea, one of Marty Frantz' State Court 
20 attorneys. She stated that Mr. Clark was hired as an expert 
21 to establish and later 
22 malpractice litigation. 
fy to the standard of care in 
23 While she testified that she asked Mr. Clark 
24 questions about damages, her testimony was not materially 
I 0 
25 inconsistent with Mr. Clark's; and the question of what sorts 
Idaho Independent Bank v_ Martin Frantz 





not ding any of the documents to her 3 
4! notes to Mr. she asserted that her questions 
sl for Mr. Clark were based on review of the depositions and 
6 the exhibits attached to those depositions. She did not 
7 testify that Mr. Clark provide advice beyond what Mr. Clark 
a himself testified to. He did not believe certain damages 
9 were available and he would not provide expert testimony on 
10 that aspect of the litigation. But again, such discussions 
11 would be consistent with an expert's analysis of the facts in 
12 defining the testimony the expert is willing to provide in 
13 the litigation and the opinion that 
14 report. 
would provide in his 
15 Ms. McCrea's testimony was responsive to 
16 questioning. I was impressed that she acted not as an 
17 advocate for the defendants 1 motion but as a percipient fact 
18 witness and she ~as careful and measured and clear in her 
19 testimony and in that way she was credible. Her testimony 
20 did not establish that Mr. Clark was a consulting expert, 
21 nor that he had entered into an attorney-client relationship 
22 with either her firm or with her firm's client. 
23 Marty Frantz testified as well. He testified as to 
24 the retention and use of Mr. Clark by his former malpractice 
251 lawyers s & Crandall. But his testimony in that 
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Ins was simply 
and expressing his opinion 
5 about its significance or its cons 
6 Whether it was volunteered from the witness stand 
7 or, more often than not 1 proffered in response to patently 
8 leading questions, it was not entitled to weight, even where 
9 arguably relevant. 
10 The Court concludes plaintiffs' analysis of the 
11 facts and the law is supported by the record. Mr. Clark was 
12 acting as a testifying expert witness only. As such, an 
14 basis to disqualify Hawley Troxell under IRPC 1.9 and 
15 defendants motion, Docket 55, will, therefore, be denied. 
16 Given this conclusion 1 the several other arguments 
17 advanced factually and legally about whether matters are 
18 substantially related under Rule 1.9 and similar sorts of 
19 debates simply need rrot be reached. 
20 I'll turn_next to the disqualification of Rand 
21 Wichman, Docket 59. 
22 The defendants that disqualification, arguing 
23 thet Wichman was previously defendant's hired expert and 
24 cannot now switch sides to provide expert testimony for the 
25 plaintiff. The evidence establishes that in 2006 Mr. Frantz 
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3 contractor Wichman s role to assist Marty Frantz his 
5 regulatory constraints and agency concerns," close quote, 
6 that were associated with the so-called Eagle Ridge at Twin 
7 Lakes Development. 
8 The agreement made no reference to or indication of 
9 confidentiality. The agreement contained an integration 
10 clause that required any modifications to be in writing and 
11 signed by both parties. There were no such other writings 
12 introduced. 
13 Mr. Wichman's role and his value was due to his 
14 long prior involvement with the regulatory side of 
15 development, including his work with the Kootenai County 
16 Planning and Development authorities. And it was in those 
17 regards that he provided advice and assistance. The 
18 defendants failed to establish that the scope and extent of 
19 Wichman's involvement went into the specific areas that he 
20 now evaluates as plaintiffs' expert. 
21 It's true that an expert may be disqualified when 
22 the expert switches sides to consult for the opposing party 
23 or is affiliated with experts for an opposing party. 
24 However, because an expert does not advocate during 
25 lit but acts as a source information and opinion, 
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3 One of the several cases on 
4 versus N-0-N-Y Life Insurance, 318 F.Supp. 




6 Another case that is relevant is Hewlett-Packard 
7 f_Qmpany versus EMC Coreoration, 330 F.Supp.2d 1087, from the 
8 Northern District of California in 2004., In the Hewlett 
9 Packard case the Court states, quote: 
10 "In switching sides cases, disqualification may be 










received from the original hiring party." Closed quote. 
In essence, quote, "disqualification of an expert 
is warranted based on a prior relationship with an 
adversary 
1) the adversary had a confidential 
relationship with the e~pert, and; 
2) the adversary disclosed confidenti 
information to the expert that is relevant to the 
current ligation." Closed quote. 
21 That again is from the Hewlett Packard case. 
22 The defendants here bear the burden of 
23 demonstrating both that a confidential relationship existed 
24 between Frantz and Wichman or that it was reasonable for them 
25 to believe that such a relationship existed. And to also 
NW TRANSCRIPTS 1 LLC - !DARO DIVISION 
P.O. Box 33, Issaquah, Washington 98027-0002 
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3 the Here as I' Mr , s 
4 agreement to provide services, Exhibit 216, signed by Mr. 
SI Frantz contained no confidentiality provision. Moreover 1 Mr. 
6 Wichman testified he didn't believe a confidential 
7 relationship existed and that he was not provided any 
8 confidential information. 
9 To be sure, Mr. Wichman admitted he held sensitive 
10 information. And Marty Frantz responded to questioning 
11 several times over emphasizing the wo:cd, "sensitive." 
12 And Marty Frantz's attorney on the Eagle Ridge 
13 project, Mr. Reagan, stated that certain of the strategies 
14 that were contemplated such as lot line adjustments we~e 
15 sensitive, at least in the sense that they could be 
16 compromised or made more difficult or expensive if they were 
17 learned of by regulators or by anti-development factions 
18 before Eagle Ridge was ready to effect the strategy. But 
19 sensitive is not generally synonymous with confidenti and 
20 it is certainly not synonymous in the legal sense that I'm 
21 required to evaluate. 
22 Mr. Wichman was under no obligation to guard such 
23 information from disclosure and the agreement, Exhibit 216, 
24 is totally silent as to any obligations or duties in regard 
25 to either sensitive or confidential information. 
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this same. 
4 The defendants were so required to, , "Point to 
5 speci and unambiguous disclosures that if revealed would 
6 prejudice the party.u Close quote. Again a quotation from 
7 Hewlett Packard. 
8 The defendants assert that Mr. Wichman was involved 
9 in numerous discussions with counsel for Eagle Ridge, Mr. 
10 Reagan, indeed he ~as. However 1 as the Court in the Hewlett 
11 Packard case noted, quote, "Discussions between parties or 
12 counsel and experts do not carry the presumpt that 
13 confidenti~l information was exchanged." Close quote. 
14 Mr. Reagan did not tell Mr. Wichman that any 
15 conversations they had were subject to the attorney-client 
16 privilege, nor did Mr. Reagan in his testimony identify any 
17 confidential disclosures that were provided. The defendants 
18 have failed to provide the specific disclosures and have 
19 failed to meet their burden. 
20 The defendants point to Mr. Wichman's attendance at 
21 several project meetings where they assert that project bids 
22 were discussed. However, the defendants did not identify 
23 specific information that would fall within the rules ambit. 
24 And when Mr. Wichman was questioned regarding those meetings, 
25 he credibly testi d that he did not recall bid amounts 
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1 3 of his 
4 Mr. Wichman's expert opinion for plaintiff deals 
5 with an analysis of the state of development at the 
6 various draw requests on the IIB credit facility were made, 
7 using those requests and the checking account records of 
8 Eagle Ridge. He testified credibly that even without his 
9 prior association with the Eagle Ridge Development he could 
10 have prepared that expert opinion. His prior association 
-·· 
11 provided some familiarity with the layout of the development1 
12 the project plan, that he could have developed the same 
13 knowledge for purposes of the expert opinion through 
14 inspection of the property and review of public records. 
15 While acting as an independent contractor for Mr. 
16 Frantz 1 Mr. Wichman did not prepare dra~ requests. Wichman 
17 did attempt to find the least expensive route to develop the 
18 property, but was not involved with procuring financing, 
19 budgeting for the project, or paying expenses. 
20 It's clear from the evidence that Mr. Wichman had 
21 not seen the draw requests or supporting materials until 
22 plaintiff provided them and it was these materials that 
23 Wichman analyzed in his expert report. 
24 Finally, I ~ould note that Wichman testified that 
25 he Mr. Frantz in 2011 to inform him that plaintiff 
--
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3 but that a good for to have 
4 Mr. Wichman educate the ainti and provide an accurate 
the development. 
That raises a couple of concerns, one of ~hich of 
course is the delay from 2011 in raising concerns over 







The other issue that it raises, concerns the nature 
of the information that Mr. Wichman could provide regarding 
the development. 
Mr. Frantz tes fied that he limited his approval 
13 of Wichman's involvement only to discussion of lot line 
14 adjustments. But I find Mr. Wichman's testimony of the 
15 discussions more credible. 
16 Frankly, if Mr. Frantz wanted to have his cake and 
17 eat it too, by o~ing Wichman to education IIB on the 
18 development but simultaneously restrict him from mentioning 
19 or commenting on other aspects of the development, a fine line 
20 to be sure, then Mr. Frantz was required to make that 
21 demarcation clear and unambiguous. He did not do so 1 nor is 
22 it clear that he would have had a right to do so and if it 
23 was a concern it is one that certainly ripened years ago. 
24 The defendants tried other avenues at hearing to 
25 convince Court that relevant confidential information was 
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3 of FN excuse me, FIN guarantees and ss Marty. 11 
4 Close quote. This is in Exhibit 217. The abbreviation of 
5 FIN means financial. 
6 This entry was rebutted by the testimony. Mr. 
7 Wichman explaining that it concerned not the financial 
8 guarantees that Mr. Frantz may have made to IIBr but instead 
9 deal with financial performance guarantees that Eagle Ridge 
10 had to make to and for the benefit of public entities. The 
11 reliance on this thin read was emblematic of the attempt of 
12 defendants to create an alleged role for Mr. Wichman and a 
13 suggestion of delivery or disclosure of so-called 
14 confidential information which simply wasn 1 t there. 
15 Based on the evidence presented I conclude there's 
16 no basis to disqualify Mr. Wichman as plaintiff's expert. 
17 The motion, Docket 59, will be denied. And because Wichman 
18 is not disqualified, the attendant motion to disqualify 
19 Hawley Troxell, based on the retention of Wichman, would also 
20 be and will also be denied. 
21 1 1 11 enter my own orders on the ruling today. 
22 Given the resolution of these motions, the trial 
23 needs to be reset. Given the Court's calendar, and this is 
24 unfortunate, the earliest that that may occur is April. 
25 I will ask the parties to provide Court with 
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3 cise, and to their unavailable dates to 
4 only settings and hearing settings of matters which are 
5 likely to go and which counsel may not utilize, substitute 
6 or co-counsel. I request and expect that the parties will 
7 provide their unavailable dates to me by the end of this week 
8 by looking at your calendars for next year. You submit them 
9 in the proper form in the adversary pleading by a submission 
10 and I will evaluate the same and will, thereafter, issue an 
11 amended pretrial order establishing briefing deadlines, which 
12 were previously abated. 
13 However, in establishing the de ines and issuing 
14 an amended,pretrial order, I will not be reopening discovery. 
15 I also will not allow for additional witnesses or exhibit 
16 disclosures beyond those that were previously required. 
17 I'm advised that the parties have disclosed their 
18 exhibits and their witnesses to one another. I believe that 
19 plaintiff has provided the original and required copies of 
20 trial exhibits to the Court. I'm not sure that the 
21 defendants have done so. But my pretrial order will 
22 establish a prompt deadline for both parties to have 
23 completed the process of delivery of their proposed exhibits 
24 to the Court so that we have· them available. 
25 My intent here should be quite , while there 
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's no more there's no more of 
4 witnesses 3nd exhibits, there's no more litigation. We're 
5 preparing for trial. 
6 I'll sue that order with the trial setting as 
7 soon as I can, after reviewing your unavailable dates. I 
8 will also get the order out on the two motions that! have 
9 resolved today. 
















MS. SCHWAGER: Thank you. 
MR. JONATHAN FRANTZ: Thanks. 
PROCEEDINGS CONCLUDED AT 2:27:16 P.M. 
* * * * * 
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UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT 
DISTRICT OF IDAHO 
INRE ) 
) 
MARTIN D. FRANTZ and ) CaseNo. 11-21337-TL:M 
CYNTHIA M. FRANTZ, ) 
) 
Debtors. ) Chapter7 
) 
) 
IDAHO INDEPENDENT BANK, ) 
) 
Plaintiff, ) 
v. ) Adv. No. 13-07024-TLM 
) 
MARTJN D. FRANTZ and ) 




ORDER DENYING MOTIONS TO DISQUALIFY 
Based on the ruling entered orally this date and good cause appearing, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants' motion to disqualify 
Plaintiffs counsel, Bawley Troxell Ennis and Hawley, Doc. No. 55, and 
Defendants' motion to disqualify Plaintiff's expert, Rand Wichman, Doc. No. 59, 
areDENIBD. 
DATED: Pecember 9, 2014 
,vJ 
•- • •• • • ••• -.- , .t-,1\-",•"• ·-- u ,..,, __ .._ ,_,._, • ,.,, • ~ 
TERRY L. MYERS · . 
CHIEF U. S. BANKRUPTCY JUDGE 
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05 015 4·56 FAX PAINE HAMBLEN 
PAINE HAMBLEN 
717 West Sprague Avenue Suite 1200 
Spokane, Washington 99201-3505 
Telephone: (509) 455-6000 
Facsimile: (509) 838-0007 
:.: fAIE OF CWiO } 
COLINT'f OF KOOTENAJ 
=1t.m 
15 
Attorney for Defendant Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley LLP 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 




HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY 
LLP, an Idaho Limited Liability Partnership, 
Defendant. 
) 
) Case No. CV15-1406 
) 
) 
) MOTION TO DISMISS OR ABATE 
) (I.R.C.P. 12(B)(8)) 
) 




COMES NOW, Defendant Hawley TroxelJ Ennis & Hawley, ("Hawley Troxell") by and 
through their attorney of record, John C. Riseborough of Paine Hamblen LLP, and move this 
court for an Order of Dismissal. This motion is based on LR.C.P. 12(b)(8), the Memorandum of 
Authorities in Support of Dismissal or Abatement, Affidavit of John C. Riseborough, attached 
exhibits and the pleadings and records filed herein. 
DATED this 1 day of __ ,,,,_/1=--V-----~' 2015. 
I 
C. Riseborough, ISB #7898 
Attorneys for Defendant 






PAINE HAMBLEN LLP 
OF SERVICE 
Jonathon Frantz 
Frantz Law, PLLC 
307 N. Lincoln St. Suite A 
Post Fails, Idaho 83815 
Theresa Henry 
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